FIDEL RAMOS

A. Enhancing economic security through development diplomacy
The extent and complexity of economic cooperation and competition in the next millennium demand more than domestic reforms. Therefore, economic linkages are also a key to progress. Given such awareness, President Ramos complemented whatever local initiatives with economic diplomacy, otherwise termed as “Development Diplomacy.” This effort only emphasized the priority placed by his administration on the importance of economic development and the kind of strategic initiatives ventured upon.
1. Domestic reforms
Lagging behind in a region of rapidly growing economies, President Ramos recognized that for the Philippines to catch up with its neighbors domestic policies must be reformed. For instance, protectionism failed to help local industries develop. In response, the Ramos government pursued decentralization, deregulation, and liberalization programs.
Decentralization, which devolved power from the national government to local government unit, was basically a political process. But its ultimate objective was to give provinces and municipalities greater command over a wide range of socio-economic policies – environmental regulation, infrastructure development, investment attraction, and revenue generation. Meanwhile, both deregulation and liberalization aimed at leveling the playing field for both local and foreign investors. Deregulation encouraged competition in the domestic market by removing policies that inhibit new investments. These polices opened up ó to varying degrees – the banking system, domestic shipping, the telecommunications sector, and air transport. The deregulation policies, coupled with extensive privatization, encouraged dramatic increase in investments. Meanwhile, liberalization sought to release the Philippines from its inward-looking orientation brought about by decades of protectionism towards trade-driven growth. The liberalization program brought down tariff rates in accordance with the Philippines’ commitments to World Trade Organization (WTO), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA).
2. Economic diplomacy
To President Ramos, the wars of the coming decades will be more economic than political. The world therefore will depend more on economic linkages rather than on arms buildup. This also meant that domestic economic reforms are insufficient to achieve economic viability. To this end, his government complemented whatever local initiatives with economic diplomacy, otherwise termed as “Development Diplomacy”. Specifically, economic diplomacy was aimed at enabling the country to access new markets and to draw foreign investors and tourists alike to the country.
Economic diplomacy was conducted in two ways. The country-team approach, whereby state visits, trade missions, trade shows, business meetings, and related activities were facilitated, resulted in investor confidence and expansion of local enterprises’ access to foreign markets. Concretely, these led to numerous bilateral economic agreements and investments into the country. In total, the country-team economic diplomacy of the Ramos administration has led to the signing of 13 bilateral trade agreements, 20 investment protection and promotion agreements, nine taxation agreements, 11 services agreements, and a host of other bilateral economic pacts. It has brought in US$ 22.4 billion in foreign investments. Most investments into the country came from new industrializing economies and ASEAN states. The P7.6-billion circumferential road (EDSA III) was a joint venture between Philippine National Construction Corporation and Indonesian construction giant P.T. Citra.
Likewise, economic diplomacy resulted in the increase of official development assistance (ODA) to the country, although this cannot be considered a measure of economic progress. For example, the Philippines became the largest Japanese ODA recipient on per capita basis. Other than Japan, the European Union, the US, Asian Development Bank and the World Bank became major sources of grants and concessional loans.
The major accomplishments of the Ramos government in economic diplomacy, however, were seen in the country’s representations in global, regional, and sub-regional economic initiatives and arrangements that placed the Philippines on the economic map of the region.
The Philippine multilateral participation can be classified into three levels: extra-regional, regional, and sub-regional. At the extra-regional level, the Philippines sought active participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) round, which ended in 1994, and the WTO. The aim of the Philippines in joining the WTO is to access more markets for its products and facilitate its trade and investments with the rest of the world in the context of a liberal global economy.
It was also during the period of the Ramos presidency when the idea of bridging the gap between Asian and Europe economies through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) took shape. The first of these meeting was held in Bangkok in 1996. Complementing the WTO’s objective of creating a liberal global economy is a regional economic cooperation via the APEC. APEC sought to achieve the following: trade and investment liberalization, trade and investment facilitation, and economic and technical cooperation. The hosting of the APEC in 1996 was one of the highlights of Philippine economic diplomacy. As Chair of APEC, the Ramos administration seized the opportunity to showcase the Philippines’ economic and political gains.
The Manila Action Plan (MAPA), APEC ís centerpiece, brought together Individual Action Plans, Collective Action Plans, and Joint Activities of the members-economies. With the MAPA, the Philippines successfully consolidated interests of various economies and brought its own initiatives into the substantive issues. Moreover, the Philippines as APEC Chair successfully cultivated a stronger private sector partnership through the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC), prioritized sustainable development on the APEC agenda, and enhanced the development of SMEs through the inauguration of APEC Center for Technology Exchange and Training for SMEs (ACTETSME).
At the sub-regional level, the ASEAN has become the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Ramos administration. In the area of regional security, not only has ASEAN became the cornerstone of the Philippine foreign policy, but it has also served as springboard for the country’s relations with other multilateral bodies like APEC, ASEM, and with more prosperous economies like that of Japan and the US.
