Essay On The Blitzkrieg
HISTORY IA
HL
CANDIDATE NAME: ANISH PURI
CANDIDATE SESSION: 003157-0053
RQ: To what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2 ?
Section A
Plan of Investigation
RQ: To what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2.
The focus of this study is to discuss to what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2? The interest in this topic has arisen from study in Modern German military tactics specifically focused on World War 2. The 2 sources that I shall use in this study are as follows; The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 by Robert M. Citino and Blitzkrieg in Retrospect by Newland, Samuel J., Military Review
The first source supports the view that the Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the German Victory over Poland and gives us an in-depth analysis to its path and implementation. In contrast the second source Reviews the Blitzkrieg and asserts that the Blitzkrieg was not the main reason …show more content…
for Germany’s victories.
Word Count: 156
Section B
Summary of Evidence
1. "Film footage of German victories during the opening phases of World War II in Europe brings to mind a term synonymous with German successes--blitzkrieg. This word might be one of the most used and abused terms from the war, and after 60 years, it is still often misunderstood even by professional military officers."1
2. " 'Blitzkrieg ' combines two German words, one means 'lightning, ' the other means 'war, ' and should probably be regarded as a catchword. Commander in Chief of the German Army Hans von Seeckt was likely correct when he stated, 'Catchwords ... are necessary for those who are unable to think for themselves. '2
3. "The term blitzkrieg, became popular during the 1939 Polish Campaign and subsequent invasions of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands."3
4. "1939 Time article during the waning phases of the Polish Campaign. The correspondent wrote, 'This is no war of occupation, but a war of quick penetration and obliteration--blitzkrieg--lightning war. '"4
5. On 1 September 1939, lead units of the invading German army (the Wehrmacht) crashed over the border into Poland. The operation, code-named Case White (Fall Weiss), was the world 's first look at a devastating new type of mechanized warfare. Highly mobile German formations, spearheaded by massed columns of tanks and working in close cooperation with the German air force (Luftwaffe), attacked on a very narrow front, making deep penetrations of the Polish defenses within hours. The speed and violence of the attack paralyzed enemy response.5
6. Despite the speed of their advance, in a recent innovation for mobile columns, the armored units stayed in communication with their own headquarters and with each other through radio. Air power also played a crucial role, helping the tanks blast through the line, with the German dive bomber (Sturzkampfflugzeug, or Stuka) serving as a sort of mobile artillery on call to the armor. Finally, once the tanks had cleared a path, mechanized infantry and artillery followed up, occupying the terrain the tanks had seized, defending it against enemy counterattack, and tightening the ring around the trapped enemy forces.6
7. Despite their bravery, the infantry and cavalry of the Polish army were no match. Cut off from supply and from communications with the rear, they had no choice but to surrender. The main fighting was over in two weeks, although Warsaw would hold out for another two. In those initial two weeks, the first mechanized campaign in military history, the Germans essentially destroyed the Polish army, inflicting about 200,000 casualties and taking almost 600,000 prisoners. Their own losses were negligible.7
8. "It was as impressive and complete a victory as the annals of military history have to offer, and still stands as proof of the genius of German generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian."8
9. While many Western observers were ready to chalk up the German success in Case White to Polish incompetence or backwardness, the events of the following spring should have changed their minds. In May 1940, the German army launched its great offensive in the West, Case Yellow (Fall Gelb). With a rapidity that shocked both the military experts and the world at large, Germany 's tank and mechanized formations shredded the French, British, Belgian, and Dutch armies. The British did manage to retreat from the Continent at Dunkirk, although their equipment losses were nearly total.9
10. "Even more important, it seemed that the age of the long, drawn-out war, the sort of bloody stalemate that had characterized World War I, was gone forever. The age of 'lightning war, ' or Blitzkrieg was upon us."10
Word Count: 599
Section C
Evaluation of Sources
Source 1: The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 by Robert M. Citino
Written by American Historian, Robert M.Citino who is regarded as the leading historian in German military history. He wrote this book in 1999 to analyze the events that lead to the Blitzkrieg. He is very well regarded all over the world due to his un-parraled knowledge of Modern German military history.
