Introduction
1.1 Corporate Governance:
Corporate governance is a combination of corporate policies and best practices adopted by the corporate bodies to achieve its objectives in relation to their stakeholders. It is also the field of economics, which studies the many issues arising from the separation from ownership and control. The fundamental objective of corporate governance reforms is to enhance transparency and transparency enhances accountability. It is widely recognized that transparency enhances trust among the major players within the governance framework. Various definitions and principles have been introduced to stabilize the corporate governance among corporate entities. The Main Objectives of corporate governance is: * To promote a healthy environment of investment * To create a trust in a corporate and in its abilities * To promote business sustainability and risk minimization * To improve the efficiency of the capital market * To enhance effectiveness in the service of real economy
Recently the terms "governance" and "good governance" are being increasingly used in information disseminated by various organizations. Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies. Major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and loans on the condition that reforms that ensure "good governance" are undertaken.
Simply put "governance" means: the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as corporate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance. Since governance is the process of decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented, an analysis of governance focuses on the formal and informal actors involved in decision-making and implementing the decisions made and the formal
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