Houses Of Refuge Research Paper
Until the 19th century, children were punished and confined in the same ways as adults. Early jails housed men, women, adults, juveniles, sane and insane all together.
Houses of Refuge
In the early 1800's reformers became concerned about the overcrowded conditions in the jails and the corruption youth experienced when confined with adult felons. The first House of Refuge opened in New York in 1825, as a facility exclusively for children. By the 1840's, 53 more were built around the country.
Houses of Refuge were not limited to children who had committed crimes. They were also homes for poor children, orphans, or any child thought to be incorrigible or wayward. The average number of children in any given House was 200, but some, like the …show more content…
New York House of Refuge, housed over 1,000 youth at any given time.
Training or Industrial Schools
In response to overcrowding, deplorable conditions, and reports of brutality in the Houses of Refuge, training schools were developed in the mid-nineteenth century.
Massachusetts opened the first state-operated training school for boys in 1847 and for girls in 1856. Training Schools placed a larger emphasis on schooling and vocational training.
Many of the new facilities were built outside cities. According to contemporary thinking, the city was the source of temptation and a rural setting would offer a more virtuous and simpler way of life.
Training schools are still the models of juvenile incarceration today. While the 20th century brought some changes, like the evolution of individualized diagnosis and treatment, new kinds of rehabilitative therapy, and improved educational programming, the congregate model of concentrating large number of juvenile offenders in one institution has remained.
History of the Juvenile Court
Until the late 19th century, children were tried in criminal courts along with adults. Movement for juvenile justice reform was informed by the 16th century educational reform movement in England that perceived children to be different than miniature adults, with less than fully developed moral and cognitive
capacities.
As early as 1825, the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency and other reform organizations were advocating for a separate court system for youth.
In 1899, the first juvenile court was finally established in Cook County, Illinois, and by 1925, all but two states had followed suit. Again, borrowing from the British thinking, the doctrine parens patriae (the State as Parent) was the underpinning of the newly established right for the state to intervene and to provide protection for children whose parents did not provide adequate care or supervision, such as in the case of juvenile delinquency. The primary motive of the juvenile court was to provide rehabilitation and benevolent supervision for the child.
There were significant differences in the juvenile and criminal court systems. The focus of the juvenile court was on the offender, not on the offense and on rehabilitation, not punishment. All crimes by individuals under the age of eighteen were adjudicated in a juvenile court, with rare exceptions (decided upon a case by case basis) when a waiver could transfer a youth to adult court.
The juvenile court, with its rehabilitative mission, could be much more flexible and informal than the criminal court. Due process protections, an attorney for the state and the youth were deemed unnecessary. A range of dispositional options that were related to the child's situation, and not only to the crime, was available to a judge.
In the 1950's and 60's public concern grew about the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system, not because of the rehabilitative philosophy, but because of its perceived lack of effectiveness and the number of juveniles who were detained indefinitely.
In the 1960's, the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that formalized the juvenile courts and made them more like criminal courts. Formal hearings were required in situations where juveniles were waived to adult courts, juvenile facing confinement were required to be given the right to receive notice of charges held against them, and the right to have an attorney represent them. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" had to be established, instead of just "a preponderance of evidence" for an adjudication. http://www.cjcj.org/jjic/intro.php Landmark cases:
Kent vs. United States, 383 U.S. 541 1966
Kent v. United States (383 U.S. 541, 1966), where a minor's waiver from the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to that of an adult court was reviewed. This case involved sixteen-year-old Morris Kent who, in September 1961, raped a woman and stole her wallet. The juvenile court judge waived Kent to the jurisdiction of an adult court, but without a hearing, without having talked with Kent's lawyer, and without having released a copy of the information contained in Kent's social service file, upon which the waiver decision was partly based. Kent was convicted and sentenced in adult court to a term of thirty to ninety years in prison.
On appeal, the case came before the Supreme Court in 1966. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act's waiver provisions were invalid. The ruling specified that prior to being waived to an adult court a juvenile had a right to (1) a hearing on the move, (2) access to social service reports, and (3) a statement of reasons for the waiver. In the decision the Court stated that a juvenile gets the worst of both worlds: neither the protection of the Constitution adults take for granted, not the care and treatment promised by the juvenile court.
