Essentialism argues that there are ‘real’ and categorical sexualities in the world and that each of these sexualities can be described definitively according to a set of characteristics or properties, e.g. a man that has sexual intercourse with another man fits the category of homosexual (Hammack, 2005). This conceptualises sexuality in terms of ‘sexual orientation’, assuming that no sexual orientation; whether homosexual, heterosexual or bisexual; is a conscious choice (Gonsiorek & Weinrich, 1991) and is instead a “fixed, independent biological mechanism that steers individual desire or behaviour either toward men or toward women irrespective of circumstances and experience” (DeCecco & Elia, 1993a, p. 11).
Essentialism relies on the assumption that there are underlying essences (homosexuality and heterosexuality), that these essences are two distinct categories, and that they are the same today as they were centuries ago (Delamater & Shibley Hyde, 1998). This is evident within essentialist research as it ignores the meanings people give to their sexualities and attempts to classify them within this dichotomous heterosexual/homosexual model (Clarke, Ellis, Peel, & Riggs, 2010). An example of this is the existence of intersex individuals (Kessler, 1998). Kessler (1998) criticises essentialism arguing that rather than treating the existence of intersex people as a sign that there are more than two natural sexes, the bodies of intersex infants are altered in line with the two-sex model in order to maintain that model as a natural fact.
There are several variations of essentialism including the biological approach, the sociobiological approach and the psychoanalytical approach; all of which view homosexuality as an anomaly (DeCecco & Elia, 1995). The biological approach assumes sexuality is innate and is primarily concerned with gonads, hormones, brain function and physiological