Evaluating the effects of teacher certification program in Indonesia

EVALUATING THE EFFECTS OF TEACHER CERTIFICATION PROGRAM IN INDONESIA
By: Irmasari Welhelmina Nenobais

Teacher Certification Program has been conducted in Indonesia since the enactment of Teacher Law No. 14 of 2005. According to World Bank Policy Brief (2012, p. 1), the purpose of Teacher Law of 2005 is for improving the standard of the educational system in Indonesia by managing the shortcomings in teacher skills and knowledge, lack of motivation and poor salaries. The government of Indonesia intended to enhance the teaching standard by providing incentives which was equivalent to a teachers’ basic salary. Other initiatives provide minimum competency levels for teachers.

The implementation of this program has caused not only positive but also negative impacts. For example, one major concern is that a teacher’s lack of interest affect a student’s performance and the quality of student competency outcomes. Ultimately, the policy has created a financial burden for the government. This essay will examine the effects of the Teacher Certification Program (TCP), and then provide arguments to improve the government policy by offering a ‘what is the problem represented to be?’ approach (Bacchi 2009) to evaluate the issues. The positive impact of the TCP for teachers across Indonesia is a higher motivation to perform better in classrooms. The TCP ensures that teachers are not hindered by economic impediments to their personal lifestyles. Problems which existed before the implementation of the TCP was the disparity between basic wage and cost of living; in most instances teachers who had to find extra work in order to meet their basic costs of living. The TCP provides, in effect, a doubling of the basic wage (World Bank Policy Brief 2012, p. 3). Indeed, there will be no more financial issues for teachers. According to World Bank data report (World Bank Policy Brief 2012, p. 5), teachers’ financial problems experienced a decrease to 38 per cent, and also there is a considerably change in teachers’ attitude to find a second job that show a 27 per cent decline. Thus, the intention was for teachers to be able to pay more attention to teach students effectively during the teaching and learning process in the classroom. This is the basic principle of the Indonesian government when taking the TCP policy into account.

There is evidence to suggest prerequisites applied to assessing teachers’ competency levels have been manipulated. For example, teachers in remote areas may find it difficult to construct a portfolio because they never attended seminars and training, which is one component of the portfolio. Even the variety of activities they are doing may not have a certificate as proof. The effect therefore is a limited competency level of teachers. Teachers who were teaching and also seeking additional income lacked the of opportunity for self-development and conducting research; the flow on effect has also limited in making a variety of instructional design for students (Indonesian Ministry of National Education 2011, pp. 5-6). Manipulating the TCP to attain the portfolio prerequisites has led to forgery that violates academic ethics and morality as educators. Thus, the self interests of teachers’ financial incentives have been prioritised over student needs. Lack of strict regulations and restrictions within the TCP is an area that therefore needs to be rectified.

On the other hand, the negative impact of the TCP in Indonesia is that it creates financial burdens for the government because it costs an enormous amount of money that has to been spent by Indonesian government (World Bank Policy Brief 2012, p. 1). According to the Indonesia’s Ministry of Education and Culture (The Jakarta Post 2013), it has been targeted that by 2015, there will be a restriction for teaching in classrooms only for teachers who have been certified, even though the government increased the budget to approximately $7 billion extra, according to the World Bank’s prediction. Indeed, this official rule would lead the government to supply extra fund around USD 5 to 7 billion per year for paying teachers salary if all 3 million Indonesian teachers have been certified. Therefore, this policy does not necessarily answer the need to improve the standard of educational quality in Indonesia because there is no significant improvement in teachers’ performance. The effect is that the TCP is merely for improving teachers’ welfare, which can be done with another action without burdening government budget. A policy option, which should be considered, is that teachers should be funded from the government on a conditional arrangement. One such arrangement would be performance based payment system, for example, submitting a scientific research paper, or are able to bring students to achieve a reward in academic competition. This action will surely motivate teachers to put more efforts in increasing the welfare in a positive way than doing forgery to accomplish their objectives. Besides that, there are still many things out of educational sectors in Indonesia that need to be addressed. Rather than spending a lot of money for teachers’ salary, it is much wiser to use the huge amounts of money to provide adequate equipments for teaching and learning process in the classroom. Further, teacher certification program in Indonesia should be reviewed as it does not meet the expectations of the Indonesia’s government to improve its educational system. To evaluate this policy, a ‘what is the problem represented to be?’ (WPR) approach can be adopted as it suggested that to get to know the real problems that need to be encountered; it should be first looked at the triggers of the problems (Bacchi 2009, p. 3). In this case, the trigger of certified teacher policy is that teachers’ lack of motivation due to poor salaries and teachers having not enough skills and knowledge to give a better performance in the classroom. These both presuppositions have led the Indonesia’s government to take into account the certification program in order to stimulate teachers by giving incentive on top of their base salary. However, this is not a good solution to improve the educational issues in Indonesia concerning poor teaching performance and low standard of students’ achievement. The government should provide more opportunity for teachers, in particular, remote areas teachers to follow training and ensure that it is accessible for them by conducting a teacher training program not only at city but also at rural areas. Thus, remote areas teachers may not find a reason not to attend the training due to a lack of substitute teachers when they have to leave the class for training. This will result in equity for all teachers to gain a high level of competency in teaching skills and knowledge.