Gault 387 U.S. at 16 Paulson, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev 547 (1957
The juvenile court system was revolutionized in 1967, with the Supreme Court's landmark Gault3 case. In the Gault case, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court, in spite of its best intentions, had not been adequately meeting the needs of children. The Court ruled that, under the Constitution, children in delinquency cases are entitled to due process rights. These include the right to a court-appointed lawyer, the right to be notified of the charges against them, the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and the privileges against self-incrimination. The Gault decision was a clear departure from the former view of the juvenile court as a benevolent system where judges had unlimited discretion to tend to children's needs. Since Gault was decided, all juvenile court actions (not only delinquency cases) have become more procedurally technical. The rights of children and parents have continued to be expanded and redefined, both by judges' decisions and by new laws.4
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
In 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in New Jersey found two girls smoking in a restroom. At the school, smoking in the restrooms was a violation of school rules; smoking was allowed only in the designated smoking area. The teacher escorted the two girls to the principal's office, where they met with an assistant vice principal, Theodore Choplick. One of the girls was T.L.O., a freshman who was 14 years old. The girl who was with T.L.O. admitted that she had been smoking; T.L.O., however, denied the allegation, and said that she did not, in fact, smoke at all.
Choplick took T.L.O. into his office and instructed her to turn over her purse. He opened the purse and found a pack of cigarettes. He took the cigarettes out of the purse and showed them to T.L.O., accusing her of having lied about smoking in the restroom. As he removed the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers, which he believed were an indicator of involvement with marijuana. Therefore, he proceeded with a more thorough search of T.L.O.'s purse. This search yielded the following items: a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a significant amount of money in one-dollar bills, a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and letters implicating T.L.O. in dealing marijuana.
Choplick then called T.L.O.'s mother and the police. The mother came to the school and, at the request of the police, took her daughter to the police station. Choplick turned the evidence from the purse over to the police. At the police station, T.L.O. admitted that she had been selling marijuana at school. As a result of T.L.O.'s confession and the evidence from her purse, the State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County.
T.L.O. tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. She also claimed that her confession should be suppressed on the grounds that it was tainted by the unlawful search. The juvenile court rejected her Fourth Amendment arguments, although it conceded that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials. However, it held that a school official may search a student if that official has a "reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies." This is a lower standard than the "probable cause" standard, which is required when police conduct a search.
The juvenile court concluded that Choplick's search was, therefore, reasonable. Choplick was justified in searching the purse, the Court said, because of his reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had violated school rules by smoking in the restroom. When he opened the purse, evidence of marijuana use was in plain view; this justified the further search of the purse. T.L.O. was found to be a delinquent and, in January 1982, she was sentenced to one year of probation.
T.L.O. appealed her conviction to the appellate division, which found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, but returned the case to juvenile court for determination of a possible Fifth Amendment problem with T.L.O.'s confession. T.L.O. then appealed the appellate division's Fourth Amendment ruling to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate division's ruling and ordered the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse suppressed. The New Jersey Court relied on Supreme Court of the United States precedent to hold that whenever an "official" search violates constitutional rights, the evidence may not be used in a criminal case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that Choplick's search was not reasonable. Mere possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules; therefore, a desire for evidence of smoking in the restroom did not justify the search. In addition, the further search of the purse was not justified by the presence of cigarette rolling papers.
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. In 1985, the Court handed down its decision.
