Homeland Security Intelligence Process

The Intelligence Process Between Homeland Security Intelligence
And State and Local Law Enforcement

The Intelligence Process Between Homeland Security Intelligence
And State and Local Law Enforcement The attacks on September 11th significantly impacted our nation in a number of ways, none more so than national security, our current procedures, and our way forward. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security as an executive department with the primary mission of preventing terrorist attacks in the United States (Public Law 107-296, 2002). The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commision Act of 2007 clearly identified the Department of Homeland Security State and Local Fusion Center
Initiative with the goal of providing operational intelligence to the State, Local, and regional fusion centers (Public Law 110-53, 2007). These two acts laid the ground work for the future of national security in an era where attacks on home soil were a real and evolving threat. Intelligence analysts, both criminal and federal alike, were forced to shift their scope from traditional international counter-terrorism to direct Homeland terrorism prevention inside US borders, through information fusion from the tactical state and local level to strategic analysis. After significant hurdles the basic process of information sharing is defined; however, serious challenges still exist within the Fusion Centers that need to be addressed in the ever evolving environment of Homeland tactical and strategic intelligence fusion.
This paper will look to address some of the current challenges involved with sharing information from criminal intelligence analysts in the Fusion Centers to national security intelligence analysts in the Department of Homeland Security and other intelligence agencies.
Criminal Intelligence and National Security Intelligence While Carter, L. David (2004) addresses the need for a clear distinction between law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence, the line is not easily drawn in the present day threat environment. In the past year and a half alone there have been several high profile attacks on US soil such as the shootings at the Aurora, Colorado movie theater, Sandy Hook Elementary, and the Washington D.C. Naval Yard, to the Boston Marathon bombings to name a few. At each of these events a flurry of law enforcement intelligence and national security intelligence were attempting to figure out the motives behind the attack as soon as possible
in an attempt to identify which intelligence jurisdiction it belonged in. The initial response is filled with information sharing from law enforcement and national security intelligence, media coverage from TV news networks, social networking coverage via Twitter or other information sharing services. Even post-threat information is generally widely shared and disseminated as in with the case of the Boston Marathon bombings. The gap in coordination starts with the most difficult phase, the pre-attack or planning phase of the threat. Taking the Boston Marathon bombings and the Aurora movie theater shooting as examples, both attacks resulted in significant loss of life; however, the motivations for each attack were different. The Boston bombings have clearly been identified as a case of radical Muslim views (Johnson 2013) while the Aurora shooting's motive has still not been identified, although the shooter's insanity plea was accepted in court (Healy 2013). In each of these examples the roles of criminal intelligence and national security intelligence overlap. In the case of the Aurora movie theatre shooting, initially criminal intelligence had the lead along with the first responders. As the event developed considerations for national security intelligence were included because there was not a clear motive. If the gunman had conducted the attacks with the intent to inflict terror or in the name of an extremist group then at that point the even would transition from a criminal focus to a national security focus. While it is important to have a clear line between criminal intelligence and national security intelligence often the roles overlap until an event develops. This makes the information sharing and overall fusion process more challenging for both the criminal analyst and national security analyst and needs to be considered among all of the Fusion Centers around the United States.
Standardization Among Fusion Centers
Another challenge that comes with information sharing between criminal intelligence analysts and national security analysts is the lack of standardization among the various Fusion Centers.
Since the Fusion Centers were stood up by each state they are all different in their own unique way. This means that inter-agency relationships are largely dependent on the individual’s relationships and networking abilities at each separate Fusion Center. The inherent problem here is that the processes that work especially well at one location is not being implemented on a massive scale to the rest of the Fusion Centers, potentially leaving one location with a set of challenges that could easily be correct by sharing lessons learned or implementing policy based on the success stories. In an October 2010 report, the Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General identified that some Fusion Center personnel said they rely on their local points of contact at local field offices instead of utilizing the contacts provided at headquarters. This is another example of personal contacts and relationship without a standardized process leading to varying degrees of effectiveness through the different Fusion
