General Westmoreland Leadership Style Analysis
Vietnam War Summary The Vietnam War lasted about two decades. The United States was engulfed in a civil war between North and South Vietnam and wanted to assist the south with preventing a hostile takeover by North Vietnam under the Communism banner. The Vietnam War was not only America’s longest War, but also costliest and deadliest. We spent over $150 billion and suffered close to $58 thousand American deaths and nearly 300 thousand wounded. By the time we decided to withdraw from the war, North Vietnam easily swept through the south and unified Vietnam under Communism. Still to this day, one of the most debated topics regarding the Vietnam War is why the United States got involved and why, when and how we should wage future wars. (Dunn, 2001)
Leadership Assessment of Gen Westmoreland …show more content…
In 1968 The Battle of Khe Sanh turned out to be one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War.
American Forces were led by General Westmoreland and for 77 days, roughly six thousand American forces held off twenty thousand Northern Vietnamese. Both sides claimed victory due to many counterattacks. However, General Westmoreland’s biggest critique was his overreliance on military calculations. Understanding the nature of General Westmoreland’s decisions and leadership style at the Battle of Khe Sanh are provided in the examples below:
Knowledge. Westmoreland’s preemptive planning and utilization of intelligence gave American forces the upper hand. Westmoreland convinced the President the Khe Sanh needed to be defended not abandoned. The Khe Sanh outpost split critical supply infiltration routes for North Vietnam. General Westmoreland decided to leave six thousand elite Marines there to defend Khe Sanh. He trusted in the Intelligence provided and had all the evidence needed to show that the North Vietnamese forces were building up for a large attack on Khe Sanh; it was just a question of when it would happen. (Flitton,
1998)
Skill. As the Operational Commander, General Westmoreland recognized the strengths of forces in a time where inter-service conflict was at a high, particularly with the Army and Marines and how to deploy infantry. The multiple specializations between services often made it difficult to cooperate, since it appear each service was on their own agenda (Van Creveld, 1985) He ordered the Marines to take a more offensive approach to seek and destroy the enemy. Up until that point, Marines sought out villages with a pacification approach to win the hearts and minds of the villagers. The problem with Westmoreland tactics was the demand it put on manpower. A more offensive approach meant more reinforcements and more casualties. (Flitton, 1998)
Nevertheless, the American Forces successfully defended Khe Sanh from 20,000 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong soldiers, but ignored the buildup of 70,000 North Vietnamese /Viet Cong troops in other major cities in South Vietnam. The build up around the Khe Sanh perimeter essentially was a diversionary tactic and North Vietnamese launched a surprise attack, known as the Tet Offensive in other major cities in South Vietnam. (Flitton, 1998)
Abilities. Westmoreland’s ability to effectively deploy air power contributed to an aerial bombardment that kept the Northern Vietnamese from entering the perimeter of Khe Sanh. Over 77 days, Americans forces in a joint effort from the Marines, Navy and Air Force dropped over 103 thousand tons of bombs on the Northern Vietnamese. In addition, the air support kept the Americans forces supplied with the rations and ammunition necessary to continue on the fight and medically evacuated the wounded in an efficient manner. (Flitton, 1998)
Attitude. President Johnson was worried that the North Vietnam build up would be too much for our forces to handle and might include intervention from other Communist forces, such as China and Soviet Union. However, Westmoreland was extremely confident in his plans to defend Khe Sanh, therefore he continued with his plan. Conversely, his optimism was not enough to keep the President’s confidence and American people after Tet Offensive because of our focus only in Khe Sanh. President Johnson withdrew his name from the next presidency election, relieved Westmoreland of his duties as commander of military forces in Vietnam and destroyed the Khe Sanh outpost. (Flitton, 1998)
Korean & Vietnam War Challenges
Perhaps, the biggest challenge of the Korean War was not from our enemies, but instead what was revealed about U.S. civil-military relations. Owens (2011) breaks down the civil-military relationship into three parts: the people of the state, the institutions of the state and the military of the state. Incidents from the Korean War shed light onto what can happen if the three parts of the civil-military relationship are not thinking on the same page. President Harry S. Truman had in his mind what was best for our military during the war, but so did General Douglas MacArthur. Consequently, their different views were also divided amongst the American people; the Battle of Chosin Reservoir highlights those differences.
Similar to the Korean War, the Vietnam War placed our civil-military relations under a microscope. Out of the three parts of the civil-military relationship mentioned by Owens (2011) the people of the state got extremely involved because for the first time Americans could witness combat footage on the news from their homes. According to Dunn (2001) media access gave The Vietnam War the infamous name of, “the Television War,” but sparked a huge antiwar movement because of the disconnection between what Americans saw on television and what was being reported by American leaders. Consequently, the antiwar movement drove one of our presidents out of office and forced similar leadership changes to occur militarily as mentioned in the aftermath of the Battle of Khe Sanh.
