Feinberg's Criticism Of Informational Blackmail

In this paper I will expand on an aspect of Gerald Dworkin’s critique of Joel Feinberg’s argument against legal moralism. Using Dworkin’s counterexample of informational blackmail, I maintain that Feinberg’s argument ignores important moral considerations and moral legalism is sometimes justifiable.
Before I proceed, some relevant background knowledge is necessary. In his argument, “Devlin Was Right: Law and the Enforcement of Morality,” Dworkin sums up Feinberg’s argument in “The Nature and Value of Rights” as:
“Given the importance of personal liberty, if we are unable to justify a restriction of liberty by pointing to someone who can complain, we cannot restrict liberty.”
For Feinberg, these instances are harmless wrongdoings—acts that
Because the two acts are so closely related, contrasting them is useful in determining why informational blackmail might be wrong. Often “blackmail” and “extortion” are used interchangeably in statuary law. In both cases the basic formula is this: the criminal threatens the victim with X unless the victim complies with Y. However, the legality and nature of the two different types of threats differs. While the threat in extortion is to perform an unlawful act (use of force or violence), the act of the threat in blackmail (releasing information) is perfectly legal. Although the release of defaming information might harm the person being blackmailed’s reputation or well being, in Feinberg’s view the harm is not directly linked to the person and consequently isn’t a strong enough reason to justify a restriction of liberty. Extortion, on the other hand, violates the harm principle and inflicts direct harm on the person. Another worthwhile contrast between the two acts is the element of consent. Blackmail seems to possess consent in some capacity. In the case of blackmail, the person being blackmailed has the option to either enter into the agreement and pay the blackmailer, or default on the agreement and risk defaming information being leaked. Whereas in extortion, the victim really has no say in the matter: there is no agreement, only a warning that violence will ensue if the victim does not comply. Feinberg likely takes no issue with the criminalization of extortion, as he would consider it a harmful wrongdoing, as it violates both the Volenti maxim and harm principle. For this reason, I am not interested in pursuing the criminalization of extortion other than its relevant contrast to informational