The purpose of this source is to provide us with an in depth knowledge of the events that lead to the Blitzkrieg tactics and also analyzes the effectiveness of these tactics when enacted. This source supports the assertion that Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the fall of Poland. The source also gives us a background on the tactics and the technology available to both sides and the tactics enacted by both sides.
This source is of very high value since it is written by one of the most well-known and well-regarded German modern military history historian. This source also is very well written and its evidence for its claims comes from mostly official reports from both sides of the confrontation.
It is speculated that since Robert does not take into account the other factors that lead to the polish defeat and pins the victory on the Blitzkrieg blindly. Also critics say that Robert even though American is a German sympathizer (speculation) and skews the ratio more towards the Germans.
Source 2: Blitzkrieg in Retrospect by Newland, Samuel J., Military Review
Written by well-known professor Samuel J, Newland as a military review. He is known for his excellent knowledge of tactics and technology during World War 2. This was written in 2004.
This source main purpose is to re-evaluate the Blitzkrieg tactics and identify whether or not the hyped up Blitzkrieg tactics were as revolutionary and effective as proposed by many.
This is a contrasting article and re-evaluates the Blitzkrieg and gives us a unique unseen perspective on the Blitzkrieg. Questions the Blitzkriegs effectiveness and provides evidence to support its point of view.
It is written by an American author and hence may be bias to the allies. Also since it is military review and not a book the source could be in brief and requires a substantial amount of pre knowledge to understand.
Word Count: 372
Section D
Analysis
Newland is one of the first of a small group of individual’s who do not credit the Blitzkrieg as being the reason for the defeat of Poland. He starts by talking about how the media sensationalized this word and tactics. He also informs us that this tactic is very often misinterpreted for something it is naught. Newland suggests that the Blitzkrieg was not a revolutionary or necessarily a German tactic and suggests that the British had earlier tried to enforce this tactic pre world war 2. He quotes General Hans Vons Seeckt to provide a certain crudity to his statements to mentioned the fact that the Blitzkrieg is not even a German word let alone a German originated tactic. Newland then goes on to talk about how the blitzkrieg was described as quick penetrative attack, which subdued Poland with little effort. Newland then sheds light to the facts at hand; He starts by Talking about the Polish commanders weak defensive strategy and how he failed to position his troops in a defensive manner. He also gives a lot of importance to the fact that Poland’s army was not very well equipped and its defensive lines were far too stretched out for the Polish forces to Handle. In conclusion to Newland’s theory; Newlands believes that the Polish underestimate their German counterparts and due tot factors such as less troops, bad tactics, weather and inferior weapons they were overtaken quickly by the superior German army at that time but he does make a very important point when he points out that most of Germanys armed forces used during that invasion were still not quite modern and lighting fast and hence one cannot ascertain everything to the Blitzkrieg tactics solely.
On the other hand Citino’s view is very different from that of Newland. Citino accredits the victory in Poland completely to the Blitzkrieg tactics; Citino believes that since the Germans used superior weapons, tactics and for the first time used special panzer divisions. The polish armed forces could not withstand this sudden crushing deep penetrating attack. He lists German weapons developments such as;
(i) German Stutka’s (Low dive bombers)
(ii) Rifles and Machineguns (Mauser and MG series weapons)
(iii) Panzer (tanks I and II versions)
(iv) German Naval ships (Battleships and Destroys outfitted with new top class weaponry)
(v) Mechanized Infantry and Armor ( Part of the Panzer Divisions)
(vi) Modern mobile communications units imbedded with regular Panzer divisions.
He also brings significant attention the facts that German Panzer Divisions were quickly able to breakthrough penetrate and surround Polish divisions and destroy them. Citino does give credit to the German military geniuses Erich von Manstein and Hanz Guderian, for their brilliant military coordination that lead to the Success of the Blitzkrieg tactics. Citino also praises the bravery of the Polish troops, cut off from the front, surrounded and poorly equipped compared to their German counterparts.
