These terms are central to my analysis, and without them, my standard for objective science would be arbitrary. First, objectivity is the freedom from preconceptions. In humans, pure objectivity is nearly unattainable, though it is nonetheless a worthwhile pursuit. How, then, do we pursue objectivity? I argue that we approach objectivity through the interplay of biases, which are predispositions engendered by experiences, worldviews, and backgrounds. To demonstrate how objectivity can arise from bias, envision a jury adjudicating a sexual harassment case. If it were composed entirely of women, who, by statistics and logical extrapolation, harbor a more personal, emotional understanding of sexual harassment, then the jury may have a bias against the defendant and/or impose excessively harsh sanctions. Oppositely, a body of men, with a likely more detached conception of sexual harassment, may view the perpetrator as harmless, perhaps even falsely accused, and propose an extremely light or nonexistent punishment for the guilty aggressor. The most just punishment in this sexual harassment problem, as is often the case, likely lies in the middle of these two extremes. Thus, I argue that the same balance that would be desirable in this jury is conducive to objectivity in science; science needs competing yet coexisting and coequal biases in order to approach objectivity. Given this framework, I shall now address Kourany’s arguments
These terms are central to my analysis, and without them, my standard for objective science would be arbitrary. First, objectivity is the freedom from preconceptions. In humans, pure objectivity is nearly unattainable, though it is nonetheless a worthwhile pursuit. How, then, do we pursue objectivity? I argue that we approach objectivity through the interplay of biases, which are predispositions engendered by experiences, worldviews, and backgrounds. To demonstrate how objectivity can arise from bias, envision a jury adjudicating a sexual harassment case. If it were composed entirely of women, who, by statistics and logical extrapolation, harbor a more personal, emotional understanding of sexual harassment, then the jury may have a bias against the defendant and/or impose excessively harsh sanctions. Oppositely, a body of men, with a likely more detached conception of sexual harassment, may view the perpetrator as harmless, perhaps even falsely accused, and propose an extremely light or nonexistent punishment for the guilty aggressor. The most just punishment in this sexual harassment problem, as is often the case, likely lies in the middle of these two extremes. Thus, I argue that the same balance that would be desirable in this jury is conducive to objectivity in science; science needs competing yet coexisting and coequal biases in order to approach objectivity. Given this framework, I shall now address Kourany’s arguments