INTRODUCTION
The changing role of law and the need to relate with a transforming society and its citizens has led to a demand on decision making in political systems (Bijsterveld 2010). Due to the variance in the decision making of these systems, interest groups carry out their public affairs (PA) activities in a plethora of ways (Baumgartner 2007) as features such as type of political system, structure, accountability, dependency on interest groups, etcetera influence PA practices. This stems from the fact that issues that are significant in one political system might not be as significant in another (Lowery, Poppelaars and Berkhout 2008). Ljiphart (1999) has identified two basic types of decision making in political systems – Majoritarian; examples are the United States of America (US), Nigeria, Sweden, France, etcetera and Consensual; examples are European Union (EU), Belgium, Netherlands and Germany. This essay seeks to focus on how PA can be influenced by the different features in political systems by comparing these institutions using the EU as an example of a consensual system, and the US for the majoritarian system.
MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUAL SYSTEMS.
Majoritarian systems are federalist democracies where policy making is divided among different authorities. Government is by the majority and follows after the desires of the majority (Woll 2006). It is characterized by “exclusivity, adversarial politics and is highly competitive”, while the consensual system is a corporatist government by diverse representatives of the people which is characterized by “inclusiveness, bargaining and compromising” in order to influence policies (Ljipart 1999 p.2). Lobbyists in the majoritarian systems have the tendency of becoming more autonomous and self limiting as their activities are geared towards influencing the private offices of government officials and
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