Cooption And Coercion Research Paper
Cooption and Coercion
Numerous ways exist to describe the people of the Middle East. One can describe a people by their ethnicity, religion or sect, tribe, class, gender, and so forth. These descriptors give one a sense of identity, and the identities of the people of the Middle East have played a critical role in the politics of the region. Especially in the cases of ethnic and religious differences, Middle Eastern regimes seek to overcome those differences, not for the sake of social harmony, but for the stability of the regime. Two methods exist for regimes to deal with ethnic and sectarian challenges in their country: cooption and coercion. The former integrates members of minority groups into the government to prevent or resolve ethnic or sectarian challenges; the latter uses force and manipulation to repress actions by minority groups which could threaten the governing legitimacy of the incumbent regime. Throughout the modern history of the Middle East, regimes have used both methods to quell challenges arising from the …show more content…
differences among the state’s people, often using a combination of the two at the same time. However, of the two coercion has proven the most effective method in suppressing challenges arising primarily from ethnic and sectarian differences.
First, we must determine what exactly constitutes a minority. One most often describes a minority group as a group smaller in size than the group constituting the majority in terms of ethnicity, religion, class, or any other demographic descriptor (Bengio 17). For example, Shias are a minority sect in the Middle East as their numbers are fewer than that of the Sunnis, the majority sect among Muslims in the Middle East. Notably, one can belong to a minority group in regards to one aspect of the person’s identity, while being a member of a majority group in regards to another (Butenschon 4). In Syria, the Alawites, whose members include the ruling Assad family, are of the majority Arabic population but are a religious minority. Likewise, in Iraq, a Sunni Arab enjoys majority status as an Arab, but remains a minority in regards to his sect, as Iraq is majority Shia. In this way, identities interact with each other in ways that can create unique political dynamics in a state.
In addition to numerical minorities, a group may be considered a cultural minority.
Cultural minorities are less able to influence the politics of the state as much as another group, even though they may have greater numbers than another group. This was the case in Iraq before the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, when the Sunni-led Baathists ruled the country even though their numbers were fewer than that of Shias in the country. While the Sunnis are a numerical minority, the Shias constituted a cultural minority, as their influence over state affairs was largely limited. After the ouster, the new Iraqi government became Shia-controlled, making the Sunnis a cultural minority as well a numerical minority in Iraq (Haddad 39). Syria is another example of a state controlled by a cultural minority, as members of the Alawite sect control the regime governing the state, though they make up only a small proportion of the population (Bengio
198).
Moving forward in our discussion on cooption versus coercion, we find that throughout the Middle East, regimes have used both tactics to control conflicts between members of one identity group and another identity group, often the group which controls the political machinery of the state. A regime uses cooption when it integrates members or ideals of one group in its government. In undertaking cooption, the regime hopes to appease some of the concerns of the minority group, whether numerical or solely cultural, and prevent conflict or reduce conflict if already present. We see this method used in Egypt, in which the government, controlled by Arab Muslims, would integrate Egyptian Coptic Christians into political society (Bengio 198). At ten percent of the population, any large-scale uprising by the Coptic population would undoubtedly lead to mass disturbances in the nation’s political and economic functioning. Through incorporating the Copts into Egyptian governing society, the government aimed to continue smooth functioning of the state, thus preserving the regime’s hold on the state.
Of note, Egyptian political leadership has not allowed Copts to reach the highest levels of government, instead relegating them to smaller roles within Egypt’s political apparatus (Bengio 198). This casts doubt on the effectiveness of cooption in fully integrating members of minority groups into the politics of a state. In addition, it acts as evidence that regimes use cooption solely for the benefit of preserving regime stability, as Copts are often effectively tokens in their selection for government posts as their ability to advance to the highest levels remains limited to non-existent.
