Could A Machine Be Conscious
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Could a machine be conscious?
This question is often dismissed as simple by those that would say “yes” in response. The usual claim made by the pro camp is that man is a ‘biological machine’ and is conscious, ergo, a machine is conscious. If we, humans, are truly biological machines and we are at the same time conscious then I would agree that yes, categorically, a machine could be conscious. But is it really that simple? I contend that it is a more difficult problem but not that it is a complicated one, merely one of ambiguity which, once resolved, leads the contemplator to the same conclusion as I do that in fact, no, a machine could not be conscious. I propose that those who argue the yes case that a machine can be conscious are, in truth, claiming that a machine can be aware, and I say that the terms are not synonymous. I will address this indistinctness by examining the multiple meanings allocated to consciousness and by proposing the adoption of what I describe as a ‘pure’ singular meaning, thus negating this issue of identity crisis and placing consciousness in the correct category, that of a non physical one. This resolution does not however refute the contention that man is a conscious machine and I will therefore necessarily talk to what I deem as the over encompassing characterisation of machine. As with consciousness I will streamline the definition of machine, thereby enabling a clearer understanding of what I think comprises the true qualities of a machine, and that neither man, nor any living sentient being of natural origin, despite being conscious, should be deemed as such.
The current abstruseness in the definition of consciousness is represented most clearly as the ‘easy problems’ versus the ‘hard problems’ (Chalmers, 1996). The ‘easy problems’ relate to those which science can get to grips with, and it is important to assess what qualities they possess as it leads to an understanding of where the overlap between the qualities of machinery and
Could a machine be conscious?
This question is often dismissed as simple by those that would say “yes” in response. The usual claim made by the pro camp is that man is a ‘biological machine’ and is conscious, ergo, a machine is conscious. If we, humans, are truly biological machines and we are at the same time conscious then I would agree that yes, categorically, a machine could be conscious. But is it really that simple? I contend that it is a more difficult problem but not that it is a complicated one, merely one of ambiguity which, once resolved, leads the contemplator to the same conclusion as I do that in fact, no, a machine could not be conscious. I propose that those who argue the yes case that a machine can be conscious are, in truth, claiming that a machine can be aware, and I say that the terms are not synonymous. I will address this indistinctness by examining the multiple meanings allocated to consciousness and by proposing the adoption of what I describe as a ‘pure’ singular meaning, thus negating this issue of identity crisis and placing consciousness in the correct category, that of a non physical one. This resolution does not however refute the contention that man is a conscious machine and I will therefore necessarily talk to what I deem as the over encompassing characterisation of machine. As with consciousness I will streamline the definition of machine, thereby enabling a clearer understanding of what I think comprises the true qualities of a machine, and that neither man, nor any living sentient being of natural origin, despite being conscious, should be deemed as such.
The current abstruseness in the definition of consciousness is represented most clearly as the ‘easy problems’ versus the ‘hard problems’ (Chalmers, 1996). The ‘easy problems’ relate to those which science can get to grips with, and it is important to assess what qualities they possess as it leads to an understanding of where the overlap between the qualities of machinery and
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