Is Canada Too Close of an Ally of the U.S

Is Canada too Close an Ally of the United States?
This paper looks at whether or not Canada may be properly considered as being far too close an ally of the United States – at least from a military and economic point of view. Although it is tempting to view Canada as being in a dangerously dependent position relative to the United States of America, the simple reality is that Canada needs those close ties with America. For one thing, although Canada is obviously a junior partner in NORAD and NATO, and although Canada appears to often engage in joint military exercises with US forces, the simple reality is that such military integration and alignment is necessary: at this paper is being written, Russia is making a move towards seizing arctic territories that Canada has a legitimate claim to; at the same time, Russia has recently engaged in “fly-bys” whereby Russian fighter jets ventured uncomfortably near Canadian airspace. Since Canada has under-spent on its military for decades, this nation is poorly-prepared to deal with a hostile assault from a well-armed and ambitious foreign nation; without US support, Canada would be very vulnerable, indeed. At the same time, although economic nationalists are frustrated at the degree of integration that has unfolded between Canada and the United States, the simple reality is that being part of a North American free trade zone has allowed Canada easy access to the richest market on earth; at the same time, the voracious American demand for Canadian natural resources has meant plenty of well-paying jobs in Canada (as well as other benefits that will be touched upon in due course). In general, it is fair to argue that Canada is too dependent militarily and economically upon the United States – but that close relationship also shelters Canada and gives this nation opportunities that other countries do not possess. It is appropriate to begin first with a discussion of Canada’s close military ties with the world’s reigning superpower. Critics of Canadian foreign policy suggest that Canada is rapidly becoming a mere appendage of the United States in military affairs. For instance, the HMCS Vancouver – one of this nation’s most celebrated frigates – was part of a 2001 US armada that launched bombing raids against Afghanistan. As well, during 2003, Canadian frigates were escorting US warships up the Persian Gulf to Kuwait whilst military intelligence/surveillance collected by two Canadian Aurora surveillance planes was relaying information to the US Fifth fleet. As if that was not bad enough in the eyes of military nationalists, Canadian troops also served in US and UK military units (ostensibly under foreign command) during the height of the hugely unpopular Iraq War. Last of all, and maybe most egregious of all, various online sources have noted how Canadian troops facilitated American violations of Article 5 of the Geneva Convention when they handed Taliban prisoners over to US forces (Staples, 50). There are other instances where Canada has been accused of forging too-close military linkages with the United States – the sort of linkages that can result in a country becoming a veritable extension of the larger, more powerful, partner. Most notably, a CanWest News Service report from late February, 2008, indicated that Canada and the United States had signed a new military agreement known as the Civil Assistance Plan. This initiative is one of the brain-childs of the Bi-National Planning Group which earned the enmity of some Canadians when it called for the establishment of a comprehensive defence and security agreement that would ensure the security of both Canada and the United States. Basically, what the new agreement does is that it permits the military of one nation to support the armed forces of the other nation in the case of a civil emergency. Consequently, Canadian nationalists are of the view that this approach will defeat Canadian sovereignty inasmuch as it will create bilateral operations in situations such as floods, forest fires, terrorist attacks or other natural disasters; put another way, forces from one nation can seamlessly move across the border to assist in the clean-up or rectification of internal problems transpiring in the partner nation (The Council of Canadians, para.1-5). For some Canadians, the consummation of such an arrangement is a distinct threat to the independence of Canada because a) it permits US forces to enter Canada with relatively little difficulty whenever a “civil crisis” arises and b) it obligates Canada to come to the aid of the Americans when they have internal problems of their own that, to more than a few Canadians, are of no concern of this nation. Finally, the many ordinary Canadians who fear Canada is becoming integrated far too deeply into the American war machine point to the creation of NORTHCOM in the spring of 2002. Under this apparatus, US Northern Command would have jurisdiction (military authority) over all of North America – including Mexico. In fact, NORTHCOM comes fairly close to be a formal manifestation of the Monroe Doctrine in the sense that it gives the US massive military predominance over portions of the Caribbean, contiguous waters in the Pacific and Atlantic oceans up to 500 miles off the US, Mexican and Canadian coastlines (Chossudovsky, “continental integration,” para.5). As of the present time, it is simply not clear whether or not Canada has agreed to the terms of NORTHCOM and whether or not Canada has integrated its military forces with the United States – as of the time of Chossudovsky’s writing, it had not but the item was seen as being fairly high up on the new Conservative government’s to-do list (Chossudovsky, “continental integration,” para.12-15) – but the mere threat of full command integration, along with close US-Canadian