Functionalism: Non Reductive Physicalism

Functionalism as Non-Reductive Physicalism

As a human beings we have beliefs, desires, emotions and other ‘mental states’; and our bodies seems to react to those mental states; for instance, if believe that Wynton Marsalis will play a show, I will move my body to get the tickets before they sell out. From the completeness of the physics we know that those mental states are physical; but nonetheless, the question remains as to how to explain those mental states in physical terms? The identity theory as a first approach has been problematic, but it is not totally wrong in the sense that mental states depend upon a physical base – a brain state – the problem is that reductive methodology is prone to the criticisms of Putnam and Fodor. These
In particular it will here be argued that functionalism can be reconciled with some form of ‘identity theory’ by following some ideas proposed by Lewis(1978) and Armstrong(1981). Furthermore, it will here be argued that as functionalism supports the multiple realizability view, it also supports a robust form of non-reductive physicalism. This non-reductive physicalism position is complemented by Donald Davidson’s views on the subject.

Functionalism

Functionalism in its classic formulation has a deep connection with the computational ideas of Alan Turing. Putnam argue that there is an analogy “between logical states of a Turing machine and mental states of a human being, on the one hand, and structural states of a Turing machine and physical states of a human being” (Putnam, 1960/1975, p. 373), On the basis of this analogy, Putnam constructed his first definition of functionalism, Putnam suggests that “According to functionalism, the behaviour of, say, a computing machine is not explained by the physics and chemistry of the computing machine. It is
xiii). In other words, if a Turing machine is constituted by inputs, machines states and outputs, human mental states are analogous to the states of a Turing machine. This suggests that the natures of the mental states are best defined in terms of functional states. Thus, instead of identity, Putnam introduced the concept of realization. According to Putnam, realization allows a “distinction [in machines] between an abstract structure and its concrete realization” (Putnam, 1973/1975, p. 299). Accordingly, “[if a Turing machine] may be physically realized in an almost infinite number of different ways...” (Putnam, 1960/1975, p. 371), then, similarly, the material base is not important in the sense that is not limited to just one specific kind of brain. This is one of the key ideas of functionalism: for instance, Janet Levine suggests that “what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part” (Levine, 2013). ,[note, for Stephen: I take this quotation from the Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, but I am not sure about how to put the referece, for example page number] But what