When a regime practices coercion, as opposed to cooption, it takes actions to restrict minority participation, reducing or removing their political and societal influence (Bengio 196). As Butenschon writes, “The state commands monopolistic control over coercive means within its jurisdiction” (Butenschon 13), endowing the state with an indispensable tool to quell ethnic and sectarian challenges. A regime can accomplish this in different ways, from actively promoting the interests of the majority group over the minority group, restricting political rights of minority groups, and using threats of or even perpetrating violence against minority groups. If successful, these policies can prove effective in suppressing further conflict and preserving the regime. As we will see in the case of Iraq, the Baathist regime often used coercive methods to help prevent minority groups from taking further power from the regime.
To examine the effectiveness of cooption versus coercion, we examine the case of Iraq, which, as mentioned before, contained in the pre-2003 era a dominant minority (in regards to religion) and a majority (again in regards to religion) which did not have control of the central government in Baghdad. Prior to Hussein’s ouster, Sunni Arabs controlled the central government through the ruling Baathist Party, and with this the state seemed to favor Sunni traditions and heritage more than those of Shias (Haddad 42-43). Tensions between the two groups came to a head in 1991 with the Shia intifada, or uprising, with Shia groups fighting against the Baathist regime (Bengio 160).
The uprising, however, failed to create any major positive change for the Shias; rather it led the Iraqi government to take a more hardline approach with the Shia population in southern Iraq. The Iraqi regime took steps such as establishing a heavy military presence (despite Western opposition) and draining the marshes in which many Shia militants resided, making military operations in the region easier for the regime. Bengio cites these actions as evidence for success of the coercion method in dealing with ethnic and sectarian challenges, writing that the marsh draining removed allowed the regime to successfully establish a presence in the region and the military presence in the region reduced Shia rebels to “sporadic operations against government troops and personalities” (Bengio 162). Using coercive powers of the state, the Iraqi government effectively reduced the formerly serious uprising to small pockets of resistance with the Shia militants strongly disadvantaged. This is not to say the Iraqi government did not use some cooption in their attempts to pacify the Shia population. The Hussein regime forged alliances with Shia tribal leaders, attempting to draw them closer to the government in hopes of preventing further Shia uprisings, rather than allowing Shia religious leaders, many of whom vigorously opposed the government, to influence them. This, however, did lead to intertribal conflict, which at times required the regime to intervene, lest it destabilize the state (Bengio 163). In addition, the regime attempted to appeal to a broader sense of Arab and Muslim identity after the uprising, in hopes of reducing the perceived wedge between Sunnis and Shias (Bengio 164). Given the Shias’ resistance to appeals to pan-Arabism and to broad appeals (Haddad 38), its effectiveness was questionable. While the regime used these methods of cooption as attempts to keep the peace in the region, the coercive techniques used by the regime were principal in establishing a sense of stability in the southern Iraq following the 1991 uprising. Iraqi Kurds also have sought more freedom and involvement in state affairs throughout the history of the state. In 1970, amid weakness of the Baath regime, the government granted Kurdish autonomy. This victory was short-lived, and once the regime gained enough power, the Baathists ended Kurdish autonomy “through a combination of military force and political overtures toward the Kurds’ main backer at the time, Iran” (Bengio 153). Through manipulating the Kurds’ foreign backer and suppressing dissent in the region through force, the Baathists reestablished their control over the region, ending any illusion of granting autonomy for a higher moral reason. However, as Bengio notes, the granting of Kurdish autonomy, while limited in duration, provided the Kurds a stronger sense of identity while providing them a template for future governance should autonomy be achieved again. Autonomy was indeed granted once more, twenty years later, following the Gulf War and the 1991 Kurdish uprising, the latter of which was crushed by Hussein’s forces. Interestingly, coercive techniques led to the second granting of Kurdish autonomy, with Western powers pushing it following Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War (Bengio 153). Because of international forces preventing the Baathists from forcibly repressing dissent in Iraqi Kurdistan, the state was left without its most potent method of suppressing ethnic challenges, coercion. With this, Iraq’s Kurdish population became more independent from the government in Baghdad, increasing the power of Kurdish government while reducing the power of the Iraqi regime.