ASEAN from its inception was basically concerned with political matters. However, with the mushrooming of economic groupings around the world, ASEAN states progressively moved to economic cooperation. Evidence of this includes the formation of ASEAN Free Trade Area, ASEAN Industrial Cooperation, the ASEAN Investment Area, and the growth areas such as the BIMP-EAGA. It is noteworthy that it was President Ramos who proposed the formation of the East ASEAN growth area, which included East Indonesia, East Malaysia, Mindanao and Brunei. The purpose of this growth area was to spur development in various parts of ASEAN countries. However, Mindanao is yet to experience the impact of the BIMP-EAGA.
B. Creating a stable socio-political environment
President Ramos realized the success of his economic endeavors could not be guaranteed without a stable socio-political environment. Given this perspective, the stability of the region and the country were equally important in the development agenda of the Ramos administration. To this end, Ramos tried to beef up the capacity of government agencies involved in one way or another with foreign relations. These include the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of National Defense (DND), and the National Security Council (NSC). Indeed, the NSC was extensively utilized in formulating national security policy.
1. National reconciliation
Putting one’s house in order to maintain regional peace has been a major tenet of the relations of ASEAN members. The Ramos government made an effort to keep domestic problems at a manageable level because only after addressing pressing social and political issues could the government affords to pursue a sound foreign policy.
At the national level, the uncompromising stand of the Ramos administration to promote political and economic development simultaneously served as a model in a region where most states put economic progress ahead of human rights. President Ramos pressed for national reconciliation through the legalization of the communist movement and the granting of amnesty for rebels who wish to try mainstream politics. Also, President Ramos attempted to negotiate with the National Democratic Front (NDF), although no agreement between the two parties was reached.
Moreover, President Ramos ordered that the Mindanao peace problem be given adequate attention. The first step was undertaken through talks with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which led to the signing of the GRP-MNLF peace agreement in September 1996. This was followed by the promise of talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), although no substantial talks actually took place. A third group, the Abu Sayyaf, known to have international links, also remained outside the national reconciliation process.
Nevertheless, what was interesting about the Mindanao problem was the openness of the Ramos administration to the use international connections to help find solutions. The government was able to seek the support of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) that served as the third party in the peace talks between the government panel and the MNLF. The OIC, through the OIC Ministerial Committee of the Six (Libya, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Bangladesh, Somalia, and the Chair, Indonesia), has been tasked to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement. As in economic diplomacy, the personal dedication of President Ramos to bring solution to the Mindanao problem was crucial. Even before his presidency, he undertook a secret visit to Libya, which led to the resumption of the stalled peace talks between the government and MNLF.
2. External Security
The termination of the basing rights of the US in the Philippines and the general decline of American military presence in the region created a general sense of anxiety for states that have largely benefited from the American security umbrella. There was also fear that a weaker regional commitment by the US would allow the more influential states to assert their supremacy in the Asia Pacific. However, there were also positive effects. States realized the importance self-reliance and the importance of regional cooperation. True enough, the Ramos administration had these as policy options. It seriously considered the modernization of the ailing military and substantially diversified linkages with other states.
Military modernization. In the past, any potential external threat to the Philippines became a responsibility of the US, thus allowing the Philippine Armed Forces (AFP) to focus on counter-insurgency campaign. However, with the withdrawal of the American forces in 1991, changing external security environment, and the decline of the communist threat there was an unavoidable need to reconsider defense policies. The first major step to this end was the separation of the police force from the military as mandated by a law creating the Philippine National Police (PNP). Specifically, PNP Law integrates the AFPís Philippine Constabulary into the police force and paved the way of transferring counter- insurgency campaign, except in specified critical areas, to the police force. With this reorganization, it was expected that the military be able to enhance its capability for external defense.
The first step to improving defense capability is the military modernization program. President Ramos, a former military man himself, lobbied extensively for the passing of the AFP Modernization Law. The law, enacted in 1995, specifically included five components in the AFP modernization program: (1) force restructuring and organizational development; (2) capability, material and technology development; (3) bases/support systems development; (4)human resources development; and (5) doctrines development.
Fundamentally, the heart of the modernization program is changing the AFP from an internal security-oriented to external defense-oriented force. The modernization emphasizes the development of sufficient strategic capabilities to support a “Defense-in-Depth” policy. This means extending the AFP’s capability to protect the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and to provide a “credible deterrent against outside threats to its territorial claims.”
In terms of budget, the Army was to get an allocation of P18.4 billionfor 15 years, the Air Force to receive P59 billion, and the Navy P70 billion over 21 years. For the first five years, the Congress decided on a P50-billion allocation. However, the Asian financial crisis reduced the modernization budget to merely half the original allocation. As a result, efforts towards self-reliant defense strategies basically did not bear fruit during the Ramos period. And with a toothless military, the Philippines could not reinforce its diplomacy over territorial claims in the South China Sea as well as patrol its vast waters.
