Jewish Pogrom Essay
In this essay, I would like to discuss the historical background of the Jewish pogrom in Lviv in 1941 as well as its current place in cultural memory in Eastern Europe. I am interested in this topic because I was doing my PhD in cultural memory of the Second World War in Eastern Europe; furthermore, I believe that by understanding reasons of past instances of mass violence and the way these are commemorated today we can prevent future genocides.
On 30 June 1941 first German troops entered Lviv, the largest city of Western Ukraine, where more than 150,000 Jews (Mick, 2011) lived before the beginning of the German-Soviet war. Among these troops was the Nachtigall battalion, a Ukrainian unit of the German military counterintelligence, which was established as a result of cooperation …show more content…
between Germany and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). On the same day, 30 June, Ukrainian officers of Nachtigall organism the gathering of local Ukrainian elites, where the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian state was proclaimed, followed by the establishment of the National Ukrainian Government. The latter, however, was disbanded by Germans in a few days, whereas the OUN leaders behind the proclamation of the Act were arrested and sent to concentration camps.
This story of Ukrainian martyrdom and independence struggle is overshadowed by less glorious episode of the Ukrainian history that started on 30 June 1941 and continued for the next day. While the restoration of the Ukrainian statehood was celebrated on the gathering, a group of Nachtigall soldiers went to the Lviv prisons, where many of their friends and relatives were held. Almost none of them, however, was alive, as the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, organized the massacre of political prisoners before leaving Lviv. The finding of hundreds of mutilated bodies, mainly of Ukrainians, sparked the desire for vengeance, which in the absence of Soviet prison guards was unleashed on Jews, whom many Ukrainians and Poles associated with the NKVD activities. According to Himka (2011), Germans inspired the anti-Jewish reprisals and in some cases actively participated in the following pogrom; however, the lead was taken by newly formed Ukrainian militia that was assisted by some Ukrainian and Polish locals. Jews were chased down and taken to the prisons, where they were forced to exhume and clean bodies of Ukrainians, only to be humiliated, beaten, and killed afterwards. The exact number of victims is still unknown; yet, estimates range from 4,000 to 8,000 Jews killed (Mick, 2011).
The pogrom that started on June 30 was only the first among many atrocities that befell the Jewish population of Lviv. In the end of July another wave of pogroms occurred followed by the organized killings by German Einsatzgruppen. In 1942 the Lviv ghetto was established, leading to intensification of mass killings, which culminated with the liquidation of ghetto in 1943. Yet, among these crimes, which depleted the Jewish population of Lviv from 150,000 to 800 (Mick, 2011), the first pogrom occupies a special place, remaining one of particularly marginalised episodes even in the context of “the marginality of the Holocaust remembrance” (Rohdewald, 2008: 176) in post-Soviet countries.
The origin of reasons behind the marginal position of memory about the Lviv pogrom in Ukrainian and Russian collective memory about the Second World War can be traced to the post-war time, when the ignorance of anti-Jewish atrocities became one of the rare meeting points between the Soviet and the Ukrainian emigree historiographies.
The Soviet historiography either omitted the subject of the Holocaust or universalized it by replacing Jewish victims with abstract Soviet citizens (Asher, 2003: 888-889). The Lviv pogrom, however, did not fit the official Soviet narrative of heroism and martyrdom of Soviet people for two major reasons. Firstly, the subject of ethnic violence was largely ignored by the Soviet historiography of the Second World War, especially, when it involved “brotherly” Soviet nations, like Ukrainians, which unanimously — except a small group of collaborators – fought against fascism. Secondly, even while evidences of NKVD crimes produced by German were quickly labeled by the Soviet Union as the war-time propaganda, the complex investigation of the Lviv pogrom could bring unpleasant revelations of Soviet crimes, which would barely suit the Great Patriotic War
narrative.
Similarly to the Soviet historiography, the Ukrainian emigree historians omitted references to the pogrom, because it did not fit the narrative of heroism and martyrdom, but not of Soviet, but of Ukrainian people (Rudling, 2011). The pogrom was an unwanted element on the backdrop of glorious story of restoration of the Ukrainian state that defied both the Soviet and the Nazi totalitarian regimes. Not only recollections of anti-Jewish reprisals tainted this moment of glory, but also presented Ukrainian nationalists as accomplices of Nazi crimes instead of victims of Soviet repressions. Unlike more convenient memories of subsequent atrocities in Lviv, which were mainly committed by Germans, the Lviv pogrom on 30 June involved too many perpetrators to be acceptable either for the Soviet or the anti-Soviet history-writing.
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the significant revisions in the domain of the Second World War historiography and gradual recognition of the Holocaust in 1990s. The growing “nationalisation” of war memories in Ukraine and Russia in the last decade, however, resulted in renewed appropriation and marginalisation of the Holocaust memory (Rohdewald, 2008). In Russia, where the main emphasis in Second World War commemoration is made on the notion of the Great Victory, the narratives of heroism attract larger attention than the narratives of suffering (Gudkov, 2005); consequentially, the Holocaust does not occupies a special place and is largely viewed in the context of common suffering of Soviet people. In Ukraine the increasing emphasis on the martyrdom of Ukrainian people led to the competition between the Jewish and Ukrainian narratives of suffering (Jilge, 2006) that was further complicated by the glorification of OUN on the state level during the Yushchenko presidency (Rudling, 2011). Consequently, in both countries the memory of the Lviv pogrom remains mostly ignored and marginalized even today despite important lessons that could be drawn from it for contemporary Eastern European countries.