Numerous ways exist to describe the people of the Middle East. One can describe a people by their ethnicity, religion or sect, tribe, class, gender, and so forth. These descriptors give one a sense of identity, and the identities of the people of the Middle East have played a critical role in the politics of the region. Especially in the cases of ethnic and religious differences, Middle Eastern regimes seek to overcome those differences, not for the sake of social harmony, but for the stability of the regime. Two methods exist for regimes to deal with ethnic and sectarian challenges in their country: cooption and coercion. The former integrates members of minority groups into the government to prevent or resolve ethnic or sectarian challenges; the latter uses force and manipulation to repress actions by minority groups which could threaten the governing legitimacy of the incumbent regime. Throughout the modern history of the Middle East, regimes have used both methods to quell challenges arising from the …show more content…
differences among the state’s people, often using a combination of the two at the same time. However, of the two coercion has proven the most effective method in suppressing challenges arising primarily from ethnic and sectarian differences.
First, we must determine what exactly constitutes a minority. One most often describes a minority group as a group smaller in size than the group constituting the majority in terms of ethnicity, religion, class, or any other demographic descriptor (Bengio 17). For example, Shias are a minority sect in the Middle East as their numbers are fewer than that of the Sunnis, the majority sect among Muslims in the Middle East. Notably, one can belong to a minority group in regards to one aspect of the person’s identity, while being a member of a majority group in regards to another (Butenschon 4). In Syria, the Alawites, whose members include the ruling Assad family, are of the majority Arabic population but are a religious minority. Likewise, in Iraq, a Sunni Arab enjoys majority status as an Arab, but remains a minority in regards to his sect, as Iraq is majority Shia. In this way, identities interact with each other in ways that can create unique political dynamics in a state.
In addition to numerical minorities, a group may be considered a cultural minority.
Cultural minorities are less able to influence the politics of the state as much as another group, even though they may have greater numbers than another group. This was the case in Iraq before the ouster of Saddam Hussein in 2003, when the Sunni-led Baathists ruled the country even though their numbers were fewer than that of Shias in the country. While the Sunnis are a numerical minority, the Shias constituted a cultural minority, as their influence over state affairs was largely limited. After the ouster, the new Iraqi government became Shia-controlled, making the Sunnis a cultural minority as well a numerical minority in Iraq (Haddad 39). Syria is another example of a state controlled by a cultural minority, as members of the Alawite sect control the regime governing the state, though they make up only a small proportion of the population (Bengio
198).
Moving forward in our discussion on cooption versus coercion, we find that throughout the Middle East, regimes have used both tactics to control conflicts between members of one identity group and another identity group, often the group which controls the political machinery of the state. A regime uses cooption when it integrates members or ideals of one group in its government. In undertaking cooption, the regime hopes to appease some of the concerns of the minority group, whether numerical or solely cultural, and prevent conflict or reduce conflict if already present. We see this method used in Egypt, in which the government, controlled by Arab Muslims, would integrate Egyptian Coptic Christians into political society (Bengio 198). At ten percent of the population, any large-scale uprising by the Coptic population would undoubtedly lead to mass disturbances in the nation’s political and economic functioning. Through incorporating the Copts into Egyptian governing society, the government aimed to continue smooth functioning of the state, thus preserving the regime’s hold on the state.
Of note, Egyptian political leadership has not allowed Copts to reach the highest levels of government, instead relegating them to smaller roles within Egypt’s political apparatus (Bengio 198). This casts doubt on the effectiveness of cooption in fully integrating members of minority groups into the politics of a state. In addition, it acts as evidence that regimes use cooption solely for the benefit of preserving regime stability, as Copts are often effectively tokens in their selection for government posts as their ability to advance to the highest levels remains limited to non-existent.