Bilateral relations with regional and external powers. While the building of oneís capability was necessary, the Ramos administration saw that unilateral undertakings such as the military self-reliance would not be sufficient to cope with threats to Philippine security. Hence, the need to strengthen defense relations with as many states as possible.
The DND and AFP actively sought cooperation with small and major powers within and outside the region. A series of intelligence and personnel exchanges, border patrol, and joint training exercises were held between ASEAN members. There was also cooperation with Australia and South Korea. With its ASEAN partners and Asia Pacific states, the Ramos government shared the view that an interlocking web of bilateral relations was a necessary step toward building a healthy security community in the absence of a Southeast defense alliance. Outside the region, the Philippines sought defense cooperation with the United Kingdom, France and Spain. With these states, cooperation was driven primarily by the need to expand the country’s arms supply.
The Ramos administration also embarked on improving the cold Philippine-American relations. Though there was a perceived reluctance of the US to remain actively involved in the region, most Asia Pacific states, including the Philippines, view it as the most important defense ally against potential regional hegemons. Hence, negotiations were held on military exercises and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), now known as Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), and on giving more teeth to the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). However, the VFA materialized only after the Ramos period, as the President himself felt that any further arrangements with the US was a political risk in the midst of strong anti-American sentiment.
Meanwhile, with the growing apprehension towards China, improving China-Philippine ties was a critical challenge to the Ramos government. In 1995, the Ramos government got a wake-up call with the Chinese occupation of the Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef). The following year, China ratified the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNLCOS) and declared its intention to abide by it in the South China Sea. In addition, President Jiang Zemin in 1996 even assured the Philippines of China’s peaceful intentions and friendliness. These pledges resulted in a renewed optimism in the region ó that disputes could be resolved peacefully. Then in April 1997, China sent two armed frigates to the Spratly areas claimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Because of a weak military, the Philippines responded only with diplomatic protest. It urged China to abide by the 1992 Manila Declaration on the South China Sea and UNCLOS. The DFA could only reiterate the call for the demilitarization of the area and joint development of its resources. President Ramos could only advance the idea of “placing the disputed islands under the stewardship of the claimant country closest to it geographically, on the understanding that the stewardship accommodates other claimants’ needs for shelter, anchorage, and other peaceful pursuits.” To this day China has not expressed any interest in these alternatives.
A multilateral approach to regional stability. The complex and uncertain nature of the post-Cold War era brought one positive impact, that is, a realization that the security of one state cannot be made separate from the security of its neighbors. Hence, one way of dealing with common concerns and dilemmas is for states to come together through a multilateral decision-making. The Asia Pacific region exemplifies the phenomenal growth of multilateralism in the post-cold war era.
Multilateral efforts, either initiated by ASEAN or otherwise, have become a complementary approach to ensuring some stability of the regional environment. As former Director General of National Security Council Jose Almonte asserted, “We cannot have peace in isolation from our neighbors. Interdependence is the wave of the future. All countries, big or small, must accept that our fates are linked together more closely than they ever been.”
The Philippines made substantial contributions to the multilateral cooperation both in Southeast Asia and the greater Asia-Pacific. Indeed, the active participation of the Philippines in multilateral security arrangements could be considered a major highlight of the Ramos administrationís foreign policy.
In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN became a springboard for President Ramos’ foreign policy initiatives on regionalism, organized transnational crime, and the South China Sea dispute. On regionalism, the Ramos administration initiated the concept of Southeast Asia-10 (SEA-10), which gradually brought together Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, and Cambodia into the ASEAN circle. He believed that a more unified Southeast Asia would bring about greater regional stability, more prospects for economic cooperation, and bigger voice by smaller states in the international arena. However, political gains from ASEAN expansion are yet to be experienced. In fact, Southeast Asian relations with Western powers suffered with Myanmar’s entry into the ASEAN. In this instance, the ASEAN policy does not necessarily contribute to economic and political well-being of the Philippines and other Southeast Asians.
More on ASEAN cooperation, the Philippines strongly supported the expansion of dialogue and consultation at the Asia Pacific level through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Formed in 1993 through ASEAN’s initiative, the ARF was conceptualized to serve as a “high-level consultative forum that can make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence- building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.” Indeed, in a security environment characterized by uncertainty, the ARF provides at most a convenient diplomatic point of contact for small and major powers in the region. It facilitates the dialogue between regional and non- regional actors, which otherwise might not be politically possible. From its side, the Philippines made a few impressive contributions to the slow institutionalization of the ARF process. In March 1997, it co-chaired with China the ARF Intersessional Group on Confidence Building Measure (CBM) in Beijing, which reached a consensus on a number of CBMs to be undertaken by the ARF countries. It this meeting, the Philippines put priority on the discussion of landmine issue. Also within the ARF, it also proposed the creation of a regime, called ASIATOM (modeled on the European Atomic Energy Community, or EUROTOM), aimed to manage the use and shipment of nuclear energy in the Asia-Pacific. In 1998, the Philippines also served as Chairman of the ARF. In general, however, the ARF as a body, still has to prove a greater role in harnessing cooperation on more pressing security concerns of the region.