Andrew Jackson Knowledge Argument

I believe Jackson’s ‘Knowledge Argument’ is a successful objection to ‘Physicalism’ (the doctrine that the entire world is physical), consequently proving it is false. I am of this view because the argument is successful in establishing the claim: ‘There are truths about consciousness that cannot be deduced from the complete physical truth’. In my view the ‘Knowledge Argument’ as it stands, is without an objection that entails its falsity, as Jackson and other supporters of the argument have been successful in there endeavors to defend the argument against its numerous objections. This paper will briefly discuss how the ‘Knowledge Argument’ (in its most simplistic form) successfully articulates its objection against ‘Physicalism’. The more
A defender of the Knowledge Argument might concede that, yes – you can only become acquainted with Q if you have had an experience with said property Q, but then it seems to obviously follow that to know an experience has Q, one must first be acquainted with Q! The argument assumes that one can know everything about the qualia associated with a certain experience without having the experience. This is why the argument is an unsuccessful objection to the Knowledge Argument. It may be said that a person knows all there is to know about being on fire – that is all the physical facts, such as the way and to which degree the C-fibers fire and what neurons and electrons are stimulated in the brain. But it would seem absurd to assert that the same person could know everything about the qualia associated with being on fire without actually have experienced being on fire. In the same way it seems bizarre to suggest that one could know everything about the qualia associated with colour vision without ever having experienced seeing colour. The phenomenal cannot be reduced to the physical, ergo – no amount of physical knowledge can suffice for phenomenal