United States: Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Death Penalty
On March 1, 2005, marking a landmark decision for human rights, the United States Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Relying on the opinions of international and domestic human rights groups - including an amicus brief by Human Rights Watch - the Court found that the death penalty was unconstitutionally cruel for people who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. Prior to the decision, the United States was one of only six countries in the world that allowed the juvenile death penalty. Human Rights Watch has long argued that juvenile offenders should not be subject to the same punishment as adults, particularly given their unique capacity for rehabilitation. We applaud the Court's decision, but continue to spotlight the brutality of "life without parole" sentences, which condemn juvenile offenders to languish for a lifetime in adult prisons with little access to education or rehabilitation. R
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9912_2/juv2.html
U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on the character and procedures of the juvenile justice system The Supreme Court has made its mark on juvenile justice Issues arising from juvenile delinquency proceedings rarely come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning in the late 1960's, however, the Court decided a series of landmark cases that dramatically changed the character and procedures of the juvenile justice system.Kent v. United States383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966)In 1961, while on probation from an earlier case, Morris Kent, age 16, was charged with rape and robbery. Kent confessed to the offense as well as to several similar incidents. Assuming that the District of Columbia juvenile court would consider waiving jurisdiction to the adult system, Kent's attorney filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.The juvenile court judge did not rule on this motion filed by Kent's attorney. Instead, he entered a motion stating that the court was waiving jurisdiction after making a "full investigation." The judge did not describe the investigation or the grounds for the waiver. Kent was subsequently found guilty in criminal court on six counts of housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison.Kent's lawyer sought to have the criminal indictment dismissed, arguing that the waiver had been invalid. He also appealed the waiver and filed a writ of habeas corpus asking the State to justify Kent's detention. Appellate courts rejected both the appeal and the writ, refused to scrutinize the judge's "investigation," and accepted the waiver as valid. In appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Kent's attorney argued that the judge had not made a complete investigation and that Kent was denied constitutional rights simply because he was a minor.The Court ruled the waiver invalid, stating that Kent was entitled to a hearing that measured up to "the essentials of due process and fair treatment," that Kent's counsel should have had access to all records involved in the waiver, and that the judge should have provided a written statement of the reasons for waiver.Technically, the Kent decision applied only to D.C. courts, but its impact was more widespread. The Court raised a potential constitutional challenge to parens patriae as the foundation of the juvenile court. In its past decisions, the Court had interpreted the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to mean that certain classes of people could receive less due process if a "compensating benefit" came with this lesser protection. In theory, the juvenile court provided less due process but a greater concern for the interests of the juvenile. The Court referred to evidence that this compensating benefit may not exist in reality and that juveniles may receive the "worst of both worlds""neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."In re Gault387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)Gerald Gault, age 15, was on probation in Arizona for a minor property offense when, in 1964, he and a friend made a crank telephone call to an adult neighbor, asking her, "Are your cherries ripe today?" and "Do you have big bombers?" Identified by the neighbor, the youth were arrested and detained.The victim did not appear at the adjudication hearing, and the court never resolved the issue of whether Gault made the "obscene" remarks. Gault was committed to a training school for the period of his minority. The maximum sentence for an adult would have been a $50 fine or 2 months in jail.An attorney obtained for Gault after the trial filed a writ of habeas corpus that was eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue presented in the case was that Gault's constitutional rights (to notice of charges, counsel, questioning of witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, a transcript of the proceedings, and appellate review) were denied.The Court ruled that in hearings that could result in commitment to an institution, juveniles have the right to notice and counsel, to question witnesses, and to protection against self-incrimination. The Court did not rule on a juvenile's right to appellate review or transcripts, but encouraged the States to provide those rights.The Court based its ruling on the fact that Gault was being punished rather than helped by the juvenile court. The Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as the founding principle of juvenile justice, describing the concept as murky and of dubious historical relevance. The Court concluded that the handling of Gault's case violated the due process clause of the 14th amendment: "Juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." In re Winship397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)Samuel Winship, age 12, was charged with stealing $112 from a woman's purse in a store. A store employee claimed to have seen Winship running from the scene just before the woman noticed the money was missing; others in the store stated that the employee was not in a position to see the money being taken.Winship was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a training school. New York juvenile courts operated under the civil court standard of a "preponderance of evidence." The court agreed with Winship's attorney that there was "reasonable doubt" of Winship's guilt, but based its ruling on the "preponderance" of evidence.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the central issue in the case was whether "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" should be considered among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process. The Court rejected lower court arguments that juvenile courts were not required to operate on the same standards as adult courts because juvenile courts were designed to "save" rather than to "punish" children. The Court ruled that the "reasonable doubt" standard should be required in all delinquency adjudications. