One of the main points in support of the decision to use the atomic bombs is that it saved American lives which would have been …show more content…
lost in two land invasions of the Japanese homeland. The first attack would be against the Southern island of Kyushu, which had been scheduled for November 1, codenamed Operation Torch. The second was against the main island of Honshu and would take place in the spring of 1946, codenamed Operation Coronet. The two operations combined were codenamed Operation Downfall. Despite there being a debate on the dropping of the atomic bombs, there is an agreement on both sides that a land invasion would have resulted in extremely high casualties, for a variety of reasons. For one, Field Marshall Hisaichi Terauchi had ordered that all allied prisoners of war were to be executed if the Americans invaded. Second, the Japanese realized, as did the Americans, that there were not many good landing sites for an invasion, and that Japanese forces would be concentrated there. Third, there was a real concern in Washington that the Japanese had made an ideological choice to fight to the death. The Japanese saw suicide as an honorable alternative rather than surrender. It was the same method for their banzai attacks in the war. In his 1944 emergency declaration, Prime Minister Tojo had called for 100 million suicide soldiers, and stated that the entire Japanese population be prepared for honorable death. For American military commanders, determining the strength of Japanese forces combined with the level of civilian resistance were the keys to preparing casualty projections.
During the war, and after, many different studies were conducted projecting the casualty count with varying results.
Despite having different number projections, there was a consensus that there would be a catastrophic loss of life. A few of the studies estimated American casualties for just the first 30 days of Operation Torch, the mission to attack the southern island Kyushu. General MacArthur, the leader of the American forces, had a study done by his staff in June of 1945, estimated 23,000 US casualties in the first 30 days. Another study by U.S. Army Chief of Staff George Marshall believed that the Americans would sustain 31,000 casualties in the first 30 days, while a third study by Admiral Ernest King, Chief of Naval Operations, put American casualties between 31,000 and 41,000. Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral Chester Nimitz, whose staff conducted yet another study, projected near 49,000 U.S casualties in the first 30 days, including 5,000 at sea from Kamikaze attacks. The studies estimating total U.S. casualties were just as varied, but once again there was a united agreement in a high loss of life. One study done by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April of 1945 projected 1,200,000 casualties and at least 267,000 fatalities. Admiral Leahy, the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, estimated 268,000 casualties. Even former President Herbert Hoover weighed in, conducting his own study, and sent a projection to President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson, with estimates of 500,000 to 1,000,000 casualties. Secretary of War Henry Stimson's staff estimated the costs at 1.7 to 4 million American casualties, including 400,000-800,000 fatalities . General Douglas MacArthur, the previously mentioned commander of the US forces for Operation Downfall, had his staff conduct their own study that continued over a few months. As time went on, and more information and research was recorded, the projections grew. In June, their prediction was 105,000 casualties for U.S.
forces after 120 days of combat. By early July, intelligence projections had U.S. casualties significantly higher. Intelligence also recorded that the number of Japanese soldiers in the main islands was near two million. However, this number increased sharply in the following weeks as more Japanese troops were recalled from the Asian mainland front for the final defense on the home front. By late July, MacArthur’s Chief of Intelligence, General Charles Willoughby, revised the previous estimate and claimed American casualties on Kyushu alone (Operation Torch) would be 500,000, or ten times what they had been on Okinawa, one of the bloodiest conflicts in the Pacific.
The methods used by the military planners to calculate the Operation Torch casualties was based on the ongoing conduct of the war and the evolving tactics used by the Japanese. When one method of warfare failed, the Japanese would switch to a new system, and the American troops would have to adapt and create a new defense. In addition, when fighting on different fronts, such as Iwo Jima and Okinawa, it became clear how difficult it would be to fight the Japanese on their home turf. The Japanese had an extensive network of tunnels throughout their island fronts, with hidden bunkers and places to put mounted machine guns to ambush American forces. On these islands and others, the Japanese had the high ground, which gave them a strategic advantage, and fought on land that they were familiar with. The Japanese forces would even fight to the last man. Assuming that the Japanese islands of Kyushu and Honshu were the same, (which they would be, according to later studies) except on a significantly larger scale, the death toll would be catastrophic for American forces.