Humanitarian Intervention: A Liberal Perspective
Humanitarian intervention: a liberal perspective
The moral legitimacy of states and the limits of sovereignty
1. Introduction
According to Slocombe (2003, p.117) there is no question that has more preoccupied the discussion of international relations than that of the legitimacy and wisdom of the use of force. Sincere efforts to substitute international institution and diplomacy for military power, the costs of multiple terrible wars, and even the potential consequences of war fought with nuclear weapons did not change the fact that threat and use of force are still the ultimate ‘last arguments’ of international relations. One very compelling aspect of the use of force within international relations is the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. …show more content…
Whitman (2005, p. 259) argues that the debate about humanitarian intervention is so compelling because it involves the three most fundamental organizational systems of human social life: law, morality and politics. In this paper humanitarian intervention is defined as the use of military force by one state within the territory of another without the latter’s consent, to protect people who are not nationals of the intervening state from violence committed or permitted by the government of the target state (Nardin, 2009, p. 297). In 1999 NATO used force against Yugoslavia with the stated aim of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, without the authorisation of the Security Council. This case highlighted the dilemma of whether is was legitimate for a group of states to act in order to prevent or halt a humanitarian emergency in cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in disagreement (Bellamy, 2002, p. 473). A few months later Australia led an intervention in East Timor, in 2011 we had the coalition military intervention in Libya, and today the question rises whether we should intervene Syria. According to Human Rights Watch the civil war in Syria, which is already taking for more than one and a half year now, is getting harder and worse. Also new evidence emerged that the Syrian air force has used cluster bombs against their own civilians (Volkskrant, 2012). The current situation in Syria raises the question again whether humanitarian intervention is morally permissible or not.
The question challenges both the non-intervention principle and the domestic analogy on which it rests (Nardin, 2009). According to domestic analogy states must respect one another’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, just like citizens must respect one another’s autonomy and bodily integrity. If one state has the right to manage its own affairs free of interference by other states, other states have no right to exercise their authority, which includes force, inside its territory. On this view intervention, for any purpose, is an act of aggression, and not permissible. But this view on humanitarian intervention forgets the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity: that states exist to protect the rights of human beings. If a state violates those rights, or allows them to be violated, this justification ceases and the state forfeits its immunity to intervention. A state cannot invoke its sovereignty to justify its violence or incompetence, thus if a government fails to protect those it governs from violence, their rights do not disappear, but the duty to defend those rights falls on others; an intervention can be a way to perform it. This duty rests on principle of beneficence or humanity, and a moral obligation to resist injustice when one can.
A big debate in literature about humanitarian intervention is one between the ‘pluralist’ and the ‘solidarists’. Pluralists argue that states need to respect common rules of the international society, and solidarists argue that the international society rests on shared goals that states cooperate to promote. Pluralists often argue that solidarists improperly supresses cultural differences and limits the liberty of states by imposing common goals. On the contrary solidarism argues against this that pluralism arbitrarily privileges sovereignty and offers an unacceptably thin concept of global justice (Nardin, 2009, p. 295). From this point of view I absolutely find myself on the side of the solidarists. I think that the conditions of global political life these days require the identification of substantive collective goals and the creation of institutionalized structures of governance to implement them.
In this normative paper I argue that humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases. My argument rests on an assumption of liberal political philosophy: it is the main purpose of states and governments to protect and secure human rights, that is, inalienable fundamental (universal) rights to which a person is entitled to because he or she is a human being. These rights are independent of history, culture, international law, national borders, and sovereignty. States and governments who violate those rights undermine the one reason that justifies their sovereignty, and thus should not be protected by international law. Furthermore, state sovereignty is an instrumental value, not an intrinsic value; it serves valuable human ends. In the second section I will elaborate on the liberal argument that favours morally permissible humanitarian interventions, and in the third, fourth and fifth section I will briefly discuss two often heard, and one less often heard objection against humanitarian intervention. These objections are (1) that humanitarian intervention violates communal integrity or similar moral status of national borders, (2) that humanitarian intervention undermines global stability, and (3) that it undermines the internal legitimacy. I will briefly elaborate on these objections, and explain why I think they do not hold stand from a liberal standpoint. And finally I will conclude this paper with a discussion in which I summarize the most important aspects of my argument.
