John Hardwig's Is There A Duty To Die

In “Is There a Duty to Die?” the philosopher John Hardwig contends that, given certain criteria, one MAY have a duty to kill oneself, or be assisted in doing so (33-42)! He argues, for example, that if someone sickly and family dependent becomes a heavy burden for their family to bear (Harwig 33-42), then it may cause this family to suffer unnecessarily (i.e. money, stress, and time are all factors that may lead to family suffering). And so, prolonging the life of this sickly family member may cause more suffering than happiness (Hardwig 34-42). Alternatively, the death of said family member could remove this suffering, this burden; it could relieve the family of stress, financial trouble, et cetera (Hardwig 34-42). I am wondering, then: do
If we cannot know Gruntilda, in herself, then I also suspect we cannot know Gruntilda’s metaphysical aspects like her purpose or duty. This is the case because we cannot precisely perceive Gruntilda. Why, then, would we assume that we know the metaphysical aspects of Gruntilda as well? Allow me, then, to fully postulate my epistemological concern: from a Hardwig-lens, we presuppose that we know Gruntilda in herself and thusly suspect our knowing of Gruntilda’s metaphysical aspects. Not only so, but Hardwig’s view presupposes our knowing of “goodness” and “badness” (though the terms are never used in his essay, it is heavily implied). Then, Harwings theory, it seems, is actually fairly complex. It may be easy to say: “Well, Gruntilda’s family suffering caused by her is bad. Therefore, Gruntilda’s death may bring forth goodness,” but this view is not constructed with the intricacies of the world in tact. Because, in truth, humans know very little about the world. Saying one has a duty to die under certain criteria implies a lot of knowing of the world: knowing, I should add, that humans cannot
The answer, though, lies in speculation, and like Kant, I am speculating that the world is divided in two parts: the phenomenal and the noumenal-- the world of experience, and the world in itself (372-373). These worlds, however, are linked. Though we cannot know the world in itself, the actions made in the phenomenal world can impact the noumenal world (e.g. global warming, a murder, et cetera). Essentially, that the phenomenal is not an island relative to the noumenal. Then, it is absurd to only take into account the phenomenal without speculating on the