Hume Is Grounded In Consent
Introduction
To have a political obligation is to have a moral duty to obey the laws of one’s state. On that point there is almost complete agreement among political philosophers but how does one acquire such an obligation? To this question many answers have been given and none till now commands reasonable assent. Several political theorists believe this obligation is grounded in consent.
‘Consent’ the dialectical apparatus that can distinguish hiking from trespass, love making from rape and boxing from assault. If x has the right that y does not Ω, consent can be morally transformative that is to say x consents to y’s Ωing which was before a violation of x’s right. (Knowles 2010: 96). This allows y to make love to her, walk around her ground or thump her in the boxing ring. It is intrinsic to acts of consent that they permit or legitimate but it is important that …show more content…
The second problem with Beitz account is the Hume’s ship example which nullifies the case. The trespasser might not have any other alternative except to remain on the landowners land.
Locke can be pushed back to the position that we are obligated neither by your own consent nor by that of the majority but by the consent that rational men in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’ would have to give. However the constraint that one cannot voluntarily transfer to a political authority rights over oneself. One does not possess seems to leave more room for voluntary consent to tyrannical government than Locke seem to want to allow. I could even if irrationally-voluntarily confer whatever rights over myself and property I own over any type of political ruler and so could everyone else.
Section
To have a political obligation is to have a moral duty to obey the laws of one’s state. On that point there is almost complete agreement among political philosophers but how does one acquire such an obligation? To this question many answers have been given and none till now commands reasonable assent. Several political theorists believe this obligation is grounded in consent.
‘Consent’ the dialectical apparatus that can distinguish hiking from trespass, love making from rape and boxing from assault. If x has the right that y does not Ω, consent can be morally transformative that is to say x consents to y’s Ωing which was before a violation of x’s right. (Knowles 2010: 96). This allows y to make love to her, walk around her ground or thump her in the boxing ring. It is intrinsic to acts of consent that they permit or legitimate but it is important that …show more content…
The second problem with Beitz account is the Hume’s ship example which nullifies the case. The trespasser might not have any other alternative except to remain on the landowners land.
Locke can be pushed back to the position that we are obligated neither by your own consent nor by that of the majority but by the consent that rational men in a hypothetical ‘state of nature’ would have to give. However the constraint that one cannot voluntarily transfer to a political authority rights over oneself. One does not possess seems to leave more room for voluntary consent to tyrannical government than Locke seem to want to allow. I could even if irrationally-voluntarily confer whatever rights over myself and property I own over any type of political ruler and so could everyone else.
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