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971)Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. He and 20 to 30 other youth allegedly chased 3 youth and took 25 cents from them. McKeiver met with his attorney for only a few minutes before his adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, his attorney's request for a jury trial was denied by the court. He was subsequently adjudicated and placed on probation. The State supreme court cited recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that had attempted to include more due process in juvenile court proceedings without eroding the essential benefits of the juvenile court. The State supreme court affirmed the lower court, arguing that of all due process rights, trial by jury is most likely to "destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings." The U.S. Supreme Court found that the due process clause of the 14th amendment did not require jury trials in juvenile court. The impact of the Court's Gault and Winship decisions was to enhance the accuracy of the juvenile court process in the fact-finding stage. In McKeiver, the Court argued that juries are not known to be more accurate than judges in the adjudication stage and could be disruptive to the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court, tending to make it more adversarial.Breed v. Jones421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, was charged with armed robbery. Jones appeared in Los Angeles juvenile court and was adjudicated delinquent on the original charge and two other robberies. At the dispositional hearing, the judge waived jurisdiction over the case to criminal court. Counsel for Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the waiver to criminal court violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The court denied this petition, saying that Jones had not been tried twice because juvenile adjudication is not a "trial" and does not place a youth in jeopardy.Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an adjudication in juvenile court, in which a juvenile is found to have violated a criminal statute, is equivalent to a trial in criminal court. Thus, Jones had been placed in double jeopardy. The Court also specified that jeopardy applies at the adjudication hearing when evidence is first presented. Waiver cannot occur after jeopardy attaches.Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court in and for Oklahoma City 480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977)The Oklahoma Publishing Company case involved a court order prohibiting the press from reporting the name and photograph of a youth involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The material in question was obtained legally from a source outside the court. The U.S. Supreme Court found the court order to be an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of the press. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979)The Daily Mail case held that State law cannot stop the press from publishing a juvenile's name that it obtained independently of the court. Although the decision did not hold that the press should have access to juvenile court files, it held that if information regarding a juvenile case is lawfully obtained by the media, the first amendment interest in a free press takes precedence over the interests in preserving the anonymity of juvenile defendants.Schall v. Martin467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984)Gregory Martin, age 14, was arrested in 1977 and charged with robbery, assault, and possession of a weapon. He and two other youth allegedly hit a boy on the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers.Martin was held pending adjudication because the court found there was a "serious risk" that he would commit another crime if released. Martin's attorney filed a habeas corpus action challenging the fundamental fairness of preventive detention. The lower appellate courts reversed the juvenile court's detention order, arguing in part that pretrial detention is essentially punishment because many juveniles detained before trial are released before, or immediately after, adjudication.The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the preventive detention statute. The Court stated that preventive detention serves a legitimate State objective in protecting both the juvenile and society from pretrial crime and is not intended to punish the juvenile. The Court found there were enough procedures in place to protect juveniles from wrongful deprivation of liberty. The protections were provided by notice, a statement of the facts and reasons for detention, and a probable cause hearing within a short time. The Court also reasserted the parens patriae interests of the State in promoting the welfare of children.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=38&did=885
By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court on March 1, 2005 held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, JJ.) stated:
When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.
The Court reaffirmed the necessity of referring to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. The Court reasoned that the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of states, the infrequent use of the punishment even where it remains on the books, and the consistent trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty demonstrated a national consensus against the practice. The Court determined that today our society views juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.
Houses of Refuge
In the early 1800's reformers became concerned about the overcrowded conditions in the jails and the corruption youth experienced when confined with adult felons. The first House of Refuge opened in New York in 1825, as a facility exclusively for children. By the 1840's, 53 more were built around the country.
Houses of Refuge were not limited to children who had committed crimes. They were also homes for poor children, orphans, or any child thought to be incorrigible or wayward. The average number of children in any given House was 200, but some, like the …show more content…
New York House of Refuge, housed over 1,000 youth at any given time.
Training or Industrial Schools
In response to overcrowding, deplorable conditions, and reports of brutality in the Houses of Refuge, training schools were developed in the mid-nineteenth century.
Massachusetts opened the first state-operated training school for boys in 1847 and for girls in 1856. Training Schools placed a larger emphasis on schooling and vocational training.
