Imperialism In Venezuela

Although adamantly against attending Belgrade, in 1964, Venezuela sent an observer to the Cairo Conference. Their representative, Dr. Antonio Araujo, publicly “supported the conference's attitude towards imperialism, racial discrimination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes, and referred to Venezuela's experience of foreign interference in its oil industry.” The process of inviting Venezuela to the Second Non-Aligned meeting was decidedly more dramatic than the event itself, revealing some intricacies in the relations between Cuba, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Cuba was vehemently opposed to Venezuela’s attendance, considering them to be little more than “an instrument of American imperialism,” and a “servile anti-Cuban tool.” The Cuban
press attacked Yugoslavia for its role in securing an invitation for Venezuela, and President Dorticós of Cuba was apparently “furious that Yugoslavia should support such a vile puppet of the United States.” Indeed, the Cubans deeply resented Yugoslavian efforts in Latin America. Tito’s trip to Latin America, and his push for the greater involvement of Latin American nations (most of which had representative democracies and were allied with the United States) in the NAM conference counteracted Cuba’s vision of a communist Latin America. Venezuela and Cuba were on particularly bad terms. During the period from 1958 to 1963, US policies toward democrats, like Rómulo Betancourt, and dictators, like Trujillo and his henchmen, hinged, as President Kennedy confessed, on the tactical question of which type of government and leader would he most effective in thwarting Fidel Castro. Venezuela, one of the more liberal democracies in Latin America, was attempting land reform with the United States’ Alliance for Progress. At the same time, they fought a violent counterinsurgency campaign against guerrillas backed by Cuba. Ideologically, Cuba and Venezuela were at opposite ends of the spectrum. The Cuban vision of Latin America: “radical nationalisation of the land and complete expropriation of foreign properties,” was fundamentally at odds with that of Venezuela. The FO noticed that by taking offense at Venezuela’s invitation, Cuba had exposed itself to the hypocritical absurdity of its own participation: “Except for attending Belgrade Conferences, of course, the Cubans make no pretense of being other than 103% aligned.” The Yugoslavian ambassador’s response to Cuban outrage was to make note of the fact that, “if Venezuela appears to Cuban eyes a puppet of the US, it must not be forgotten that to some people Cuba appears a puppet of the Soviet Union….” As Cuban-Russian relations were not at their height in this period, this would likely have angered the Cubans. Obviously, they did not succeed in barring the Venezuelans or other Latin American democracies from Cairo. In an interview on CMQ Television given by Doctor Raúl Roa who accompanied President Dorticós to the Cairo Conference, Roa gives a candid opinion of Cuba’s experience.
Roa found Africa and Asia to be extremely warm and friendly, and recalls forming bonds with representatives of African and Asian nations. He believed the source of the positive response he experienced was due to the inspiration Cuba must be for the African countries, especially those which still lacked independence. Roa was expressly irritated at the presence of Venezuela, claiming the obvious reason for his displeasure was the inability to accept a representative of “this ‘squatting gorilla’ Rómulo Betancourt.” With regard to the other Latin American observers, Roa explained that they “played the most ignominious role imaginable: in a single word, they were ridiculous. Not only were they isolated; They, and particularly the Venezuelan delegate, were utterly characterless, colourless and insipid.” Roa’s insults, while amusing, are also indicative of the degree of disdain and frustration held by Cubans toward the Latin American governments. While Cuba’s own position of nonalignment seems dubious at best, it is hypocritical of them to anger at other Latin American attendance (who, in turn, felt the same about Cuba). Roa found that “the position of all the Latin American countries, with the exception of Mexico, was utterly
absurd.” Mexico was given a pass from Cuba’s ire.
Mexico’s approach to both Cuba and the NAM were unique to Mexico. It was the sole nation to refuse to break diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1962, and remained the only state in the Western Hemisphere to maintain relations with Cuba until 1970. Mexico also uniquely did not vote for Cuba’s elimination from the OAS, and opposed the 1964 resolution which involved breaking economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba. Vanni Pettiná outlines President Adolfo López Mateos’ efforts to overcome dependency upon the United States by operating a more autonomous foreign policy. Mexico flirted with the notion of attending Belgrade in 1961. Although ultimately they did not attend, “Mexican diplomacy showed great interest in the gathering, which it saw as having the potential to formalise the existence of a new Third World political bloc amid Washington and Moscow.” Pettinà finds that Mexico’s foreign policy strategies showed a “sophisticated perception of the 1960s international system” and “a subtle calculation of the options that a more independent foreign policy disclosed in terms of the country’s bilateral relations with the United
States.” On the whole Latin America was underrepresented during the early part of the Non-Aligned Movement. While Cuba was an active and vocal participant at meetings, the handful of Latin American observers at the conferences had no vote and little voice. The greater story of Latin American involvement in this movement happened behind the scenes via diplomatic maneuvering. The NAM was a platform for Cuba to make connections amongst the Third World, and to gain the legitimacy it had lost in the OAS. Latin American governments knew themselves to be clearly allied with the United States. Those who adamantly refused to participate in the NAM sought to curry favor with the West. Countries like Brazil, Mexico, Bolivia, and Venezuela used the NAM to open up some slack from close ties with the United States, and pursue a (slightly) more independent foreign policy.