2. The liberal argument
I will defend humanitarian intervention on principles of liberal political philosophy. Political philosophy addresses the justification of political power, and hence the justification of the state. The argument I want to make has two components. The first component is that the exercise of governmental tyranny and behaviour that typically takes place in situations of extreme anarchy are serious forms of injustice towards persons. And the second component is that external intervention is morally permissible to end this injustice.
To explain and justify the concept of a state I follow a Kantian account. This account claims that states are justified as institutions created by autonomous persons, and that the liberal state includes a constitution that defines the powers of governments in a manner with respect for individual autonomy. This way there is dealt with the dilemmas of anarchy and tyranny. According to Téson (2001, p. 7) anarchy and tyranny are two extremes in a continuum of political coercion. Téson (2001, p. 8) argues that anarchy is the complete absence of social order, which leads tot a Hobbesian war of all against all, and is a result of too little government. On the other side of the continuum there is tyranny. Here is meant a widespread human rights abuses, it is a betrayal of the very purpose for which government exists and is a case of abuse of too much government. Within anarchy persons are not able to conduct a meaningful life in common or pursue individual plans of life. And within tyranny persons are not able to pursue their own autonomous projects because of state coercion.
Humanitarian intervention is a tool to prevent that political freedom moves too much away from the centre towards either anarchy or tyranny. If governments seriously violate human rights, then others, even outsiders (governments, international organization, foreign persons) have the moral obligation to help ensure that governments respect these rights and stops violating them. One can say that outsiders have not only the duty to respect human rights themselves but also to ensure that other governments respect them. Serious violations of human rights generate obligations on others to secure individual autonomy and dignity (Téson, p. 7). Persons trapped in situations of injustice deserve to be rescued; it is our general duty to assist persons in danger if we can do it as reasonable cost to ourselves. I think that critics of humanitarian intervention mostly agree on this, but they rely on moral significance of state sovereignty, national borders, global stability, and the argument that war in itself is wrong and a crime. Thus, even for the purpose of saving peoples life, it cannot be right to support war. I, as a liberal, do not support war in any form. But I think that the deeply ingrained view that war is by definition immoral regardless of cause is not correct. I do believe that sometimes it is morally permissible to fight, even more; I think that sometimes people are even obligated to do so. In line with this argument it is interesting to realise that critics of humanitarian intervention are not pacifists. They often argue that they support the use of force in self-defence and in actions that are authorized by the Security Council. So their argument against humanitarian intervention cannot be based on a general rejection of war. Then, I briefly want to elaborate on the debate whether a legitimate state requires a thick liberal account, because in my experience this is often used as an argument against humanitarian intervention in a way that , but simply rests on a misinterpretation. John Rawls (1993, p. 66), among others, has argued that a legitimate state does not require a thick liberal account. He claims that legitimacy is unrelated to the duty of obedience, and that liberals must respect non-liberal states that fulfill some minimal functions. I foremost agree with this argument, and although it is often used as argument against humanitarian intervention, it is irrelevant for the question raised in this paper. I want to make clear that the discussion is not about how liberal states should treat non-liberal states, but about the conditions for the legitimacy of forcible humanitarian intervention. I personally think that a moral legitimate international order is one whose members are morally legitimate states. If liberal principles are valid internally, they should apply internationally as well, and a morally legitimate international society cannot tolerate morally illegitimate states as members. A legitimate state violates its own principles if it accepts illegitimate ones as equal members of international society (Nardin, 2009, p. 295). Again, this is not a reason for intervention. It is important to understand that the collapse of state legitimacy is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is reserved for the more serious cases; it is about those cases that I have defined as anarchy and tyranny. Thus, the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention does not solely depend on legitimacy of the state, but mainly on the serious forms injustice toward persons. To conclude, then, I think that states exist to protect the universal rights of human beings. This gives them the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. If a state violates those rights, or allows them to be violated, this justification ceases and the state forfeits its immunity to intervention. A state cannot invoke its sovereignty to justify its violence or incompetence, thus if a government fails to protect those it governs from violence, their rights do not disappear, but the duty to defend those rights falls on others; an intervention can be a way to perform it. Once more, state sovereignty is an instrumental value, not an intrinsic value; it serves valuable human ends.