Moreover, teacher certification policy can be evaluated by referring to the second question of Bacchi’s WPR approach (2009, p. 5) which emphasises on the implicit assumptions towards representative problems that provide background information. Bacchi believes that by examining the assumptions, the basis of thoughts that support the reasonable arguments of the problem can be recognized. The Indonesia’s government assumes that poor salary has led the teachers’ loss in motivation to develop their skills and knowledge; thereby a portfolio has been used as the indicator to measure teachers’ competency levels. An expert on education of Jakarta State University, Arief Rachman (The Jakarta Post 2009) asserts that the requirement of data and information from portfolio is not enough to be an evidence of teachers’ competency. As shown by statistics (cited in The Jakarta Post 2009), portfolio requirements cannot be met by almost 60 per cent of teachers in Indonesia. Additionally, the independent teams of monitoring and evaluation (The Jakarta Post 2009 cited in Kompas April 9) discover that the quotas of teacher certification program from 2006 to 2008 disclosed a large number of fake certificates that are used by teachers in the portfolio submission. Indeed, a portfolio is not an appropriate method for assessing the competent teachers in Indonesia because it is only giving a chance for teachers to forge the documents in order to be certified. Hence, the government of Indonesia should revise the policy if they still want to continue the certification program for teachers.

Another thing that could be undertaken by Indonesia’s government as offered by WPR approach in question 5 about the effects that emerge as a result of the representative problem (Bacchi 2009, p. 15) is that the government of Indonesia should be careful in taking the presumptions into consideration so that it would not create another complication. Apparently, a long term financial issue that may likely to arise has never been taken into account by the government when implementing this program. According to World Bank Policy Brief (2012, p. 2), the teaching profession has now become more attractive career opportunities to fresh graduates. This situation may bring positive impact wherein there will be no more shortage of teachers in remote areas, although the quality of pedagogical skills of fresh graduated teachers is questionable. Therefore, the Indonesia’s government must conduct frequent training to enhance teachers’ pedagogical skills and knowledge, though it will cost substantial sums of money. Moreover, a promised incentive has created a financial burden for government in teachers’ double salary. The government has to allocate more budget money to pay the salary which has been proved brings no significant effects on student learning. Hence, the government of Indonesia can take an example of educational systems management in Philippines whereby additional allowances can be received only if the teachers are able to show significant improvement in the classroom teaching and learning activity. To measure this, the teachers will be observed by the supervisors at school when they demonstrate the capability in the classroom in terms of students’ interaction while teachers deliver lesson, teaching preparation and props supporting learning. The report from the school supervisor will be an important fact for teachers to obtain their incentive, and also can be useful as promotion prospects for teachers’ career (The Jakarta Post 2013).

