Divided We Govern
Divided We Govern
Mayhew’s Thesis: “Divided government, which the separation of powers produces, works as well as unified government that party discipline would create.”
First Question: “Even if important laws win enactment just as often under conditions of divided party control, might they not be worse than laws? Isn’t “seriously defective legislation” a likelier result?”
Mayhew’s Answer: “That is sometimes alleged, and if true it would obviously count heavily. Enacting coalitions under divided control, being composed of elements not “naturally” united on policy goals, might be less apt to write either clear ends or efficient means into their statutes. Such coalitions, absolved from unambiguous “party government” checks by the electorate down the line, might worry less about the actual effects of laws.”
Second Question: “Even if important individual statutes can win enactment regardless of conditions of party control, how about programmatic “coherence” across statutes? Isn’t that a likelier outcome under unified party control?”
Mayhew’s Answer: “One’s first response is to note that “coherence” exists in the eye of the beholders, that beholders differ in what they see, and in any event, why is “coherence” necessary or desirable? Democracy, according to some leading models, can function well enough as an assortment of decentralized, unconnected incursions into public affairs.” Widespread agreement exists about two patterns of coherence, ideological and budgetary. A system needs to allow ideological packaging “to permit broad ranging change of the sort recommended by ideologies and to provide a graspable politics to sectors of the public who might be interested in such change.”
Example: “The postwar American system has accommodated it (ideological packaging) under circumstances of both unified and divided party control---notably in the successfully enacted presidential programs of Johnson and Reagan, and in the liberal legislative surge of 1963 through
Mayhew’s Thesis: “Divided government, which the separation of powers produces, works as well as unified government that party discipline would create.”
First Question: “Even if important laws win enactment just as often under conditions of divided party control, might they not be worse than laws? Isn’t “seriously defective legislation” a likelier result?”
Mayhew’s Answer: “That is sometimes alleged, and if true it would obviously count heavily. Enacting coalitions under divided control, being composed of elements not “naturally” united on policy goals, might be less apt to write either clear ends or efficient means into their statutes. Such coalitions, absolved from unambiguous “party government” checks by the electorate down the line, might worry less about the actual effects of laws.”
Second Question: “Even if important individual statutes can win enactment regardless of conditions of party control, how about programmatic “coherence” across statutes? Isn’t that a likelier outcome under unified party control?”
Mayhew’s Answer: “One’s first response is to note that “coherence” exists in the eye of the beholders, that beholders differ in what they see, and in any event, why is “coherence” necessary or desirable? Democracy, according to some leading models, can function well enough as an assortment of decentralized, unconnected incursions into public affairs.” Widespread agreement exists about two patterns of coherence, ideological and budgetary. A system needs to allow ideological packaging “to permit broad ranging change of the sort recommended by ideologies and to provide a graspable politics to sectors of the public who might be interested in such change.”
Example: “The postwar American system has accommodated it (ideological packaging) under circumstances of both unified and divided party control---notably in the successfully enacted presidential programs of Johnson and Reagan, and in the liberal legislative surge of 1963 through