Many of the new facilities were built outside cities. According to contemporary thinking, the city was the source of temptation and a rural setting would offer a more virtuous and simpler way of life.
Training schools are still the models of juvenile incarceration today. While the 20th century brought some changes, like the evolution of individualized diagnosis and treatment, new kinds of rehabilitative therapy, and improved educational programming, the congregate model of concentrating large number of juvenile offenders in one institution has remained.
History of the Juvenile Court
Until the late 19th century, children were tried in criminal courts along with adults. Movement for juvenile justice reform was informed by the 16th century educational reform movement in England that perceived children to be different than miniature adults, with less than fully developed moral and cognitive
capacities.
As early as 1825, the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency and other reform organizations were advocating for a separate court system for youth.
In 1899, the first juvenile court was finally established in Cook County, Illinois, and by 1925, all but two states had followed suit. Again, borrowing from the British thinking, the doctrine parens patriae (the State as Parent) was the underpinning of the newly established right for the state to intervene and to provide protection for children whose parents did not provide adequate care or supervision, such as in the case of juvenile delinquency. The primary motive of the juvenile court was to provide rehabilitation and benevolent supervision for the child.
There were significant differences in the juvenile and criminal court systems. The focus of the juvenile court was on the offender, not on the offense and on rehabilitation, not punishment. All crimes by individuals under the age of eighteen were adjudicated in a juvenile court, with rare exceptions (decided upon a case by case basis) when a waiver could transfer a youth to adult court.
The juvenile court, with its rehabilitative mission, could be much more flexible and informal than the criminal court. Due process protections, an attorney for the state and the youth were deemed unnecessary. A range of dispositional options that were related to the child's situation, and not only to the crime, was available to a judge.
In the 1950's and 60's public concern grew about the effectiveness of the juvenile justice system, not because of the rehabilitative philosophy, but because of its perceived lack of effectiveness and the number of juveniles who were detained indefinitely.
In the 1960's, the Supreme Court made a series of decisions that formalized the juvenile courts and made them more like criminal courts. Formal hearings were required in situations where juveniles were waived to adult courts, juvenile facing confinement were required to be given the right to receive notice of charges held against them, and the right to have an attorney represent them. "Proof beyond a reasonable doubt" had to be established, instead of just "a preponderance of evidence" for an adjudication. http://www.cjcj.org/jjic/intro.php Landmark cases:
Kent vs. United States, 383 U.S. 541 1966
Kent v. United States (383 U.S. 541, 1966), where a minor's waiver from the jurisdiction of a juvenile court to that of an adult court was reviewed. This case involved sixteen-year-old Morris Kent who, in September 1961, raped a woman and stole her wallet. The juvenile court judge waived Kent to the jurisdiction of an adult court, but without a hearing, without having talked with Kent's lawyer, and without having released a copy of the information contained in Kent's social service file, upon which the waiver decision was partly based. Kent was convicted and sentenced in adult court to a term of thirty to ninety years in prison.
On appeal, the case came before the Supreme Court in 1966. The Court reversed the conviction, holding that the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act's waiver provisions were invalid. The ruling specified that prior to being waived to an adult court a juvenile had a right to (1) a hearing on the move, (2) access to social service reports, and (3) a statement of reasons for the waiver. In the decision the Court stated that a juvenile gets the worst of both worlds: neither the protection of the Constitution adults take for granted, not the care and treatment promised by the juvenile court.
Gault 387 U.S. at 16 Paulson, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn. L. Rev 547 (1957
The juvenile court system was revolutionized in 1967, with the Supreme Court's landmark Gault3 case. In the Gault case, the Supreme Court found that the juvenile court, in spite of its best intentions, had not been adequately meeting the needs of children. The Court ruled that, under the Constitution, children in delinquency cases are entitled to due process rights. These include the right to a court-appointed lawyer, the right to be notified of the charges against them, the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and the privileges against self-incrimination. The Gault decision was a clear departure from the former view of the juvenile court as a benevolent system where judges had unlimited discretion to tend to children's needs. Since Gault was decided, all juvenile court actions (not only delinquency cases) have become more procedurally technical. The rights of children and parents have continued to be expanded and redefined, both by judges' decisions and by new laws.4
New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985)
In 1980, a teacher at Piscataway High School in New Jersey found two girls smoking in a restroom. At the school, smoking in the restrooms was a violation of school rules; smoking was allowed only in the designated smoking area. The teacher escorted the two girls to the principal's office, where they met with an assistant vice principal, Theodore Choplick. One of the girls was T.L.O., a freshman who was 14 years old. The girl who was with T.L.O. admitted that she had been smoking; T.L.O., however, denied the allegation, and said that she did not, in fact, smoke at all.