In conclusion, despite the fact that the teacher certification program in Indonesia brings a great change in teachers’ welfare as they do not have to find a second job to fulfil their living expenses, it still does not meet the Indonesia’s government objectives when conducting this policy, which is to improve the quality standard of educational systems in Indonesia. There is still no significant improvement in student learning because teachers show no interest to increase their competency levels. In fact, it only creates financial burdens for the government since they have to supply a huge amount of extra fund for teachers’ double salary. Therefore, a WPR approach in question number 2 which stressing on the implicit assumptions of the problems evaluate that portfolios cannot be an appropriate parameter to assess teachers competency levels since it has led them to forge the certificates just to meet the portfolio requirements. Furthermore, question number 5 of the WPR approach which emphasises on the effects that may emerge as a result of the problem found that the desire of Indonesia’s government to achieve a better educational system resulting in another financial burden for the government to supply extra budget for teachers’ additional allowances, which is unnecessary. To improve its educational system, the government of Indonesia will need to place an emphasis on frequent training to enhance teachers’ skills and knowledge and also make it accessible for teachers in remote areas to follow the academic training. In this way, the government will equity prevails for all teachers to have an opportunity for self-development in teaching skills and knowledge. Thus, Indonesia’s government should revise its policy if they still want to continue the teacher certification program.

REFERENCES:
Abbas, H 2013, ‘Inconvenient truths about teacher certification program’, The Jakarta Post, 27 April, viewed 21 August 2013,
Bacchi, C 2009, ‘Analysing policy: what’s the problem represented to be?’, Pearson Australia, Chapter 1.
Indonesian Ministry of National Education 2011, ‘Teacher certification system analysis study: in the context of internal bureaucratic reform‘, pp. 1-47, viewed 23 August 2013, .
Jalal, F, Samani, M, Chang, MC, Stevenson, R, Ragatz, AB & Negara SD 2009, ‘Teacher certification in Indonesia: a strategy for teacher quality improvement’, April, pp. 1-219, viewed 7 August 2013, .
Johnson, SM, Birkeland, SE & Peske HG 2005, ‘Life in the fast track: how states seek to balance incentives and quality in alternative teacher certification programs’, educational policy, January, pp. 1-28.
Koning, MD 2012, ‘Reforming teacher education in Indonesia: are they taking the quality out of education?’, World of Education, vol. 41, November, pp. 36-39.

Rachman, A 2009, ‘Teacher certification process still under fire’, The Jakarta Post, 8 September, viewed 21 August 2013, .
Sugiharto, S 2009, ‘Fraud in teacher certification program: who 's to blame?’, The Jakarta Post, 16 May, viewed 21 August 2013, .
Triyanto 2012, ‘Improving teacher profesionalism through certification program: an Indonesia case study’, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, vol. 67, pp. 864-868.
World Bank Policy Brief 2012, ‘Teacher certification in Indonesia: a doubling of pay, or a way to improve learning?’, October, pp. 1-5, viewed 7 August 2013, .

References: Abbas, H 2013, ‘Inconvenient truths about teacher certification program’, The Jakarta Post, 27 April, viewed 21 August 2013, Bacchi, C 2009, ‘Analysing policy: what’s the problem represented to be?’, Pearson Australia, Chapter 1. Indonesian Ministry of National Education 2011, ‘Teacher certification system analysis study: in the context of internal bureaucratic reform‘, pp. 1-47, viewed 23 August 2013, . Jalal, F, Samani, M, Chang, MC, Stevenson, R, Ragatz, AB & Negara SD 2009, ‘Teacher certification in Indonesia: a strategy for teacher quality improvement’, April, pp. 1-219, viewed 7 August 2013, . Johnson, SM, Birkeland, SE & Peske HG 2005, ‘Life in the fast track: how states seek to balance incentives and quality in alternative teacher certification programs’, educational policy, January, pp. 1-28. Koning, MD 2012, ‘Reforming teacher education in Indonesia: are they taking the quality out of education?’, World of Education, vol. 41, November, pp. 36-39. Rachman, A 2009, ‘Teacher certification process still under fire’, The Jakarta Post, 8 September, viewed 21 August 2013, . Sugiharto, S 2009, ‘Fraud in teacher certification program: who 's to blame?’, The Jakarta Post, 16 May, viewed 21 August 2013, . Triyanto 2012, ‘Improving teacher profesionalism through certification program: an Indonesia case study’, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology, vol. 67, pp. 864-868. World Bank Policy Brief 2012, ‘Teacher certification in Indonesia: a doubling of pay, or a way to improve learning?’, October, pp. 1-5, viewed 7 August 2013, .