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Jean-Paul Sartre and the Nature of Consciousness
“Man is nothing else but that which he makes of himself. That is the first principle of existentialism” - Jean-Paul Sartre “If God did not exist, everything would be permitted” -Dostoevsky
It is nearly impossible to remove individual ideas from Sartre’s magnum opus; they do not function as distinct, discrete concepts that are bricked together like the foundation of a house. Rather, the concepts Sartre addresses in Being are all part of a continuum, a single thread woven together to for the whole of the work. Picking at one idea in an effort to remove and examine it reveals that one idea leads to the next until the entire work is unwound. In fact, in some ways, Being and Nothingness is an examination of a single idea –the nature of our existence- examined through various lenses. Sartre considers the nature of human existence in various ways; primary among these are considerations of human consciousness, largely as defined by how we perceive ourselves and how we perceive others.
Ontological questions are as old as humanity itself. They form the core of the earliest philosophical considerations, and remain at the core of the work of Sartre in the 20th Century. How we perceive ourselves, and how we perceive the world, are the most fundamental precepts of nearly all philosophical inquiries.
Sartre considers these ideas in all of his works; Being and Nothingness is perhaps the most significant, if not always the most accessible, of his works that address such concerns. The nature of being is fundamental to Sartre’s philosophy; defining the nature of being is, ultimately, the goal of Being and Nothingness.
Sartre was greatly influenced by Kant, another philosopher who considered the nature of being as fundamental to understanding the world
Cited: McCulloch, Gregory. Using Sartre : An Analytical Introduction to Early Sartrean Themes. London, , GBR: Routledge, 1994. p 5. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/univmiami/Doc?id=10070512&ppg=18 Copyright © 1994. Routledge. All rights reserved.