Choplick took T.L.O. into his office and instructed her to turn over her purse. He opened the purse and found a pack of cigarettes. He took the cigarettes out of the purse and showed them to T.L.O., accusing her of having lied about smoking in the restroom. As he removed the cigarettes, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers, which he believed were an indicator of involvement with marijuana. Therefore, he proceeded with a more thorough search of T.L.O.'s purse. This search yielded the following items: a small amount of marijuana, a pipe, empty plastic bags, a significant amount of money in one-dollar bills, a list of students who owed T.L.O. money, and letters implicating T.L.O. in dealing marijuana.
Choplick then called T.L.O.'s mother and the police. The mother came to the school and, at the request of the police, took her daughter to the police station. Choplick turned the evidence from the purse over to the police. At the police station, T.L.O. admitted that she had been selling marijuana at school. As a result of T.L.O.'s confession and the evidence from her purse, the State of New Jersey brought delinquency charges against T.L.O. in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Middlesex County.
T.L.O. tried to have the evidence from her purse suppressed, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment. She also claimed that her confession should be suppressed on the grounds that it was tainted by the unlawful search. The juvenile court rejected her Fourth Amendment arguments, although it conceded that the Fourth Amendment applies to searches by school officials. However, it held that a school official may search a student if that official has a "reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or reasonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce school policies." This is a lower standard than the "probable cause" standard, which is required when police conduct a search.
The juvenile court concluded that Choplick's search was, therefore, reasonable. Choplick was justified in searching the purse, the Court said, because of his reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. had violated school rules by smoking in the restroom. When he opened the purse, evidence of marijuana use was in plain view; this justified the further search of the purse. T.L.O. was found to be a delinquent and, in January 1982, she was sentenced to one year of probation.
T.L.O. appealed her conviction to the appellate division, which found no violation of the Fourth Amendment, but returned the case to juvenile court for determination of a possible Fifth Amendment problem with T.L.O.'s confession. T.L.O. then appealed the appellate division's Fourth Amendment ruling to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the appellate division's ruling and ordered the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse suppressed. The New Jersey Court relied on Supreme Court of the United States precedent to hold that whenever an "official" search violates constitutional rights, the evidence may not be used in a criminal case. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that Choplick's search was not reasonable. Mere possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school rules; therefore, a desire for evidence of smoking in the restroom did not justify the search. In addition, the further search of the purse was not justified by the presence of cigarette rolling papers.
In 1983, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the State of New Jersey's petition for certiorari. In 1985, the Court handed down its decision.
