Foreign Policy of Russia
Andrew C. Kuchins and Igor A. Zevelev
Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change
he imminent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012 raises many questions about the future of Russian foreign and security policy as well as U.S. —Russia relations. To what extent will Putin seek to continue and implement the goals of current President Dmitri Medvedev’s modernization program? Will Putin reform the political system in the direction of decentralization of power and pluralism? Will the ‘‘reset’’ in U.S. —Russia relations endure? Even with these issues up in the air, the return of Putin as president will not significantly alter the course of Moscow’s foreign policy. Some argue that Putin never relinquished authority over foreign policy in the first place, and that may well be true. But even if it is, there are deeper structural reasons involving debates among Russian elites about foreign policy and Russia’s place in the world that are more important in explaining why Putin’s return will not usher in a significant policy shift.
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Liberals, Balancers, and Nationalists
The debating parameters over Russia’s national identity and its core foreign policy goals are rooted in five elements of Russian history.1 First, an enduring belief exists that Russia is a great power and must be treated as such. Second, that international politics is essentially a Darwinian or Hobbesian competition in which ‘‘realist’’ and ‘‘neo-realist’’ state-centric power politics is the dominant paradigm. Third, that Russia from Peter the Great 300 years ago to Putin and
Andrew C. Kuchins is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. He can be reached at akuchins@csis.org. Igor A. Zevelev is the Director of the Moscow Office of The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and can be reached at izevelev@macfound.org. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions of
Russian Foreign Policy: Continuity in Change
he imminent return of Vladimir Putin to the presidency of the Russian Federation in 2012 raises many questions about the future of Russian foreign and security policy as well as U.S. —Russia relations. To what extent will Putin seek to continue and implement the goals of current President Dmitri Medvedev’s modernization program? Will Putin reform the political system in the direction of decentralization of power and pluralism? Will the ‘‘reset’’ in U.S. —Russia relations endure? Even with these issues up in the air, the return of Putin as president will not significantly alter the course of Moscow’s foreign policy. Some argue that Putin never relinquished authority over foreign policy in the first place, and that may well be true. But even if it is, there are deeper structural reasons involving debates among Russian elites about foreign policy and Russia’s place in the world that are more important in explaining why Putin’s return will not usher in a significant policy shift.
T
Liberals, Balancers, and Nationalists
The debating parameters over Russia’s national identity and its core foreign policy goals are rooted in five elements of Russian history.1 First, an enduring belief exists that Russia is a great power and must be treated as such. Second, that international politics is essentially a Darwinian or Hobbesian competition in which ‘‘realist’’ and ‘‘neo-realist’’ state-centric power politics is the dominant paradigm. Third, that Russia from Peter the Great 300 years ago to Putin and
Andrew C. Kuchins is a Senior Fellow and the Director of the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program. He can be reached at akuchins@csis.org. Igor A. Zevelev is the Director of the Moscow Office of The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and can be reached at izevelev@macfound.org. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect positions of