3. Objection I: Communal integrity: national borders & sovereignty
As I said before, I do not think that critics of intervention deny the moral abhorrence of tyranny and anarchy. They just often place decisive value on sovereignty and national borders. I also assume that no one will object to government forces acting to stop massacres within a state. They start to object if those same troops cross international borders to stop similar massacres. It looks to me like this act of humanitarian rescue suddenly changes into a war. I would like to argue that the true war starts with the human rights violations by their own government. But not everyone does acknowledge this, why? I think this has for a huge part to do with the moral significance of national borders as a necessary part of the principle of sovereignty. But how can national borders have moral significance in this context? For one thing, the ironic part is that borders in the first place are a random result of past aggressions and all other kinds of morally objectionable historical fact, and in the second place I think that a great part of injustice in the world derives from the overrated importance that people assign to national borders. Think of ethnic cleansing to discrimination against immigrants, trade protections that only benefit special interests, ideas of nation, state and borders have been used to justify all kinds of harm to persons.
In spite of all that, I want to say that of course there are good reasons for respecting national borders. But none invalidates humanitarian intervention. One reason, a liberal reason, often given is that the state is the result of the free consent by autonomous individuals in civil society, and must be respected. Argued is that the sovereignty of the state and the inviolability of its borders belong to the social contract, and serve the liberal ends of respecting freedom and human rights. But I think that where government is committing major injustice against its own citizens the moral significance of national borders has no value anymore.
According to Walzer (1980) we should make a crucial distinction between domestic and international legitimacy. He argues that a government may be illegitimate internally, but that does mean that external actors are entitled to intervene and restore the legitimacy. Most of the time there still is enough fit between the people and the government to make injustice purely a domestic matter. Only when this fit is not there anymore, an intervention can be allowed. This will be the case of genocide, enslavement or mass deportation. Walzer (1980, p. 228) claims that nations have histories and loyalties that define their political process, and outsiders should not interfere with it, even if it is against their outcomes are repulsive to the liberal political philosophy. This is what he calls ‘communal integrity’. I think that this argument about communal integrity is wrong, and extremely arbitrary.
When Walzer (1980) claims that a loss of internal legitimacy is not a reason for outsiders to intervene I absolutely agree with him, but when he implicitly argues that in case of tyranny or anarchy humanitarian intervention also should not be morally permissible cannot agree. It seems to me like he argues that dictators come from society itself, like they come naturally. This basically comes down to the fact that the society is responsible there self for the injustice they suffer. Unless there is Genocide, enslavement or mass deportation there is a fit between government and the people. The best argument against this is from Luban (1980, p. 392). I quote: “The government fits the people the way the sole of a boot fits a human face: after a while the patterns of indentation fit with uncanny …show more content…
precision.” I will conclude by saying that in my opinion the right to assist and protect victims of injustice is unaffected by the moral significance of national borders. Again, I think that also this objection fails to recognise the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. Objection II: humanitarian intervention undermines global stability
One very often heard objection to humanitarian intervention is that of preserving world order. This complaint is not per se about the internal sovereignty of the state, but it is about the ‘systems of states’ that is important. By intervention, is argued, people undermine the stability of the system in two ways. First by the very act of intervening, and second by creating a dangerous precedent that, if followed by even well intentioned governments, will result in universal chaos (Téson, p. 29). And according to Téson order is preferable to chaos, even if it means tolerating injustice. This comes down to the argument that the avoidance of conflict is necessary for world order. This is also where international law comes in, we need to preserve international law and most definitely not undermine it by allowing humanitarian intervention. I think that this objection to humanitarian intervention is not really convincing. First, I am not convinced by the argument that the state system is worth to be preserved, it looks to me like the argument of preserving the system of states is based on something of a higher order. Something metaphysical, that must be preserved for the greater good. But in sake of argument I will assume it is worth preserving. Nevertheless, I think it becomes really problematic if we use victims of tyranny and other forms of injustice for the purpose of preserving the state system. Whatever de merit of the state system is, I think it cannot be achieved at that kind of human cost. Secondly, Tyranny and anarchy are as likely- if not more- to generate instability and chaos as interventions. People who support the argument of global stability often ignore this argument. This neglect is due to the fact that they simply see states as the only relevant units in international relations and ignore what happens inside. But it is very short sighted to think that as long as there is order between states, you can safely ignore what happens within them (Téson, p. 30). As Téson has pointed out, there is overwhelming evidence about the causal relation between internal upheaval and international instability. He even argues that one who is concerned with long-term stability should rationally support a general prohibition of war and a system for protection of human rights that includes a properly limited right of humanitarian intervention. Finally, I do not think that the assumption that humanitarian intervention triggers other interventions and thus world order. The non-interventionist predict that allowing humanitarian intervention will motivate governments and other international actors to over-intervene, often without a good motive. This can be empirical tested. Their have been quit some interventions the last decades. I do not think that the interventions in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia, and Libya for example have shaken the world order beyond recognition. I even think that these interventions have improved things on the whole. Another reason why humanitarian interventions do not produce other interventions is because they are very expensive. Governments have a very strong disincentive to undertake action.