United States: Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile Death Penalty
On March 1, 2005, marking a landmark decision for human rights, the United States Supreme Court abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders. Relying on the opinions of international and domestic human rights groups - including an amicus brief by Human Rights Watch - the Court found that the death penalty was unconstitutionally cruel for people who were under the age of eighteen at the time of their crimes. Prior to the decision, the United States was one of only six countries in the world that allowed the juvenile death penalty. Human Rights Watch has long argued that juvenile offenders should not be subject to the same punishment as adults, particularly given their unique capacity for rehabilitation. We applaud the Court's decision, but continue to spotlight the brutality of "life without parole" sentences, which condemn juvenile offenders to languish for a lifetime in adult prisons with little access to education or rehabilitation. R
http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/9912_2/juv2.html
U.S. Supreme Court cases have had an impact on the character and procedures of the juvenile justice system The Supreme Court has made its mark on juvenile justice Issues arising from juvenile delinquency proceedings rarely come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Beginning in the late 1960's, however, the Court decided a series of landmark cases that dramatically changed the character and procedures of the juvenile justice system.Kent v. United States383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966)In 1961, while on probation from an earlier case, Morris Kent, age 16, was charged with rape and robbery. Kent confessed to the offense as well as to several similar incidents. Assuming that the District of Columbia juvenile court would consider waiving jurisdiction to the adult system, Kent's attorney filed a motion requesting a hearing on the issue of jurisdiction.The juvenile court judge did not rule on this motion filed by Kent's attorney. Instead, he entered a motion stating that the court was waiving jurisdiction after making a "full investigation." The judge did not describe the investigation or the grounds for the waiver. Kent was subsequently found guilty in criminal court on six counts of housebreaking and robbery and sentenced to 30 to 90 years in prison.Kent's lawyer sought to have the criminal indictment dismissed, arguing that the waiver had been invalid. He also appealed the waiver and filed a writ of habeas corpus asking the State to justify Kent's detention. Appellate courts rejected both the appeal and the writ, refused to scrutinize the judge's "investigation," and accepted the waiver as valid. In appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Kent's attorney argued that the judge had not made a complete investigation and that Kent was denied constitutional rights simply because he was a minor.The Court ruled the waiver invalid, stating that Kent was entitled to a hearing that measured up to "the essentials of due process and fair treatment," that Kent's counsel should have had access to all records involved in the waiver, and that the judge should have provided a written statement of the reasons for waiver.Technically, the Kent decision applied only to D.C. courts, but its impact was more widespread. The Court raised a potential constitutional challenge to parens patriae as the foundation of the juvenile court. In its past decisions, the Court had interpreted the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to mean that certain classes of people could receive less due process if a "compensating benefit" came with this lesser protection. In theory, the juvenile court provided less due process but a greater concern for the interests of the juvenile. The Court referred to evidence that this compensating benefit may not exist in reality and that juveniles may receive the "worst of both worlds""neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."In re Gault387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (1967)Gerald Gault, age 15, was on probation in Arizona for a minor property offense when, in 1964, he and a friend made a crank telephone call to an adult neighbor, asking her, "Are your cherries ripe today?" and "Do you have big bombers?" Identified by the neighbor, the youth were arrested and detained.The victim did not appear at the adjudication hearing, and the court never resolved the issue of whether Gault made the "obscene" remarks. Gault was committed to a training school for the period of his minority. The maximum sentence for an adult would have been a $50 fine or 2 months in jail.An attorney obtained for Gault after the trial filed a writ of habeas corpus that was eventually heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The issue presented in the case was that Gault's constitutional rights (to notice of charges, counsel, questioning of witnesses, protection against self-incrimination, a transcript of the proceedings, and appellate review) were denied.The Court ruled that in hearings that could result in commitment to an institution, juveniles have the right to notice and counsel, to question witnesses, and to protection against self-incrimination. The Court did not rule on a juvenile's right to appellate review or transcripts, but encouraged the States to provide those rights.The Court based its ruling on the fact that Gault was being punished rather than helped by the juvenile court. The Court explicitly rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as the founding principle of juvenile justice, describing the concept as murky and of dubious historical relevance. The Court concluded that the handling of Gault's case violated the due process clause of the 14th amendment: "Juvenile court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure." In re Winship397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970)Samuel Winship, age 12, was charged with stealing $112 from a woman's purse in a store. A store employee claimed to have seen Winship running from the scene just before the woman noticed the money was missing; others in the store stated that the employee was not in a position to see the money being taken.Winship was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a training school. New York juvenile courts operated under the civil court standard of a "preponderance of evidence." The court agreed with Winship's attorney that there was "reasonable doubt" of Winship's guilt, but based its ruling on the "preponderance" of evidence.