Descartes Argument Analysis

Upon Hobbes reading of Descartes proposition “I am thing that thinks, that is a mind, soul, understanding or reason (Ibid, 2000); he draws a conundrum with the latter part of Descartes proposition namely ‘that is a mind, soul, understanding or reason’ (Ibid, 2000); conceiving it to be erroneous; for it ostensibly reads ‘I am thinking, therefore I am a thought’. This is condemned by Hobbes as a spurious argument for it does not seem logical to say a thinking thing equates its faculty of thinking. Nor is it logical to say ‘I understand, therefore I am an understanding’ (Ibid, 2000). Surely rather from Hobbes' point of view, it is efficacious to contend ‘I am thinking’ is reciprocal to the association of human; thus the latter part of the propositional
syllogism should read: that is human, matter, body etc. This refutation of Descartes rationalisation is heightened with the juxta-positional physical act of walking, where he affirms that he could just as well say “I am walking, therefore I am walking’ Ibid,2000).
He appends that there is a disparity between the subject and its faculties and acts, which is to put it precisely that is between the subject and its essences and properties, for a being is itself one thing and essences is another (Ibid, 2000). Thus it is possible for a thing that thinks to be subject; in which the mind and soul act as the circumference for this act. The mystery of ‘I’ in ‘I know I exist proposition (Ibid, 2000) is the audacious task Hobbe assigns himself, he confers that since it is unimaginable for an act to be conducted without it’s subject; such as leaping without one who leaps, knowing without one who knows and thinking without one who thinks. It follows that it is prescient that the thinking thing in question is something
monolithic. Accordingly, it is plausible for the subject to be understood from the viewpoint of something corporeal, he immerses Descartes wax argument to consolidate this conclusion. His discourse on this, is that despite the colour, hardness and shape undergoing transformation, the wax more or less is the same substance underneath that façade of change.
Conversely to Hobbes somewhat monism doctrine, Descartes attempts to scrutinise this insufficient and put the reader in a position of contemplation over this. Formerly, Descartes attempts to disambiguate Hobbes absurdity from his reading of his proposition, by contending imperatively that he is not attempting to draw an identical affinity between a subject engaging in thought and the faculty of thinking, rather the usage of the ‘mind, soul, understanding and reason’ (Ibid,2000); is an employment of the elements encompassing thinking. Furthermore, he confutes that substance involved in the act of thinking should be considered from the perspective of the body; deploring Hobbes heavy usage of concrete terminology ‘subject, matter and body’ (Ibid, 2000). This is perhaps the most part of Descartes reply where he is most vitriolic about Hobbes objection undermining it to be idiosyncratic, relying on a supposition. He contends that the nature of the act of thinking is of a different entirety to act denoting material
element. The two realms of the human have a contrasting relationship and thus it is improper to draw a relationship between the two. He furthermore contradicts reference of the wax argument as extraneous; having no affiliation with the subject of understanding the nature of substances; and thus rendered as a misinterpretation on Hobbes account for he proved that the only derived from the wax argument was that the colour etc didn’t affiliate to essence of the wax.