5. Objection 3: the internal legitimacy
This is a seldom discussed but, especially from a liberal point of view, very interesting and important aspect of humanitarian intervention.
Can a liberal government justify to its own citizens when it intervenes on humanitarian grounds? And if so, how can they do this? I think this is a very relevant question. An often-heard ‘liberal’ argument against humanitarian intervention is that the state is just a tool for advancing the citizens’ interest and will, so in that case the government does not have the authority to engage the collective resources of the state in a humanitarian intervention because it does not owe any duties to foreigners (Buchanan, 1999). I reject this argument on the ground of a natural duty to contribute to the inclusion of all persons to live in justice. I think you should not see it as proper action of a state to pay no attention to oppression elsewhere, instead I think that states should be seen as instruments of justice, and should be used to promote and secure human rights, also human rights in other societies as long as this is done at a reasonable cost. This should also be the case for means of military humanitarian
intervention. Another argument is that governments do not have the right to force citizens to fight for the freedom of foreigners. Governments cannot force their own citizens to fight for someone else his freedom. The argument is not that humanitarian intervention should not take place because the cause is unjust, rather it should not be allowed because the government cannot force unwilling persons to fight a foreign war. I think this view overlooks the public good argument. People in a liberal society who think that we should intervene in a foreign country to end tyranny or anarchy might expect that others will make the effort. This is commonly known as the free riders problem. I think that just as one can give public good arguments to justify self-defence internally, one can give public good arguments to humanitarian intervention internally. It is the duty to assist victims of injustice in other societies; it is a problem of collective action.
6. Conclusion
In this short paper I argued why I think that humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases, and why I think that assumptions and consequences of non-interventionism are non defensible from a liberal point of view. My argument rests on an assumption of liberal political philosophy, which assumes that the main purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights. These rights are independent of history, culture, international law, national borders, and sovereignty. The exercise of governmental tyranny and behaviour that typically takes place in situations of extreme anarchy are serious forms of injustice towards persons, and therefore external intervention can be a way to end this injustice.
I briefly elaborated on three objections against humanitarian intervention, and argued why I think these arguments do not hold stand from a liberal point of view. These objections are (1) that humanitarian intervention violates communal integrity or similar moral status of national borders, (2) that humanitarian intervention undermines global stability, and (3) that humanitarian intervention undermines internal legitimacy. These objections, and especially the first who, claim to protect communal values and self-government, but have caused grievous harm to persons over time. Neither the assumptions nor the consequences of non-interventionism are defensible on basis of a thick liberal concept of global justice.
To conclude, then, I think that the principle of non-intervention denies victims of tyranny and anarchy the possibility of appealing to instances higher than their tormentors. As Téson (2001, p. 54) argues: rescuing will always be onerous, but if we do not do so, we deny the centrality of justice in political affairs and the common humanity that binds us all.
References
ANP. (15 oktober 2012) ‘Assad zet clusterbommen in tegen Syrische burgers’.Volkskrant, pp. 16.
Bellamy, A.J. (2002) Pragmatic solidarism and the dilemmas of humanitarian intervention. Journal of international studies, vol. 31, no. 3, 473-497.
Buchanan, A. (1999). The internal legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. The journal of political philosophy, vol 7, no. 1, 71-87. doi: 10.1177/03058298020310030601.
Luban, D. (1980). The romance of the nation-state. Philosophy and public affairs, vol.7, no. 4, 392-397.
Nardin, T. (2009). International political theory. In Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnely, J., Nardin, T., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C., True, J., (ed), Theories of international relations, 284-304. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 4th edition).