Lessons learned from Korean and Vietnam Wars
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir and Battle of Khe Sanh are historic battles exemplary of Carl Von Clausewitz On War principles. Handel (1999) argues that while On War is a difficult read, it is important nonetheless for military strategists and policy makers to understand the holistic concepts that have historically defined war. Very similar to Owen (2011) civ-mil relationship, Handel (1999) elaborates on Clausewitz’s three main characters (people, military, government) and three main components (rational, non-rational, irrational) in war and when they are aligned war will continue. In both battles the people, military and government were never in alignment and the non-rational component or unknown factors got the best of General MacArthur and Westmoreland. MacArthur plans did not include the intervention of China, just like Westmoreland could have known the North Vietnamese attack at Khe Sanh was a diversion. Although hindsight is always 20/20 and some may say Clausewitz principles are outdated because technology is not included, nevertheless On War is still of value today.
Today’s Challenges in PACOM AOR America’s only challenge militarily, economically and as the top power in the world is China. Haddick (2014) says China possess a large inventory of land and anti-ship ballistic missiles to compete with the U.S. in the western Pacific. Also, according to Allison (2015) China has already surpassed the U.S. in the following 20 indicators that determine economic power:
Manufacturer, Exporter, Trading Nation, Saver, Holder of U.S. Debt, Foreign-direct-investment destination, Energy consumer, Oil importer, Carbon emitter, Steel producer, Auto market, Smartphone market, E-commerce market, Luxury-goods market, Internet user, Fastest supercomputer, Holder of foreign reserves, Source of initial public offerings, and economy. Allison (2015) research also states that “in 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed.” Despite the following claims, war between the U.S. and China is more likely than recognized at the moment, but only time will dictate the final outcome.
Leader of the Future
My leadership assessments of General MacArthur from the Korean War and General
Westmoreland from the Vietnam War are from an antithesis approach to leadership, but that’s not to take away from all the great things that did in their careers. The intention was to get a snapshot of their leadership in a particular battle and to illustrate how important the leadership component is to the security environment. China’s growth in the PACOM AOR should be enough to keep the U.S. concerned since many feel a warlike engagement is more likely than not. Moyar (2009) contends future engagements will be of leader-centric warfare and not network-centric, population-centric or enemy-centric. Leader-centric warfare is a contest between elites in which superiority in the following leadership attributes usually wins: Initiative, Flexibility, Creativity, Judgment, Empathy, Charisma, Sociability, Dedication, Integrity, and Organization. I tend to agree with Moyar’s claim, however the attributes listed are partially innate, partially learned and partially molded by culture and since leadership is complex this list will be forever changing. All in all the leadership component of the security environment has proven to be historically important and will continue to be important today and in the future.
Leadership Assessment of Gen Westmoreland …show more content…
In 1968 The Battle of Khe Sanh turned out to be one of the longest and bloodiest battles of the Vietnam War.
American Forces were led by General Westmoreland and for 77 days, roughly six thousand American forces held off twenty thousand Northern Vietnamese. Both sides claimed victory due to many counterattacks. However, General Westmoreland’s biggest critique was his overreliance on military calculations. Understanding the nature of General Westmoreland’s decisions and leadership style at the Battle of Khe Sanh are provided in the examples below:
Knowledge. Westmoreland’s preemptive planning and utilization of intelligence gave American forces the upper hand. Westmoreland convinced the President the Khe Sanh needed to be defended not abandoned. The Khe Sanh outpost split critical supply infiltration routes for North Vietnam. General Westmoreland decided to leave six thousand elite Marines there to defend Khe Sanh. He trusted in the Intelligence provided and had all the evidence needed to show that the North Vietnamese forces were building up for a large attack on Khe Sanh; it was just a question of when it would happen. (Flitton,
1998)
Skill. As the Operational Commander, General Westmoreland recognized the strengths of forces in a time where inter-service conflict was at a high, particularly with the Army and Marines and how to deploy infantry. The multiple specializations between services often made it difficult to cooperate, since it appear each service was on their own agenda (Van Creveld, 1985) He ordered the Marines to take a more offensive approach to seek and destroy the enemy. Up until that point, Marines sought out villages with a pacification approach to win the hearts and minds of the villagers. The problem with Westmoreland tactics was the demand it put on manpower. A more offensive approach meant more reinforcements and more casualties. (Flitton, 1998)
Nevertheless, the American Forces successfully defended Khe Sanh from 20,000 North Vietnamese/Viet Cong soldiers, but ignored the buildup of 70,000 North Vietnamese /Viet Cong troops in other major cities in South Vietnam. The build up around the Khe Sanh perimeter essentially was a diversionary tactic and North Vietnamese launched a surprise attack, known as the Tet Offensive in other major cities in South Vietnam. (Flitton, 1998)
