Background:
The thought is the father to the deed, and the multilateral trading system could never have been built if it had not first been imagined. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is not the product of just one idea, however, or even one school of thought. It instead represents the confluence of, and sometimes the conflict between, three distinct areas of theory and practice. Law, economics and politics have each inspired and constrained the capacity of countries to work together for the creation and maintenance of a rules-based regime in which members with widely different levels of economic development and asymmetrical political power work together to reduce barriers to trade. It is therefore fitting to begin this history with a review of the intellectual prehistory of the WTO, as well as the contemporary debates surrounding each of these fields.
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is among the most powerful, and one of the most secretive international bodies on earth. It is rapidly assuming the role of global government, as 134 nation-states, including the United States (U.S.), have ceded to its vast authority and powers. The WTO represents the rules-based regime of the policy of economic globalization. The central operating principal of the WTO is that commercial interests should supersede all others. Any obstacles in the path of operations and expansion of global business enterprise must be subordinated. In practice these "obstacles" are usually policies or democratic processes that act on behalf of working people, labor rights, environmental protection, human rights, consumer rights, social justice, local culture, and national sovereignty (Craig VanGrasstek, 2013).
The WTO has proved to be quite effective in sustaining cooperation between members. Most of what was agreed in the Doha Round was implemented. The dispute settlement mechanism has worked: there have been
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