Gettier's Justification
Gettier’s (1963, pp. 121-123) rejection bases itself upon two main points. Firstly, that since Smith was initially justified in believing that Jones will get the job via a credible source, the company’s president, and that Smith visually knows of the existence of ten coins in Jones’s pocket, both pieces of evidence jointly support him making the entailing proposition that “The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket” (p. 122). Secondly, Gettier assets that beliefs in propositions that are justified can be false. And as it turns out, Smith, instead of Jones, got the job. Therefore Smith’s initial proposition that “Jones…will get the job” (p. 122) is false. This is where the problem starts. Gettier believes that while Smith’s
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Lozanski (2007, p. 29) claims that Smith’s second proposition fails to prove that JTB cannot constitute knowledge because it itself would not fulfil properties of JTB. Because Smith’s inferred second proposition did not specify who “the man” (Gettier, 1963, p. 122) was referring to, if Smith had intended the person to be Jones, the proposition could not possibly be true and if it was referring to Smith himself, the conclusion Gettier appears to allude to, the proposition cannot be justifiably made based on Smith’s prior evidence. Therefore, the proposition made either way fail to constitute JTB entirely. However Lozanski’s defence of JTB, it appears, only work when the initial proposition is false. In the variant of a Gettier’s case proposed by Goldman (1976, p. 772-774), it appears that JTB would remain to be unable to constitute knowledge, despite faithfully fulling its conditions. In the example, Henry, who is driving by the countryside full of barns, points to one barn and and says that it is a barn. Unknown to him, the barn he had pointed to was the only real barn in the entire countryside of fake barns. While it would be doubtful that Henry had knowledge of the barn being real, it cannot be denied that Henry’s belief, based on visual justification, had fulfilled all aspects of JTB. It could be said that Henry, similar to Smith, had got their propositions right on a basis of luck,
Lozanski (2007, p. 29) claims that Smith’s second proposition fails to prove that JTB cannot constitute knowledge because it itself would not fulfil properties of JTB. Because Smith’s inferred second proposition did not specify who “the man” (Gettier, 1963, p. 122) was referring to, if Smith had intended the person to be Jones, the proposition could not possibly be true and if it was referring to Smith himself, the conclusion Gettier appears to allude to, the proposition cannot be justifiably made based on Smith’s prior evidence. Therefore, the proposition made either way fail to constitute JTB entirely. However Lozanski’s defence of JTB, it appears, only work when the initial proposition is false. In the variant of a Gettier’s case proposed by Goldman (1976, p. 772-774), it appears that JTB would remain to be unable to constitute knowledge, despite faithfully fulling its conditions. In the example, Henry, who is driving by the countryside full of barns, points to one barn and and says that it is a barn. Unknown to him, the barn he had pointed to was the only real barn in the entire countryside of fake barns. While it would be doubtful that Henry had knowledge of the barn being real, it cannot be denied that Henry’s belief, based on visual justification, had fulfilled all aspects of JTB. It could be said that Henry, similar to Smith, had got their propositions right on a basis of luck,