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, the central issue in the case was whether "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" should be considered among the "essentials of due process and fair treatment" required during the adjudicatory stage of the juvenile court process. The Court rejected lower court arguments that juvenile courts were not required to operate on the same standards as adult courts because juvenile courts were designed to "save" rather than to "punish" children. The Court ruled that the "reasonable doubt" standard should be required in all delinquency adjudications. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971)Joseph McKeiver, age 16, was charged with robbery, larceny, and receiving stolen goods. He and 20 to 30 other youth allegedly chased 3 youth and took 25 cents from them. McKeiver met with his attorney for only a few minutes before his adjudicatory hearing. At the hearing, his attorney's request for a jury trial was denied by the court. He was subsequently adjudicated and placed on probation. The State supreme court cited recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that had attempted to include more due process in juvenile court proceedings without eroding the essential benefits of the juvenile court. The State supreme court affirmed the lower court, arguing that of all due process rights, trial by jury is most likely to "destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings." The U.S. Supreme Court found that the due process clause of the 14th amendment did not require jury trials in juvenile court. The impact of the Court's Gault and Winship decisions was to enhance the accuracy of the juvenile court process in the fact-finding stage. In McKeiver, the Court argued that juries are not known to be more accurate than judges in the adjudication stage and could be disruptive to the informal atmosphere of the juvenile court, tending to make it more adversarial.Breed v. Jones421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779 (1975)In 1970, Gary Jones, age 17, was charged with armed robbery. Jones appeared in Los Angeles juvenile court and was adjudicated delinquent on the original charge and two other robberies. At the dispositional hearing, the judge waived jurisdiction over the case to criminal court. Counsel for Jones filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the waiver to criminal court violated the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment. The court denied this petition, saying that Jones had not been tried twice because juvenile adjudication is not a "trial" and does not place a youth in jeopardy.Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an adjudication in juvenile court, in which a juvenile is found to have violated a criminal statute, is equivalent to a trial in criminal court. Thus, Jones had been placed in double jeopardy. The Court also specified that jeopardy applies at the adjudication hearing when evidence is first presented. Waiver cannot occur after jeopardy attaches.Oklahoma Publishing Company v. District Court in and for Oklahoma City 480 U.S. 308, 97 S.Ct. 1045 (1977)The Oklahoma Publishing Company case involved a court order prohibiting the press from reporting the name and photograph of a youth involved in a juvenile court proceeding. The material in question was obtained legally from a source outside the court. The U.S. Supreme Court found the court order to be an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of the press. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Company443 U.S. 97, 99 S.Ct. 2667 (1979)The Daily Mail case held that State law cannot stop the press from publishing a juvenile's name that it obtained independently of the court. Although the decision did not hold that the press should have access to juvenile court files, it held that if information regarding a juvenile case is lawfully obtained by the media, the first amendment interest in a free press takes precedence over the interests in preserving the anonymity of juvenile defendants.Schall v. Martin467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403 (1984)Gregory Martin, age 14, was arrested in 1977 and charged with robbery, assault, and possession of a weapon. He and two other youth allegedly hit a boy on the head with a loaded gun and stole his jacket and sneakers.Martin was held pending adjudication because the court found there was a "serious risk" that he would commit another crime if released. Martin's attorney filed a habeas corpus action challenging the fundamental fairness of preventive detention. The lower appellate courts reversed the juvenile court's detention order, arguing in part that pretrial detention is essentially punishment because many juveniles detained before trial are released before, or immediately after, adjudication.The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the preventive detention statute. The Court stated that preventive detention serves a legitimate State objective in protecting both the juvenile and society from pretrial crime and is not intended to punish the juvenile. The Court found there were enough procedures in place to protect juveniles from wrongful deprivation of liberty. The protections were provided by notice, a statement of the facts and reasons for detention, and a probable cause hearing within a short time. The Court also reasserted the parens patriae interests of the State in promoting the welfare of children.
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=38&did=885
By a vote of 5-4, the U.S. Supreme Court on March 1, 2005 held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority (Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens, JJ.) stated:
When a juvenile offender commits a heinous crime, the State can exact forfeiture of some of the most basic liberties, but the State cannot extinguish his life and his potential to attain a mature understanding of his own humanity.
The Court reaffirmed the necessity of referring to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" to determine which punishments are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual. The Court reasoned that the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in the majority of states, the infrequent use of the punishment even where it remains on the books, and the consistent trend toward abolition of the juvenile death penalty demonstrated a national consensus against the practice. The Court determined that today our society views juveniles as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.