cooperation overseas, makes it easy to see why so many are so fearful about the future of Canadian sovereignty. Before going too far, something also needs to be said about NORAD and about NATO, two other massive super-structures that invite plenty of discussion when the matter turns to whether or not Canada has genuine independence on defence matters. To get to the heart of the matter, NATO was a cold war creation that was designed to offer collective security against the Soviet threat in the event of a war; Canada actually pushed for the creation of NATO inasmuch as it would mean collective decision-making amongst several nations – a state of affairs that would prevent Canada from falling under the immense US influence and pressure it would receive if it was merely a junior partner in a bilateral defence pact aimed at protecting the North American continent from attack. Even if Canada is only a junior member dwarfed by the colossus to the South, the fact remains that NATO at least gives the Canadian government the small comfort of knowing that the United States must deal with several European nations in addition to Canada and must horse-swap and negotiate matters with all or a number of them at any one time (Avis, para.3-4). Although any sort of defence pact involving the United States might be too much for some, NATO actually does a fairly good job of attenuating the otherwise vice-like grip on Canadian defence initiatives that the United States would have if bilateralism held sway over multilateralism. A more serious matter, for the ubiquitous Canadian nationalist, is NORAD. Here, Canada is left on its own to deal with the American colossus with no one else present to distract the United States or to frustrate its ambitions. As most are aware, the North American Aerospace Defence Command is a bi-national Canadian and US organization that provides aerospace warning and control for the two nations. Its responsibilities are many, but, basically, NORAD monitors man-made objects in space, detects and warns of attack by aircrafts, missiles or space vehicles, and ensures air sovereignty and air defence of Canada and America’s airspace. In 2006, the NORAD Agreement renewal added a maritime warning system that included an integrated approach to controlling US and Canadian maritime approaches and to controlling inland waterways (North American Aerospace Defence Command, para.1). The big issue at present as it pertains to NORAD – at least from the Canadian perspective – is that the bi-national military authority known as the Bi-national Planning Group wants to set in motion a process whereby NORAD and the aforementioned NORTHCOM would be merged so that Canada, for all intents and purposes, would serve under the jurisdiction of US Northern Command – which is itself controlled by the US Department of Defence (Chossudovsky, “Canada’s sovereignty,” para.6-10). Given all that has been described in this paragraph and in the past several ones, it appears hard to argue against the notion that Canada is too deeply integrated into the American empire. However, things are a little more complex than they appear. Most of all, if Canada is a close ally of the United States, it is because it has to be; this country is simply not equipped to wage a bitter fight against any determined, capable enemy that wants territory Canada perceives to be its – such as territory in the Arctic circle. According to one returning veteran of the Afghanistan campaign, Canadian troops had to make do with almost no ammunition magazines and did not have extra ammunition clips when they should have had at least a couple extra ones for their side-arm. As if that was not humiliating enough, Canadian soldiers wore boots that were ill-suited for the harsh Afghan terrain and they had holsters that were so shoddy as to permit the gun to fall out unexpectedly, thereby creating a needless security hazard (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Soldier claims,” para.1-8). To expand further on the weakness of the Canadian forces, consider that there was, in 2005 alone, a $1.3 billion funding shortfall – which meant too many planes that could not fly, ships left in the dock and a modern army hampered by “asset deterioration” as equipment falls apart (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, “Canadian military,” para.5). For a nation that, as of February 2002, was involved in 18 NATO, UN or other military operations and had nearly 4500 troops deployed overseas (McNamara, para.1), and for a nation that likes to think of itself as a respectable middle power, Canada most certainly has done little to enhance its ability to actually carry out peace-keeping missions around the globe. Given that reality, close ties with America are essential because Canada, quite literally, is ill-prepared to defend itself from external threats. Moreover, those threats are increasingly pressing and real. Obviously, terrorism is a threat, but a more immediate threat is a resurgent Russia that is looking to rekindle the Cold War – and take some land that Canada thought was its land. Specifically, a Russian bomber came perilously close to Canadian airspace on the eve of the first visit to Canada of President Barack Obama (Xinhua News Agency, para.1-2) and the Russians have publicly staked a claim to a vast stretch of Arctic territory believed to contain huge stores of subterranean mineral riches (British Broadcasting Corporation, para.1-5). Without NATO, without NORAD, and with a United Nations that features Russia on its Security Council, it is highly doubtful that Canada would be able to protect its territorial claims or its citizens from a determined Russian assault; without close ties to the United States, Canada is an almost defenceless nation. Turning to the Canadian economy, Economic nationalists are quick to decry the high level of