In conclusion to Citino’s theory he also pays specific attention to the fact that, many Western observers were ready to attribute the German success to Polish incompetence or backwardness.
But in May 1940 it changed their minds, the German army launched its great offensive in the West. With a rapid attack that shocked military experts and the world at large, Germany 's tank and mechanized formations broke through the Allied armies. The British Expeditionary forced did manage to retreat from the Continent at Dunkirk, although their equipment losses were almost total. He ends by saying "Even more important, it seemed that the age of the long, drawn-out war, the sort of bloody stalemate that had characterized World War I, was gone forever. The age of 'lightning war, ' or Blitzkrieg was upon
us."11
Section E
Conclusion
In conclusion, The Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the defeat of Poland supported by Citino’s argument, which verifies my supposition. Some questions, which still remain though, are firstly in terms of military history it is very difficult to ascertain the invasion of Poland’s specifics due to the invasions high level of secrecy. Therefore the question posed is how reliable are Citino’s statements about German military strength, tactics when compared to Polish forces. Another question I would like to pose is Newland suggested that Polish forces could have counteracted the Blitzkrieg if they had a better command structure and co-ordination between armed forces, but there are reports which prove that the Polish command structure was high organized and efficient even though they lacked the resources to combat German armed forces who had the benefit of advanced technology and numbers. Consequently does Newland’s theory stand? Is his information on the polish command and their actions during the war reliable? Could the reports he read have been falsified?
Bibliography
Internet Sources/Printed Sources
Newland, Samuel J. "Blitzkreig in Retrospect." Military Review 84.4 (2004): 86+. Questia School. Web. 24 Mar. 2014.
Citino, Robert M. The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Questia School. Web. 24 Mar. 2014.
HL
CANDIDATE NAME: ANISH PURI
CANDIDATE SESSION: 003157-0053
RQ: To what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2 ?
Section A
Plan of Investigation
RQ: To what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2.
The focus of this study is to discuss to what extent were the Blitzkrieg tactics the main reason for the German victory over Poland during World War 2? The interest in this topic has arisen from study in Modern German military tactics specifically focused on World War 2. The 2 sources that I shall use in this study are as follows; The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 by Robert M. Citino and Blitzkrieg in Retrospect by Newland, Samuel J., Military Review
The first source supports the view that the Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the German Victory over Poland and gives us an in-depth analysis to its path and implementation. In contrast the second source Reviews the Blitzkrieg and asserts that the Blitzkrieg was not the main reason …show more content…
for Germany’s victories.
Word Count: 156
Section B
Summary of Evidence
1. "Film footage of German victories during the opening phases of World War II in Europe brings to mind a term synonymous with German successes--blitzkrieg. This word might be one of the most used and abused terms from the war, and after 60 years, it is still often misunderstood even by professional military officers."1
2. " 'Blitzkrieg ' combines two German words, one means 'lightning, ' the other means 'war, ' and should probably be regarded as a catchword. Commander in Chief of the German Army Hans von Seeckt was likely correct when he stated, 'Catchwords ... are necessary for those who are unable to think for themselves. '2
3. "The term blitzkrieg, became popular during the 1939 Polish Campaign and subsequent invasions of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands."3
4. "1939 Time article during the waning phases of the Polish Campaign. The correspondent wrote, 'This is no war of occupation, but a war of quick penetration and obliteration--blitzkrieg--lightning war. '"4
5. On 1 September 1939, lead units of the invading German army (the Wehrmacht) crashed over the border into Poland. The operation, code-named Case White (Fall Weiss), was the world 's first look at a devastating new type of mechanized warfare. Highly mobile German formations, spearheaded by massed columns of tanks and working in close cooperation with the German air force (Luftwaffe), attacked on a very narrow front, making deep penetrations of the Polish defenses within hours. The speed and violence of the attack paralyzed enemy response.5