On 30 June 1941 first German troops entered Lviv, the largest city of Western Ukraine, where more than 150,000 Jews (Mick, 2011) lived before the beginning of the German-Soviet war. Among these troops was the Nachtigall battalion, a Ukrainian unit of the German military counterintelligence, which was established as a result of cooperation …show more content…
between Germany and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). On the same day, 30 June, Ukrainian officers of Nachtigall organism the gathering of local Ukrainian elites, where the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian state was proclaimed, followed by the establishment of the National Ukrainian Government. The latter, however, was disbanded by Germans in a few days, whereas the OUN leaders behind the proclamation of the Act were arrested and sent to concentration camps.
This story of Ukrainian martyrdom and independence struggle is overshadowed by less glorious episode of the Ukrainian history that started on 30 June 1941 and continued for the next day. While the restoration of the Ukrainian statehood was celebrated on the gathering, a group of Nachtigall soldiers went to the Lviv prisons, where many of their friends and relatives were held. Almost none of them, however, was alive, as the Soviet secret police, the NKVD, organized the massacre of political prisoners before leaving Lviv. The finding of hundreds of mutilated bodies, mainly of Ukrainians, sparked the desire for vengeance, which in the absence of Soviet prison guards was unleashed on Jews, whom many Ukrainians and Poles associated with the NKVD activities. According to Himka (2011), Germans inspired the anti-Jewish reprisals and in some cases actively participated in the following pogrom; however, the lead was taken by newly formed Ukrainian militia that was assisted by some Ukrainian and Polish locals. Jews were chased down and taken to the prisons, where they were forced to exhume and clean bodies of Ukrainians, only to be humiliated, beaten, and killed afterwards. The exact number of victims is still unknown; yet, estimates range from 4,000 to 8,000 Jews killed (Mick, 2011).
The pogrom that started on June 30 was only the first among many atrocities that befell the Jewish population of Lviv. In the end of July another wave of pogroms occurred followed by the organized killings by German Einsatzgruppen. In 1942 the Lviv ghetto was established, leading to intensification of mass killings, which culminated with the liquidation of ghetto in 1943. Yet, among these crimes, which depleted the Jewish population of Lviv from 150,000 to 800 (Mick, 2011), the first pogrom occupies a special place, remaining one of particularly marginalised episodes even in the context of “the marginality of the Holocaust remembrance” (Rohdewald, 2008: 176) in post-Soviet countries.
The origin of reasons behind the marginal position of memory about the Lviv pogrom in Ukrainian and Russian collective memory about the Second World War can be traced to the post-war time, when the ignorance of anti-Jewish atrocities became one of the rare meeting points between the Soviet and the Ukrainian emigree historiographies.
The Soviet historiography either omitted the subject of the Holocaust or universalized it by replacing Jewish victims with abstract Soviet citizens (Asher, 2003: 888-889). The Lviv pogrom, however, did not fit the official Soviet narrative of heroism and martyrdom of Soviet people for two major reasons. Firstly, the subject of ethnic violence was largely ignored by the Soviet historiography of the Second World War, especially, when it involved “brotherly” Soviet nations, like Ukrainians, which unanimously — except a small group of collaborators – fought against fascism. Secondly, even while evidences of NKVD crimes produced by German were quickly labeled by the Soviet Union as the war-time propaganda, the complex investigation of the Lviv pogrom could bring unpleasant revelations of Soviet crimes, which would barely suit the Great Patriotic War
narrative.
Similarly to the Soviet historiography, the Ukrainian emigree historians omitted references to the pogrom, because it did not fit the narrative of heroism and martyrdom, but not of Soviet, but of Ukrainian people (Rudling, 2011). The pogrom was an unwanted element on the backdrop of glorious story of restoration of the Ukrainian state that defied both the Soviet and the Nazi totalitarian regimes. Not only recollections of anti-Jewish reprisals tainted this moment of glory, but also presented Ukrainian nationalists as accomplices of Nazi crimes instead of victims of Soviet repressions. Unlike more convenient memories of subsequent atrocities in Lviv, which were mainly committed by Germans, the Lviv pogrom on 30 June involved too many perpetrators to be acceptable either for the Soviet or the anti-Soviet history-writing.
The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the significant revisions in the domain of the Second World War historiography and gradual recognition of the Holocaust in 1990s. The growing “nationalisation” of war memories in Ukraine and Russia in the last decade, however, resulted in renewed appropriation and marginalisation of the Holocaust memory (Rohdewald, 2008). In Russia, where the main emphasis in Second World War commemoration is made on the notion of the Great Victory, the narratives of heroism attract larger attention than the narratives of suffering (Gudkov, 2005); consequentially, the Holocaust does not occupies a special place and is largely viewed in the context of common suffering of Soviet people. In Ukraine the increasing emphasis on the martyrdom of Ukrainian people led to the competition between the Jewish and Ukrainian narratives of suffering (Jilge, 2006) that was further complicated by the glorification of OUN on the state level during the Yushchenko presidency (Rudling, 2011). Consequently, in both countries the memory of the Lviv pogrom remains mostly ignored and marginalized even today despite important lessons that could be drawn from it for contemporary Eastern European countries.