integration that has developed between Canada and the United States over time. As most students of Canadian history are aware, Canada is a nation that has long been viewed as little more than an adjunct to the United States when it comes to economic matters; in other words, Canada is land where powerful US resource companies extract minerals and oil and where US automotive concerns set up branch plants. As if that was not enough, Canada was saddled with a massive trade deficit for much of its history relative to the United States; in fact, by the early 1960s, the automotive trade deficit between Canada and America was so great that the 1965 Auto Pact was belatedly brought into being. Amongst other things, this agreement demanded that, for each vehicle sold in Canada, one had to be built in Canada. As well, each vehicle built in Canada was required to have at least 60 percent Canadian content when it came to both parts and labour; if these conditions were not met, Canada would have free reign to apply punitive tariffs (Government of Canada, para.2). The formulation of the Auto Pact was just one acknowledgement of the fact that Canada was a nation in danger of losing its economic sovereignty (if, indeed, it had ever enjoyed true economic sovereignty) because of integration with the world’s most powerful economy. Today, there may well be economic nationalists every bit as fearful as their predecessors were back in the 1960s at the prospect of Canada being taken over by the United States and reduced to a resource-rich fifty-first state. A quick glance at the most recent data, however, suggests that things might not be quite so bleak as is commonly supposed. According to recent data, only about 26 percent of Canadian GDP was made up of Canadian exports in goods and services to America in 2007 – which does not seem like an overwhelming percentage, though it is certainly a significant proportion of the whole. At the same time, whilst the United States accounted for 57.6 percent of the Foreign Direct Investment in Canada in 2007, Canada made some sizable investments in America of its own: the data reveals that 44 percent of Canadian Foreign Direct Investment (or about 226 billion Canadian dollars) went to America (People’s Daily Online, para.6,8). The point here is that Canada is not simply a passive recipient of branch plants and FDI from the United States; it makes acquisitions of its own and business forays of its own into America each year that add up to hundreds of billions of Canadian dollars. Thus, while the degree of integration is high, Canada cannot be viewed as merely an agent-less vassal that has no ability to seek out opportunities proactively – and no ability to compete effectively with American firms. Nonetheless, people troubled by Canada’s economic absorption into the United States do have a valid reason for feeling as they do. As of 2007, nearly two billion Canadian dollars of goods and services crossed the American border every day. Furthermore, the United States of America absorbs three-quarters of Canada’s merchandise exports at the same time as it satisfies almost two-thirds of Canada’s imports. Moreover, no one can overlook the fact that Canada’s largest foreign direct investment donor is the United States (by a wide margin) and US direct investment in Canada has grown markedly in recent years (People’s Daily Online, para.8). Thus, there is reason for concern. Not to be lightly dismissed, Canada also runs the risk of becoming little more than a source of minerals and fuel for the United States – something that makes economic nationalists cringe. For example, Canada is presently the largest supplier of energy – natural gas, uranium, electricity and oil – to America and accounts for almost 10 percent of total US energy demand. The statistics that are available indicate that Canada exports crude oil and petroleum to the United States at a massive rate: 2.4 million barrels per day and this accounts for about 18 percent of US crude oil imports – or it did in 2007. Turning to natural gas imports, Canada is the major supplier of the United States and the dominion also furnishes America with about one-third of the uranium used in its US nuclear power plants. Finally, just to complete the picture that Canada and the United States are bound tightly together – which should be evident in light of the fact that Canada is such a prime source of resources to America – the two nations share a fully-integrated electricity grid (People’s Daily Online, para.9-12). An analysis of the long-term trends appears to reveal that things are moving more and more towards a complete integration of Canada and the United States – and also closer integration of Canada into a pan-North American regional trade bloc that includes Mexico. For example, courtesy NAFTA, more than 90 percent of goods under the treaty are duty-free and total US trade with NAFTA partners increased from $293 billion in 1993 to $710 billion in 2004. As well, Canada and Mexico went from accounting for 28 percent of total US trade in 1993 to accounting for 31 percent of US foreign trade in 2004. Finally, Canada has increasingly become – as touched upon earlier – a magnet for American foreign Direct Investment (Villareal, 14-15). However, the numbers are a little more complex than they may at first appear. To get to the heart of the matter, the United States is running a trade deficit with Canada – and even with Mexico. In fairness, the percentage of this trade imbalance relative to the total US trade balance is rather small and growing smaller. Nonetheless, it remains in place and is still quite sizable (Villareal, 14-15). The point, therefore, is that Canada is no longer in the same position it was in more than 40 years ago when huge trade deficits favouring the US were the norm; now, Canada is enjoying a lucrative trade surplus