6. Despite the speed of their advance, in a recent innovation for mobile columns, the armored units stayed in communication with their own headquarters and with each other through radio. Air power also played a crucial role, helping the tanks blast through the line, with the German dive bomber (Sturzkampfflugzeug, or Stuka) serving as a sort of mobile artillery on call to the armor. Finally, once the tanks had cleared a path, mechanized infantry and artillery followed up, occupying the terrain the tanks had seized, defending it against enemy counterattack, and tightening the ring around the trapped enemy forces.6
7. Despite their bravery, the infantry and cavalry of the Polish army were no match. Cut off from supply and from communications with the rear, they had no choice but to surrender. The main fighting was over in two weeks, although Warsaw would hold out for another two. In those initial two weeks, the first mechanized campaign in military history, the Germans essentially destroyed the Polish army, inflicting about 200,000 casualties and taking almost 600,000 prisoners. Their own losses were negligible.7
8. "It was as impressive and complete a victory as the annals of military history have to offer, and still stands as proof of the genius of German generals Erich von Manstein and Heinz Guderian."8
9. While many Western observers were ready to chalk up the German success in Case White to Polish incompetence or backwardness, the events of the following spring should have changed their minds. In May 1940, the German army launched its great offensive in the West, Case Yellow (Fall Gelb). With a rapidity that shocked both the military experts and the world at large, Germany 's tank and mechanized formations shredded the French, British, Belgian, and Dutch armies. The British did manage to retreat from the Continent at Dunkirk, although their equipment losses were nearly total.9
10. "Even more important, it seemed that the age of the long, drawn-out war, the sort of bloody stalemate that had characterized World War I, was gone forever. The age of 'lightning war, ' or Blitzkrieg was upon us."10
Word Count: 599
Section C
Evaluation of Sources
Source 1: The Path to Blitzkrieg Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920–1939 by Robert M. Citino
Written by American Historian, Robert M.Citino who is regarded as the leading historian in German military history. He wrote this book in 1999 to analyze the events that lead to the Blitzkrieg. He is very well regarded all over the world due to his un-parraled knowledge of Modern German military history.
The purpose of this source is to provide us with an in depth knowledge of the events that lead to the Blitzkrieg tactics and also analyzes the effectiveness of these tactics when enacted. This source supports the assertion that Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the fall of Poland. The source also gives us a background on the tactics and the technology available to both sides and the tactics enacted by both sides.
This source is of very high value since it is written by one of the most well-known and well-regarded German modern military history historian. This source also is very well written and its evidence for its claims comes from mostly official reports from both sides of the confrontation.
It is speculated that since Robert does not take into account the other factors that lead to the polish defeat and pins the victory on the Blitzkrieg blindly. Also critics say that Robert even though American is a German sympathizer (speculation) and skews the ratio more towards the Germans.
Source 2: Blitzkrieg in Retrospect by Newland, Samuel J., Military Review
Written by well-known professor Samuel J, Newland as a military review. He is known for his excellent knowledge of tactics and technology during World War 2. This was written in 2004.
This source main purpose is to re-evaluate the Blitzkrieg tactics and identify whether or not the hyped up Blitzkrieg tactics were as revolutionary and effective as proposed by many.
This is a contrasting article and re-evaluates the Blitzkrieg and gives us a unique unseen perspective on the Blitzkrieg. Questions the Blitzkriegs effectiveness and provides evidence to support its point of view.
It is written by an American author and hence may be bias to the allies. Also since it is military review and not a book the source could be in brief and requires a substantial amount of pre knowledge to understand.