Rawls, J. (1993) The law of peoples. Critical inquiry, vol. 20, no. 1, 36-68.
Slocombe, W.B. (2003) Force, pre-emption and legitimacy. Survival: global politics and strategy, 45 (1), 117-130. doi: 10.1080/00396330312331343346.
Téson, F. (2001). The liberal case for humanitarian intervention. Public law and legal theory, no. 39, 2-55.
Walzer, M. (1980). The moral standing of states: a response to four critics. Philosophy and public affairs, vol. 9, no. 3, 209-229.
Whitman, J. (2005) Humanitarian intervention in an era of pre-emptive self-defence. Security dialogue, vol. 36, no. 3, 259-274. doi: 10.1177/0967010605056984.
The moral legitimacy of states and the limits of sovereignty
1. Introduction
According to Slocombe (2003, p.117) there is no question that has more preoccupied the discussion of international relations than that of the legitimacy and wisdom of the use of force. Sincere efforts to substitute international institution and diplomacy for military power, the costs of multiple terrible wars, and even the potential consequences of war fought with nuclear weapons did not change the fact that threat and use of force are still the ultimate ‘last arguments’ of international relations. One very compelling aspect of the use of force within international relations is the concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. …show more content…
Whitman (2005, p. 259) argues that the debate about humanitarian intervention is so compelling because it involves the three most fundamental organizational systems of human social life: law, morality and politics. In this paper humanitarian intervention is defined as the use of military force by one state within the territory of another without the latter’s consent, to protect people who are not nationals of the intervening state from violence committed or permitted by the government of the target state (Nardin, 2009, p. 297). In 1999 NATO used force against Yugoslavia with the stated aim of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, without the authorisation of the Security Council. This case highlighted the dilemma of whether is was legitimate for a group of states to act in order to prevent or halt a humanitarian emergency in cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in disagreement (Bellamy, 2002, p. 473). A few months later Australia led an intervention in East Timor, in 2011 we had the coalition military intervention in Libya, and today the question rises whether we should intervene Syria. According to Human Rights Watch the civil war in Syria, which is already taking for more than one and a half year now, is getting harder and worse. Also new evidence emerged that the Syrian air force has used cluster bombs against their own civilians (Volkskrant, 2012). The current situation in Syria raises the question again whether humanitarian intervention is morally permissible or not.
The question challenges both the non-intervention principle and the domestic analogy on which it rests (Nardin, 2009). According to domestic analogy states must respect one another’s political sovereignty and territorial integrity, just like citizens must respect one another’s autonomy and bodily integrity. If one state has the right to manage its own affairs free of interference by other states, other states have no right to exercise their authority, which includes force, inside its territory. On this view intervention, for any purpose, is an act of aggression, and not permissible. But this view on humanitarian intervention forgets the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity: that states exist to protect the rights of human beings. If a state violates those rights, or allows them to be violated, this justification ceases and the state forfeits its immunity to intervention. A state cannot invoke its sovereignty to justify its violence or incompetence, thus if a government fails to protect those it governs from violence, their rights do not disappear, but the duty to defend those rights falls on others; an intervention can be a way to perform it. This duty rests on principle of beneficence or humanity, and a moral obligation to resist injustice when one can.
A big debate in literature about humanitarian intervention is one between the ‘pluralist’ and the ‘solidarists’. Pluralists argue that states need to respect common rules of the international society, and solidarists argue that the international society rests on shared goals that states cooperate to promote. Pluralists often argue that solidarists improperly supresses cultural differences and limits the liberty of states by imposing common goals. On the contrary solidarism argues against this that pluralism arbitrarily privileges sovereignty and offers an unacceptably thin concept of global justice (Nardin, 2009, p. 295). From this point of view I absolutely find myself on the side of the solidarists. I think that the conditions of global political life these days require the identification of substantive collective goals and the creation of institutionalized structures of governance to implement them.
