Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown dramatically as a major form of international capital transfer over the past decade. Between 1980 and 1990,world flows of FDI-defined as cross-border expenditures to acquire or expandcorporate control of productive assets-have approximately tripled. FDI has become a major form of net international borrowing for Japan and the United States (the world’s largest international lender and borrower, respectively). Direct investment has grown even more rapidly of late within Europe. To what extent is this sudden worldwide surge in FDI explained by traditional theories? These theories predict the scale and scope of multinational enterprises by looking to differences in competitive advantage, across firms or countries, that might lead to the extension of corporate control across borders. So, for example, better technology, management capability, and product design; stronger consumer allegiance; and greater complementarities in production or use of technology can allow a domestic firm to control foreign assets more productively than would a foreign firm and could therefore predicate direct investment. In many cases, these theories also explain why an enterprise’s alternatives to FDI-domestically based production or licensing of foreign-based production-are less efficient than direct control of foreign based operations (see, e.g., Caves 1982; Vernon 1966).Traditional theories are very useful for explaining basic long-term patterns of FDI. For example, they help understand the behavior of U.S. firms during the post-World War I1 period (the experience on which these theories were honed). At that time, advanced U.S. firms were superior in technology and well established in foreign markets. U.S. firms tended to move overseas to retain competitive access (or to preempt competitors’ access) to those markets and, in the process, met with relatively little competition. These theories also help us understand why the tide of U.S.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown dramatically as a major form of international capital transfer over the past decade. Between 1980 and 1990,world flows of FDI-defined as cross-border expenditures to acquire or expandcorporate control of productive assets-have approximately tripled. FDI has become a major form of net international borrowing for Japan and the United States (the world’s largest international lender and borrower, respectively). Direct investment has grown even more rapidly of late within Europe. To what extent is this sudden worldwide surge in FDI explained by traditional theories? These theories predict the scale and scope of multinational enterprises by looking to differences in competitive advantage, across firms or countries, that might lead to the extension of corporate control across borders. So, for example, better technology, management capability, and product design; stronger consumer allegiance; and greater complementarities in production or use of technology can allow a domestic firm to control foreign assets more productively than would a foreign firm and could therefore predicate direct investment. In many cases, these theories also explain why an enterprise’s alternatives to FDI-domestically based production or licensing of foreign-based production-are less efficient than direct control of foreign based operations (see, e.g., Caves 1982; Vernon 1966).Traditional theories are very useful for explaining basic long-term patterns of FDI. For example, they help understand the behavior of U.S. firms during the post-World War I1 period (the experience on which these theories were honed). At that time, advanced U.S. firms were superior in technology and well established in foreign markets. U.S. firms tended to move overseas to retain competitive access (or to preempt competitors’ access) to those markets and, in the process, met with relatively little competition. These theories also help us understand why the tide of U.S.