Word Count: 372
Section D
Analysis
Newland is one of the first of a small group of individual’s who do not credit the Blitzkrieg as being the reason for the defeat of Poland. He starts by talking about how the media sensationalized this word and tactics. He also informs us that this tactic is very often misinterpreted for something it is naught. Newland suggests that the Blitzkrieg was not a revolutionary or necessarily a German tactic and suggests that the British had earlier tried to enforce this tactic pre world war 2. He quotes General Hans Vons Seeckt to provide a certain crudity to his statements to mentioned the fact that the Blitzkrieg is not even a German word let alone a German originated tactic. Newland then goes on to talk about how the blitzkrieg was described as quick penetrative attack, which subdued Poland with little effort. Newland then sheds light to the facts at hand; He starts by Talking about the Polish commanders weak defensive strategy and how he failed to position his troops in a defensive manner. He also gives a lot of importance to the fact that Poland’s army was not very well equipped and its defensive lines were far too stretched out for the Polish forces to Handle. In conclusion to Newland’s theory; Newlands believes that the Polish underestimate their German counterparts and due tot factors such as less troops, bad tactics, weather and inferior weapons they were overtaken quickly by the superior German army at that time but he does make a very important point when he points out that most of Germanys armed forces used during that invasion were still not quite modern and lighting fast and hence one cannot ascertain everything to the Blitzkrieg tactics solely.
On the other hand Citino’s view is very different from that of Newland. Citino accredits the victory in Poland completely to the Blitzkrieg tactics; Citino believes that since the Germans used superior weapons, tactics and for the first time used special panzer divisions. The polish armed forces could not withstand this sudden crushing deep penetrating attack. He lists German weapons developments such as;
(i) German Stutka’s (Low dive bombers)
(ii) Rifles and Machineguns (Mauser and MG series weapons)
(iii) Panzer (tanks I and II versions)
(iv) German Naval ships (Battleships and Destroys outfitted with new top class weaponry)
(v) Mechanized Infantry and Armor ( Part of the Panzer Divisions)
(vi) Modern mobile communications units imbedded with regular Panzer divisions.
He also brings significant attention the facts that German Panzer Divisions were quickly able to breakthrough penetrate and surround Polish divisions and destroy them. Citino does give credit to the German military geniuses Erich von Manstein and Hanz Guderian, for their brilliant military coordination that lead to the Success of the Blitzkrieg tactics. Citino also praises the bravery of the Polish troops, cut off from the front, surrounded and poorly equipped compared to their German counterparts.
In conclusion to Citino’s theory he also pays specific attention to the fact that, many Western observers were ready to attribute the German success to Polish incompetence or backwardness.
But in May 1940 it changed their minds, the German army launched its great offensive in the West. With a rapid attack that shocked military experts and the world at large, Germany 's tank and mechanized formations broke through the Allied armies. The British Expeditionary forced did manage to retreat from the Continent at Dunkirk, although their equipment losses were almost total. He ends by saying "Even more important, it seemed that the age of the long, drawn-out war, the sort of bloody stalemate that had characterized World War I, was gone forever. The age of 'lightning war, ' or Blitzkrieg was upon
us."11
Section E
Conclusion
In conclusion, The Blitzkrieg was the main reason for the defeat of Poland supported by Citino’s argument, which verifies my supposition. Some questions, which still remain though, are firstly in terms of military history it is very difficult to ascertain the invasion of Poland’s specifics due to the invasions high level of secrecy. Therefore the question posed is how reliable are Citino’s statements about German military strength, tactics when compared to Polish forces. Another question I would like to pose is Newland suggested that Polish forces could have counteracted the Blitzkrieg if they had a better command structure and co-ordination between armed forces, but there are reports which prove that the Polish command structure was high organized and efficient even though they lacked the resources to combat German armed forces who had the benefit of advanced technology and numbers. Consequently does Newland’s theory stand? Is his information on the polish command and their actions during the war reliable? Could the reports he read have been falsified?
Bibliography
Internet Sources/Printed Sources
Newland, Samuel J. "Blitzkreig in Retrospect." Military Review 84.4 (2004): 86+. Questia School. Web. 24 Mar. 2014.
Citino, Robert M. The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Questia School. Web. 24 Mar. 2014.