against America and Mexico is joining in the fun, as well. Given that, Canada may not quite be as overwhelmed as some might suppose. What has been mentioned in the preceding several paragraphs lends itself to a discussion of why close economic integration with America is actually beneficial for Canada. In fact, in a day and age when so many nations are banding together for economic or political reasons (the European Union, the nations of Africa, and the Asian countries comprising the Association of Southeast Asia), Canada places itself in an advantageous position by being so closely aligned with the world’s most powerful, most well-developed and most resilient economy. Beyond that, there are quality of life issues and business opportunities that present themselves through close association with America that give Canada a competitive advantage over other states – even potentially more powerful states – that lack such close ties with America. Supporters of NAFTA are quick to point out that the trade deal involving Canada, America and Mexico opened up US and Mexican markets to Canadian businesspeople and led to Canadian businesses becoming more efficient and more competitive on a global scale. Free capital flows courtesy free trade have been important to Canadian prosperity because such capital flows have permitted this country to accrue foreign savings which can then be utilized to finance large investment projects aimed at the industrial infrastructure or elsewhere as such projects are needed. Likewise, two-way direct investment untrammelled by onerous state regulation has meant that Canada has secured easy access to technological innovations and processes originating in America that can be used to great benefit up here (Dodge, para.15-16). Canadians may decry closer integration with America, but the benefits appear to outweigh the risks in the sense that Canada is a more prosperous land precisely because it can access much-needed capital for projects that benefit Canadians. At the same time, as a prior passage from this essay makes clear, Canadian businesses do invest a great deal in the United States, so many Canadian entrepreneurs and businesses are finding it possible to carve out a progressive, independent niche of their own in the North American economy. Critics charge that closer economic integration with the United States will mean the dismantling of this country’s social programs; in effect, the things that make Canada distinct from other countries – or at least from the United States – will be taken away in the interests of liberalizing trade and making the Canadian economy more competitive with its American counterpart. This is a rational argument and it makes sense at first glance. However, just because a “Canadian” social program exists does not mean that its existence will best serve the needs of Canadians. For example, generous EI programs back in the 1980s literally encouraged people to not work and led to unhappy generational cycles whereby entire families and communities decided to stay unemployed rather than to work towards fulfilling part-time (or even full-time) employment (McMahon, para.22-23). A scaling-back of some (not necessarily all) social welfare programs because of closer integration with the United States may be just the impetus that drives people into the labour force and into greater independence. At a minimum, closer integration with America, from an economic point of view, has increased overall wealth in Canada and has reduced the poverty levels found in this nation (McMahon, para.18). Suffice it to say, a wealthier Canada ultimately means a Canada that can afford to pay for independent social services through tax and internal redistribution policies. As a final point, health care is something that Canadians do not want to see disappear because of closer integration with the United States. As it stands, health care is still with us; however, critics of integration with the United States argue that free trade (and globalization more generally) has resulted in “incremental commercialization” and in public-private partnerships – to say nothing of outsourcing (Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, para.12). Yet, what is commonly overlooked by these people is that closer economic integration with America may be just the tonic for Canada’s flagging healthcare system insofar as it will heighten demands for a more cost-efficient approach to public healthcare; after all, given its considerable cost, the public health system should be doing a better job of cutting down on line-ups and on access to medical procedures than it does. If privatization of the health sector is one of the consequences of economic integration with America and that leads to better health care for Canadians (in the sense that wealthier individuals can pay for their own health care so that costs are reduced and public funds can then target those most at need), then maybe that is the direction which is best for Canada. To end, this paper has shown that military and economic integration with the United States does not have to be a bête noire for Canada; it offers protection, compels greater efficiencies, and can lead to better social policy that will be more cost-effective and more targeted towards helping those who most need help. While people are often fretful about Canada’s sovereignty, the truth of the matter is that Canada has never had complete sovereignty insofar as it has always shared the continent with the world’s most powerful nation and has arctic territory covetously sought by at least one other great power possessed of military might that vastly outstrips Canada’s. Whether Canadians like it or not, Canada is not too integrated with America – and probably will do well to be even more integrated with America.

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