In this normative paper I argue that humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases. My argument rests on an assumption of liberal political philosophy: it is the main purpose of states and governments to protect and secure human rights, that is, inalienable fundamental (universal) rights to which a person is entitled to because he or she is a human being. These rights are independent of history, culture, international law, national borders, and sovereignty. States and governments who violate those rights undermine the one reason that justifies their sovereignty, and thus should not be protected by international law. Furthermore, state sovereignty is an instrumental value, not an intrinsic value; it serves valuable human ends. In the second section I will elaborate on the liberal argument that favours morally permissible humanitarian interventions, and in the third, fourth and fifth section I will briefly discuss two often heard, and one less often heard objection against humanitarian intervention. These objections are (1) that humanitarian intervention violates communal integrity or similar moral status of national borders, (2) that humanitarian intervention undermines global stability, and (3) that it undermines the internal legitimacy. I will briefly elaborate on these objections, and explain why I think they do not hold stand from a liberal standpoint. And finally I will conclude this paper with a discussion in which I summarize the most important aspects of my argument.
2. The liberal argument
I will defend humanitarian intervention on principles of liberal political philosophy. Political philosophy addresses the justification of political power, and hence the justification of the state. The argument I want to make has two components. The first component is that the exercise of governmental tyranny and behaviour that typically takes place in situations of extreme anarchy are serious forms of injustice towards persons. And the second component is that external intervention is morally permissible to end this injustice.
To explain and justify the concept of a state I follow a Kantian account. This account claims that states are justified as institutions created by autonomous persons, and that the liberal state includes a constitution that defines the powers of governments in a manner with respect for individual autonomy. This way there is dealt with the dilemmas of anarchy and tyranny. According to Téson (2001, p. 7) anarchy and tyranny are two extremes in a continuum of political coercion. Téson (2001, p. 8) argues that anarchy is the complete absence of social order, which leads tot a Hobbesian war of all against all, and is a result of too little government. On the other side of the continuum there is tyranny. Here is meant a widespread human rights abuses, it is a betrayal of the very purpose for which government exists and is a case of abuse of too much government. Within anarchy persons are not able to conduct a meaningful life in common or pursue individual plans of life. And within tyranny persons are not able to pursue their own autonomous projects because of state coercion.
Humanitarian intervention is a tool to prevent that political freedom moves too much away from the centre towards either anarchy or tyranny. If governments seriously violate human rights, then others, even outsiders (governments, international organization, foreign persons) have the moral obligation to help ensure that governments respect these rights and stops violating them. One can say that outsiders have not only the duty to respect human rights themselves but also to ensure that other governments respect them. Serious violations of human rights generate obligations on others to secure individual autonomy and dignity (Téson, p. 7). Persons trapped in situations of injustice deserve to be rescued; it is our general duty to assist persons in danger if we can do it as reasonable cost to ourselves. I think that critics of humanitarian intervention mostly agree on this, but they rely on moral significance of state sovereignty, national borders, global stability, and the argument that war in itself is wrong and a crime. Thus, even for the purpose of saving peoples life, it cannot be right to support war. I, as a liberal, do not support war in any form. But I think that the deeply ingrained view that war is by definition immoral regardless of cause is not correct. I do believe that sometimes it is morally permissible to fight, even more; I think that sometimes people are even obligated to do so. In line with this argument it is interesting to realise that critics of humanitarian intervention are not pacifists. They often argue that they support the use of force in self-defence and in actions that are authorized by the Security Council. So their argument against humanitarian intervention cannot be based on a general rejection of war. Then, I briefly want to elaborate on the debate whether a legitimate state requires a thick liberal account, because in my experience this is often used as an argument against humanitarian intervention in a way that , but simply rests on a misinterpretation. John Rawls (1993, p. 66), among others, has argued that a legitimate state does not require a thick liberal account. He claims that legitimacy is unrelated to the duty of obedience, and that liberals must respect non-liberal states that fulfill some minimal functions. I foremost agree with this argument, and although it is often used as argument against humanitarian intervention, it is irrelevant for the question raised in this paper. I want to make clear that the discussion is not about how liberal states should treat non-liberal states, but about the conditions for the legitimacy of forcible humanitarian intervention. I personally think that a moral legitimate international order is one whose members are morally legitimate states. If liberal principles are valid internally, they should apply internationally as well, and a morally legitimate international society cannot tolerate morally illegitimate states as members. A legitimate state violates its own principles if it accepts illegitimate ones as equal members of international society (Nardin, 2009, p. 295). Again, this is not a reason for intervention. It is important to understand that the collapse of state legitimacy is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is reserved for the more serious cases; it is about those cases that I have defined as anarchy and tyranny. Thus, the moral permissibility of humanitarian intervention does not solely depend on legitimacy of the state, but mainly on the serious forms injustice toward persons. To conclude, then, I think that states exist to protect the universal rights of human beings. This gives them the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity. If a state violates those rights, or allows them to be violated, this justification ceases and the state forfeits its immunity to intervention. A state cannot invoke its sovereignty to justify its violence or incompetence, thus if a government fails to protect those it governs from violence, their rights do not disappear, but the duty to defend those rights falls on others; an intervention can be a way to perform it. Once more, state sovereignty is an instrumental value, not an intrinsic value; it serves valuable human ends.
