American Doctrine: Pre-landing Bombing or Bombardment with Naval Gunfire and overwhelming fire support from all sources. (US Experience in Central Pacific)
^ Amphibious
British Doctrine: Amphibious operations. Tactical surprise under the cover of darkness - limiting effects of enemy fire.--lessens casualties, and allows you to attack in high defense (British experience in North Africa and Mediterranean)
Compromise: Overall Operational plan took element of each. Daytime landing with air support...but failed (FLAWED VICTORY)
1st Infantry Division - "Big Red One" combat experienced, without them US driven back into the sea
-Adapted and overcame whatever was in front of them during push against German defenses
Low Tide vs. High Tide: Effects on landing craft.
-Low tide was best, because there were tank barriers on the beach -D-Day happened at 6:30am - that's when low tide is -12 hours later would be low tide again
Air Support that was to fly over 30 minutes before landing:
-Damaged targets, missed all barriers and barricades
4 of 35 landing crafts survived
Thesis of Argument: The plan for the Normandy invasion did not conform to the British practice of amphibious operations used in N Africa, Sicily and Italy, nor did it conform to the American practice of amphibious operations used at Tarawa, Kwajalein, Iow Jima, and other Central Pacific islands.
Question 8:
High losses in 1st Infantry caused by:
- Deliberate Defense of the Germans
- Sunken tanks (4 / 36)
- Failed bombings that didn't take out defenses
- Attack took place during the day
- Mental and physical exhaustion: attack was supposed to take place on the 5th, but was postponed, then men were fed huge breakfast, some were sick... -Still did their job, but contributed to loss of life
***Combined amphibious doctrine just didn't work the way it was