When a regime practices coercion, as opposed to cooption, it takes actions to restrict minority participation, reducing or removing their political and societal influence (Bengio 196). As Butenschon writes, “The state commands monopolistic control over coercive means within its jurisdiction” (Butenschon 13), endowing the state with an indispensable tool to quell ethnic and sectarian challenges. A regime can accomplish this in different ways, from actively promoting the interests of the majority group over the minority group, restricting political rights of minority groups, and using threats of or even perpetrating violence against minority groups. If successful, these policies can prove effective in suppressing further conflict and preserving the regime. As we will see in the case of Iraq, the Baathist regime often used coercive methods to help prevent minority groups from taking further power from the regime.
To examine the effectiveness of cooption versus coercion, we examine the case of Iraq, which, as mentioned before, contained in the pre-2003 era a dominant minority (in regards to religion) and a majority (again in regards to religion) which did not have control of the central government in Baghdad. Prior to Hussein’s ouster, Sunni Arabs controlled the central government through the ruling Baathist Party, and with this the state seemed to favor Sunni traditions and heritage more than those of Shias (Haddad 42-43). Tensions between the two groups came to a head in 1991 with the Shia intifada, or uprising, with Shia groups fighting against the Baathist regime (Bengio 160).
The uprising, however, failed to create any major positive change for the Shias; rather it led the Iraqi government to take a more hardline approach with the Shia population in southern Iraq. The Iraqi regime took steps such as establishing a heavy military presence (despite Western opposition) and draining the marshes in which many Shia militants resided, making military operations in the region easier for the regime. Bengio cites these actions as evidence for success of the coercion method in dealing with ethnic and sectarian challenges, writing that the marsh draining removed allowed the regime to successfully establish a presence in the region and the military presence in the region reduced Shia rebels to “sporadic operations against government troops and personalities” (Bengio 162). Using coercive powers of the state, the Iraqi government effectively reduced the formerly serious uprising to small pockets of resistance with the Shia militants strongly disadvantaged. This is not to say the Iraqi government did not use some cooption in their attempts to pacify the Shia population. The Hussein regime forged alliances with Shia tribal leaders, attempting to draw them closer to the government in hopes of preventing further Shia uprisings, rather than allowing Shia religious leaders, many of whom vigorously opposed the government, to influence them. This, however, did lead to intertribal conflict, which at times required the regime to intervene, lest it destabilize the state (Bengio 163). In addition, the regime attempted to appeal to a broader sense of Arab and Muslim identity after the uprising, in hopes of reducing the perceived wedge between Sunnis and Shias (Bengio 164). Given the Shias’ resistance to appeals to pan-Arabism and to broad appeals (Haddad 38), its effectiveness was questionable. While the regime used these methods of cooption as attempts to keep the peace in the region, the coercive techniques used by the regime were principal in establishing a sense of stability in the southern Iraq following the 1991 uprising. Iraqi Kurds also have sought more freedom and involvement in state affairs throughout the history of the state. In 1970, amid weakness of the Baath regime, the government granted Kurdish autonomy. This victory was short-lived, and once the regime gained enough power, the Baathists ended Kurdish autonomy “through a combination of military force and political overtures toward the Kurds’ main backer at the time, Iran” (Bengio 153). Through manipulating the Kurds’ foreign backer and suppressing dissent in the region through force, the Baathists reestablished their control over the region, ending any illusion of granting autonomy for a higher moral reason. However, as Bengio notes, the granting of Kurdish autonomy, while limited in duration, provided the Kurds a stronger sense of identity while providing them a template for future governance should autonomy be achieved again. Autonomy was indeed granted once more, twenty years later, following the Gulf War and the 1991 Kurdish uprising, the latter of which was crushed by Hussein’s forces. Interestingly, coercive techniques led to the second granting of Kurdish autonomy, with Western powers pushing it following Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War (Bengio 153). Because of international forces preventing the Baathists from forcibly repressing dissent in Iraqi Kurdistan, the state was left without its most potent method of suppressing ethnic challenges, coercion. With this, Iraq’s Kurdish population became more independent from the government in Baghdad, increasing the power of Kurdish government while reducing the power of the Iraqi regime.