Abilities. Westmoreland’s ability to effectively deploy air power contributed to an aerial bombardment that kept the Northern Vietnamese from entering the perimeter of Khe Sanh. Over 77 days, Americans forces in a joint effort from the Marines, Navy and Air Force dropped over 103 thousand tons of bombs on the Northern Vietnamese. In addition, the air support kept the Americans forces supplied with the rations and ammunition necessary to continue on the fight and medically evacuated the wounded in an efficient manner. (Flitton, 1998)
Attitude. President Johnson was worried that the North Vietnam build up would be too much for our forces to handle and might include intervention from other Communist forces, such as China and Soviet Union. However, Westmoreland was extremely confident in his plans to defend Khe Sanh, therefore he continued with his plan. Conversely, his optimism was not enough to keep the President’s confidence and American people after Tet Offensive because of our focus only in Khe Sanh. President Johnson withdrew his name from the next presidency election, relieved Westmoreland of his duties as commander of military forces in Vietnam and destroyed the Khe Sanh outpost. (Flitton, 1998)
Korean & Vietnam War Challenges
Perhaps, the biggest challenge of the Korean War was not from our enemies, but instead what was revealed about U.S. civil-military relations. Owens (2011) breaks down the civil-military relationship into three parts: the people of the state, the institutions of the state and the military of the state. Incidents from the Korean War shed light onto what can happen if the three parts of the civil-military relationship are not thinking on the same page. President Harry S. Truman had in his mind what was best for our military during the war, but so did General Douglas MacArthur. Consequently, their different views were also divided amongst the American people; the Battle of Chosin Reservoir highlights those differences.
Similar to the Korean War, the Vietnam War placed our civil-military relations under a microscope. Out of the three parts of the civil-military relationship mentioned by Owens (2011) the people of the state got extremely involved because for the first time Americans could witness combat footage on the news from their homes. According to Dunn (2001) media access gave The Vietnam War the infamous name of, “the Television War,” but sparked a huge antiwar movement because of the disconnection between what Americans saw on television and what was being reported by American leaders. Consequently, the antiwar movement drove one of our presidents out of office and forced similar leadership changes to occur militarily as mentioned in the aftermath of the Battle of Khe Sanh.
Lessons learned from Korean and Vietnam Wars
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir and Battle of Khe Sanh are historic battles exemplary of Carl Von Clausewitz On War principles. Handel (1999) argues that while On War is a difficult read, it is important nonetheless for military strategists and policy makers to understand the holistic concepts that have historically defined war. Very similar to Owen (2011) civ-mil relationship, Handel (1999) elaborates on Clausewitz’s three main characters (people, military, government) and three main components (rational, non-rational, irrational) in war and when they are aligned war will continue. In both battles the people, military and government were never in alignment and the non-rational component or unknown factors got the best of General MacArthur and Westmoreland. MacArthur plans did not include the intervention of China, just like Westmoreland could have known the North Vietnamese attack at Khe Sanh was a diversion. Although hindsight is always 20/20 and some may say Clausewitz principles are outdated because technology is not included, nevertheless On War is still of value today.
Today’s Challenges in PACOM AOR America’s only challenge militarily, economically and as the top power in the world is China. Haddick (2014) says China possess a large inventory of land and anti-ship ballistic missiles to compete with the U.S. in the western Pacific. Also, according to Allison (2015) China has already surpassed the U.S. in the following 20 indicators that determine economic power:
Manufacturer, Exporter, Trading Nation, Saver, Holder of U.S. Debt, Foreign-direct-investment destination, Energy consumer, Oil importer, Carbon emitter, Steel producer, Auto market, Smartphone market, E-commerce market, Luxury-goods market, Internet user, Fastest supercomputer, Holder of foreign reserves, Source of initial public offerings, and economy. Allison (2015) research also states that “in 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed.” Despite the following claims, war between the U.S. and China is more likely than recognized at the moment, but only time will dictate the final outcome.
Leader of the Future
My leadership assessments of General MacArthur from the Korean War and General
Westmoreland from the Vietnam War are from an antithesis approach to leadership, but that’s not to take away from all the great things that did in their careers. The intention was to get a snapshot of their leadership in a particular battle and to illustrate how important the leadership component is to the security environment. China’s growth in the PACOM AOR should be enough to keep the U.S. concerned since many feel a warlike engagement is more likely than not. Moyar (2009) contends future engagements will be of leader-centric warfare and not network-centric, population-centric or enemy-centric. Leader-centric warfare is a contest between elites in which superiority in the following leadership attributes usually wins: Initiative, Flexibility, Creativity, Judgment, Empathy, Charisma, Sociability, Dedication, Integrity, and Organization. I tend to agree with Moyar’s claim, however the attributes listed are partially innate, partially learned and partially molded by culture and since leadership is complex this list will be forever changing. All in all the leadership component of the security environment has proven to be historically important and will continue to be important today and in the future.