Centers.
Information Systems Inconsistencies
Another major challenge involved with information sharing between the Fusion Centers and the national level federal agencies is the inherent distance between all of the physical offices. According to Carter and Carter (2009) there are 72 active Fusion Centers scattered throughout the United States from coast to coast and Hawaii. The shared distance created a need for centralized information systems that could be accessed by all of the Fusion Centers. The Department of Homeland Security developed several systems to increase information sharing throughout the Fusion Centers to include the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), the Homeland Security State and Local Intelligence community of Interest (HS SLIC), and the Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN). Each system provides a unique tool to help share information at a central hub seamlessly for all of the Fusion Centers and the Department of Homeland Security. HSIN is utilized by the Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the Operations components of DHS. It is accessed on an unclassified network and through embedded DHS Intelligence Officers at some of the primary Fusion Centers, information of interest is passed on a forum board style medium. HS SLIC is a segment of HSIN that specifically focuses on Sensitive But Unclassified information and follows a similar format. HSDN is the DHS version of the Secret Internet Protocol Network and allows access to any Secret level information (2010, October). Although the idea of each of these information systems is good on paper, the implementation presents a few significant issues, the first of which being the human factor. It takes a significant effort to train every individual that would have access to each of these programs, especially when one massive implementation takes place. The most logical implementation of training would be computer based to minimize the manpower needed, but not everyone is immediately proficient with a program after a computer based training. It takes time to work on the system and learn the ins and outs. In the beginning everyone was facing this same challenge all at once which likely significantly reduced the potential functionality of the systems. Another issue is physical system availability. To access HSDN an individual must have a security clearance up to the Secret level which is not handed out to everyone involved in the information fusion process. It is kept to as few people as possible that have the need to know the higher classification information. Then a cleared individual must access a cleared vault that is coded to handle Secret level information and have the proper accounts in place to then log on to the system. While having access to HSDN in an emergency situation is good to have, it is not practical in a high paced environment during and after a major attack on the homeland. These problems are just skimming the surface of the hurdles that come with the information systems involved in the information sharing process. As time moves on and lessons are learned the systems will eventually be more streamlined, but until then these challenges exist at all Fusion Centers to varying degrees.
Conclusion
With an ever evolving enemy and threat to Homeland it is crucial that we adapt our security measure, practices, and procedures to meet the threat. Serious challenges still exist within the Fusion Centers that need to be addressed to different degrees. No process is perfect, but since the attacks on September 11th, the criminal intelligence analyst and the national security intelligence analyst are becoming more and more familiar with each other’s processes and areas of interest. It will only get better, we can only hope that it does before another gap in our intelligence and information sharing leads to another intelligence failure resulting in a significant attack on US soil.
References
Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002.

Public Law 110-53, Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007

Carter, L. David. (2004). A Guide for State, Local, and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies. Law Enforcement Intelligence, page 35. Retrieved from http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e09042536.pdf

Johnson, Kevin. (2013, May 17). Tsarnaev Note Allegedly Explains Motive for Bombing. USA Today. Retrieved from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/05/16/boston-marathon- bombing-dzhokhar-tsarnaev-note-boat/2165543/

Healy, Jack. (2013, May 13). Mental Evaluations Endorse Insanity Please in Colorado Shootings. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/us/james-holmes-aurora- shooting-suspect-enters-insanity-plea.html?_r=0

OIG-11-04. (2010, October). Department of Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General.
Information Sharing With Fusion Centers Has Improved, but Information System Challenges Remain, page 12. Retrieved from http://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/OIG_11-04_Oct10.pdf

Carter, D. L.; Carter, J. G. (2009). "The Intelligence Fusion Process for State, Local and Tribal Law
Enforcement". Criminal Justice and Behavior 36 (12): 1323–1339.