3. Objection I: Communal integrity: national borders & sovereignty
As I said before, I do not think that critics of intervention deny the moral abhorrence of tyranny and anarchy. They just often place decisive value on sovereignty and national borders. I also assume that no one will object to government forces acting to stop massacres within a state. They start to object if those same troops cross international borders to stop similar massacres. It looks to me like this act of humanitarian rescue suddenly changes into a war. I would like to argue that the true war starts with the human rights violations by their own government. But not everyone does acknowledge this, why? I think this has for a huge part to do with the moral significance of national borders as a necessary part of the principle of sovereignty. But how can national borders have moral significance in this context? For one thing, the ironic part is that borders in the first place are a random result of past aggressions and all other kinds of morally objectionable historical fact, and in the second place I think that a great part of injustice in the world derives from the overrated importance that people assign to national borders. Think of ethnic cleansing to discrimination against immigrants, trade protections that only benefit special interests, ideas of nation, state and borders have been used to justify all kinds of harm to persons.
In spite of all that, I want to say that of course there are good reasons for respecting national borders. But none invalidates humanitarian intervention. One reason, a liberal reason, often given is that the state is the result of the free consent by autonomous individuals in civil society, and must be respected. Argued is that the sovereignty of the state and the inviolability of its borders belong to the social contract, and serve the liberal ends of respecting freedom and human rights. But I think that where government is committing major injustice against its own citizens the moral significance of national borders has no value anymore.
According to Walzer (1980) we should make a crucial distinction between domestic and international legitimacy. He argues that a government may be illegitimate internally, but that does mean that external actors are entitled to intervene and restore the legitimacy. Most of the time there still is enough fit between the people and the government to make injustice purely a domestic matter. Only when this fit is not there anymore, an intervention can be allowed. This will be the case of genocide, enslavement or mass deportation. Walzer (1980, p. 228) claims that nations have histories and loyalties that define their political process, and outsiders should not interfere with it, even if it is against their outcomes are repulsive to the liberal political philosophy. This is what he calls ‘communal integrity’. I think that this argument about communal integrity is wrong, and extremely arbitrary.
When Walzer (1980) claims that a loss of internal legitimacy is not a reason for outsiders to intervene I absolutely agree with him, but when he implicitly argues that in case of tyranny or anarchy humanitarian intervention also should not be morally permissible cannot agree. It seems to me like he argues that dictators come from society itself, like they come naturally. This basically comes down to the fact that the society is responsible there self for the injustice they suffer. Unless there is Genocide, enslavement or mass deportation there is a fit between government and the people. The best argument against this is from Luban (1980, p. 392). I quote: “The government fits the people the way the sole of a boot fits a human face: after a while the patterns of indentation fit with uncanny …show more content…
precision.” I will conclude by saying that in my opinion the right to assist and protect victims of injustice is unaffected by the moral significance of national borders. Again, I think that also this objection fails to recognise the justification of political sovereignty and territorial integrity.
