Deontological Constraints

The main argument concealed in this statement is that of utilitarianism demanding too much from us when considering topics such as murdering to lessen murder. It is paradoxical to disagree with something yet use that very objectionable act to minimise the number of the same objectionable act.
I will try and dismantle this tug-of-war—between what one ought or ought not to do—by reflecting on the doctrine of deontological constraints and conclude with an un-demanding finale of how one’s ethics (thereby my agreement with deontological constraints) do not provide basis for all ethics (and every person’s ethics), merely a motivation to thoroughly analyse thought-experiments which question our very morals.

The paradox arises when we take into account
Even if imposition of deontological constraints aren’t the answer, murdering to prevent murder is a double effect that cannot be formatted as “Good”. For example, let me bring up a separate account of murder to minimise murder scenario: a murderer is caught and sentenced to capital death to prevent more murders done by him. Is this okay? Instinctively one may say yes, and in the world we live in, acts of the same nature happen frequently. According to deontological constraints though, this man shouldn’t be given the death penalty, as it punishes the crime-doing with the crime itself; what sort of a world should one want to live in: one that abides by one’s personal moral judgements, or one that imposes objective and restrictive clauses? Perhaps moral claims such as “murder is bad,” rather than being ‘objects’ in the real world, are simply secondary qualities, susceptible to human sentiment. Although I thoroughly believe in the humaneness of deontological constraints, I’m easily susceptible to circumstantiality, for instance if I needed to defend myself (otherwise I’d die), or if in the situation that I must prioritize the life of my sister over that of a stranger. Although hypothetical scenarios, there is a guilt in admitting this—thereby
It wasn’t important anymore whether the bad man deserved punishment, but how the victim’s friends and relatives dealt with the situation at hand. Of course some wished his death, but the mother’s dose of human kindness surprised me and is what compels me to argue deontological constraints. I believe it to be something quite cruel in human nature to turn the punishment of death into a justice, and therefore the question isn’t any more on the act of murder, but situation based morality. Another point I’d like to add is that of the Murder Act (UK’s abolition of the death penalty act) in 1965; under the convention of Human Rights, Nozick’s idea of distinctiveness of persons is re-applied, proving that humanity must have internalised the concept that murder does not minimise