In more detail, functionalism is the view that the physical realization of a functional component is not, in some sense, its essence. Rather, what makes a functional component the type it is, is characterized in terms of its role in relating inputs to outputs and its relations to other functional components. Functionalism says that mental states are understood by their relations to (a) their sensory stimulation or input, (b) other inner states, and (c) their behavior effects. It is not a meterialistic theory, but can be seen as compatible with the spirit of materialism. In Heil's view, 'although immaterial substances like spirits, are conceiveable, in all probability, every substance is a material substance. So every property posesses by a substance is posesses by a material substance' (1998 p.89). Although functionalists associate themselves with this idea of materialistic monoism, there is a dualism lurking beneath the surface. For, since any given mental state cannot be reduced to the physical
Bibliography: N. Block, "Troubles with functionalism", Rosenthal Heil, The Philosophy of Mind, 1998, Routledge S. Shoemaker, Identity, cause and mind, 1984, Cambridge University Press E. Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, 2000, Cambridge Uni. Press Braddon-Mitchel and Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, 1996, Blackwells www.trinity.edu/cbrown/mind/functionalism.html www.artsci.wustl.edu/~philos/MindDict/functionalism.html www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/functionalism.html www.edu/gsas/dept/philo.faculty/block/papers/