4. Objection II: humanitarian intervention undermines global stability
One very often heard objection to humanitarian intervention is that of preserving world order. This complaint is not per se about the internal sovereignty of the state, but it is about the ‘systems of states’ that is important. By intervention, is argued, people undermine the stability of the system in two ways. First by the very act of intervening, and second by creating a dangerous precedent that, if followed by even well intentioned governments, will result in universal chaos (Téson, p. 29). And according to Téson order is preferable to chaos, even if it means tolerating injustice. This comes down to the argument that the avoidance of conflict is necessary for world order. This is also where international law comes in, we need to preserve international law and most definitely not undermine it by allowing humanitarian intervention. I think that this objection to humanitarian intervention is not really convincing. First, I am not convinced by the argument that the state system is worth to be preserved, it looks to me like the argument of preserving the system of states is based on something of a higher order. Something metaphysical, that must be preserved for the greater good. But in sake of argument I will assume it is worth preserving. Nevertheless, I think it becomes really problematic if we use victims of tyranny and other forms of injustice for the purpose of preserving the state system. Whatever de merit of the state system is, I think it cannot be achieved at that kind of human cost. Secondly, Tyranny and anarchy are as likely- if not more- to generate instability and chaos as interventions. People who support the argument of global stability often ignore this argument. This neglect is due to the fact that they simply see states as the only relevant units in international relations and ignore what happens inside. But it is very short sighted to think that as long as there is order between states, you can safely ignore what happens within them (Téson, p. 30). As Téson has pointed out, there is overwhelming evidence about the causal relation between internal upheaval and international instability. He even argues that one who is concerned with long-term stability should rationally support a general prohibition of war and a system for protection of human rights that includes a properly limited right of humanitarian intervention. Finally, I do not think that the assumption that humanitarian intervention triggers other interventions and thus world order. The non-interventionist predict that allowing humanitarian intervention will motivate governments and other international actors to over-intervene, often without a good motive. This can be empirical tested. Their have been quit some interventions the last decades. I do not think that the interventions in Rwanda, Kosovo, Somalia, and Libya for example have shaken the world order beyond recognition. I even think that these interventions have improved things on the whole. Another reason why humanitarian interventions do not produce other interventions is because they are very expensive. Governments have a very strong disincentive to undertake action.
5. Objection 3: the internal legitimacy
This is a seldom discussed but, especially from a liberal point of view, very interesting and important aspect of humanitarian intervention.
Can a liberal government justify to its own citizens when it intervenes on humanitarian grounds? And if so, how can they do this? I think this is a very relevant question. An often-heard ‘liberal’ argument against humanitarian intervention is that the state is just a tool for advancing the citizens’ interest and will, so in that case the government does not have the authority to engage the collective resources of the state in a humanitarian intervention because it does not owe any duties to foreigners (Buchanan, 1999). I reject this argument on the ground of a natural duty to contribute to the inclusion of all persons to live in justice. I think you should not see it as proper action of a state to pay no attention to oppression elsewhere, instead I think that states should be seen as instruments of justice, and should be used to promote and secure human rights, also human rights in other societies as long as this is done at a reasonable cost. This should also be the case for means of military humanitarian
intervention. Another argument is that governments do not have the right to force citizens to fight for the freedom of foreigners. Governments cannot force their own citizens to fight for someone else his freedom. The argument is not that humanitarian intervention should not take place because the cause is unjust, rather it should not be allowed because the government cannot force unwilling persons to fight a foreign war. I think this view overlooks the public good argument. People in a liberal society who think that we should intervene in a foreign country to end tyranny or anarchy might expect that others will make the effort. This is commonly known as the free riders problem. I think that just as one can give public good arguments to justify self-defence internally, one can give public good arguments to humanitarian intervention internally. It is the duty to assist victims of injustice in other societies; it is a problem of collective action.
6. Conclusion
In this short paper I argued why I think that humanitarian intervention is morally justified in appropriate cases, and why I think that assumptions and consequences of non-interventionism are non defensible from a liberal point of view. My argument rests on an assumption of liberal political philosophy, which assumes that the main purpose of states and governments is to protect and secure human rights. These rights are independent of history, culture, international law, national borders, and sovereignty. The exercise of governmental tyranny and behaviour that typically takes place in situations of extreme anarchy are serious forms of injustice towards persons, and therefore external intervention can be a way to end this injustice.
I briefly elaborated on three objections against humanitarian intervention, and argued why I think these arguments do not hold stand from a liberal point of view. These objections are (1) that humanitarian intervention violates communal integrity or similar moral status of national borders, (2) that humanitarian intervention undermines global stability, and (3) that humanitarian intervention undermines internal legitimacy. These objections, and especially the first who, claim to protect communal values and self-government, but have caused grievous harm to persons over time. Neither the assumptions nor the consequences of non-interventionism are defensible on basis of a thick liberal concept of global justice.
To conclude, then, I think that the principle of non-intervention denies victims of tyranny and anarchy the possibility of appealing to instances higher than their tormentors. As Téson (2001, p. 54) argues: rescuing will always be onerous, but if we do not do so, we deny the centrality of justice in political affairs and the common humanity that binds us all.
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