Divestiture Isues And Concerns
PAPANDROPOULOS AND TAJANA: THE MERGER REMEDIES STUDY—IN DIVESTITURE WE TRUST?: [2006] E.C.L.R. 443
The Merger Remedies
Study—In Divestiture
We Trust?
Penelope Papandropoulos and
Alessandro Tajana*
[Keywords to Follow]
1. Introduction
In October 2005, DG Competition published a detailed ex-post assessment of merger remedies adopted in 40 cleared mergers over the period 1996 to 2000 (hereafter,
‘‘the study’’).1 It is the first review of this kind by competition authorities in Europe,2 and it was published amid international discussions between authorities about the design, implementation and effectiveness of merger remedies.3 A similar study, albeit solely related
* Penelope Papandropoulos, CRA International, Brussels
(ppapandropoulos@crai.com); Alessandro Tajana, Linklaters,
Brussels (alessandro.tajana@linklaters.com). Alessandro Tajana thanks Paul McGeown, Tom Snels and Johan Ysewyn for their valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 ‘‘Merger Remedy Study’’, DG Competition, October 2005 (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/mergers/others/remedies study.pdf ). See also A. Kopke,
‘‘Merger Remedies Study’’ (2005) Competition Policy Newsletter, autumn, p.3.
2 Last year the UK Competition Authorities published a study on the ex-post assessment of merger decisions but the focus of the review was on the accuracy of market analysis undertaken during investigations. See Joint Report of the Office of Fair
Trading, Department of Trade and Industry and the Competition
Commission, ‘‘Ex-post Evaluation of Mergers’’, published in
March 2005.
3 Indeed, merger remedies are currently on the agenda of competition authorities and international agencies. The
Canadian Bureau of Competition is reviewing its policy on merger remedies (see draft Information Bulletin on Merger
Remedies in Canada, October 2005). Merger remedies have been the object of an in-depth analysis by the OECD, ‘‘Merger
Remedies’’, DAF/COMP (2004) 21, and at the ICN, ‘‘Merger
The Merger Remedies
Study—In Divestiture
We Trust?
Penelope Papandropoulos and
Alessandro Tajana*
[Keywords to Follow]
1. Introduction
In October 2005, DG Competition published a detailed ex-post assessment of merger remedies adopted in 40 cleared mergers over the period 1996 to 2000 (hereafter,
‘‘the study’’).1 It is the first review of this kind by competition authorities in Europe,2 and it was published amid international discussions between authorities about the design, implementation and effectiveness of merger remedies.3 A similar study, albeit solely related
* Penelope Papandropoulos, CRA International, Brussels
(ppapandropoulos@crai.com); Alessandro Tajana, Linklaters,
Brussels (alessandro.tajana@linklaters.com). Alessandro Tajana thanks Paul McGeown, Tom Snels and Johan Ysewyn for their valuable comments and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply.
1 ‘‘Merger Remedy Study’’, DG Competition, October 2005 (available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition
/mergers/others/remedies study.pdf ). See also A. Kopke,
‘‘Merger Remedies Study’’ (2005) Competition Policy Newsletter, autumn, p.3.
2 Last year the UK Competition Authorities published a study on the ex-post assessment of merger decisions but the focus of the review was on the accuracy of market analysis undertaken during investigations. See Joint Report of the Office of Fair
Trading, Department of Trade and Industry and the Competition
Commission, ‘‘Ex-post Evaluation of Mergers’’, published in
March 2005.
3 Indeed, merger remedies are currently on the agenda of competition authorities and international agencies. The
Canadian Bureau of Competition is reviewing its policy on merger remedies (see draft Information Bulletin on Merger
Remedies in Canada, October 2005). Merger remedies have been the object of an in-depth analysis by the OECD, ‘‘Merger
Remedies’’, DAF/COMP (2004) 21, and at the ICN, ‘‘Merger