This paper aims to analyze the Hewlett Packard- Kittyhawk by taking into account “Disruptive Technologies” and “Value Network” by Christensen. In 1992, Hewlett Packard (HP) decided to produce a 1.3-inch disk drive-the Kittyhawk Microdrive, in hope to establish itself as a leader in a disk drive market. This smallest drive in the world will represent a disruptive innovation and a breakthrough in technology. A special team was dedicated to developing Kittyhawk and high hopes were laid for its revenue. However, the commercialization of Kittyhawk was a failure as a result of poor market forecast.
Recommendations from Christensen
HP followed Christensen’s recommendation to organize an independent organization for disruptive business and isolated it from mainstream business to reduce conflicts between two parties. After an internal disagreement signaled to Spenner that Kittyhawk is a disruptive technology, he effectively organized an autonomous group dedicated financially and physically only to developing Kittyhawk. This is a strength as the development team consisting of highly skilled engineers was focused, have freedom and flexibility, and top-level support. Project manager, Woito, further ensured the team members were not under the influence of HP’s cultural bias but viewed themselves as a start-up business that upheld the creed of creating something cheap, dumb and unique.
The weakness of the team lies in Spenner’s immodest and unrealistic financial goals and revenue projection. He was going to attack a new hill even though this new market has yet to be identified. The team was positively biased; they laid heavy bets and wishfully think the disruptive technology will be the company’s future. They have forgotten that such a technology is more prompted to failure and the short-term goal should be to create positive cash flow instead of huge revenue generation.
Searching for Initial Market
The team also followed Christensen’s