We are here concerned with the relationship between the human mind, somatic-sensory perceptions, objects of perception, and claims of knowledge arising from their interaction, through the philosophies of John Locke and Immanuel Kant. Confounding the ability to find solid epistemological ground, philosophers have, generally speaking, debated whether ‘what’ we know is prima facie determined by the objective, as-they-are, characteristics of the external world 1(epistemological realism) or if the mind determines, as-it-is, the nature of objects through its own experiential deductions (epistemological idealism). The purpose of this paper is to use the synthetical approach of Immanuel Kant, who utilizes a logical schematization of cognition along with experience (transcendental idealism), in the attaining of knowledge, to criticize Locke’s claims against innate ideas, and subsequently, origin and attainment of knowledge.
In the first part of this paper, I will explain the major differences which distinguish epistemological realism and idealism. This disambiguation of philosophical jargon is to allow the reader to understand why the debate exists, how it impacts what human’s claims as ‘knowledge’, and whether or not the debate has any contemporary philosophical importance. This last feature is a relevant aspect of the debate since ‘knowledge’ applies to a great many areas of human life, including, but not limited to, the sciences, morality and ethics, and aesthetics.
In the second part of this paper, I will outline Kant’s idealism, otherwise known as, transcendental idealism. This section will lay out the terminology in Kant’s epistemology which will act as a backdrop for comparing and contrasting the theory of Locke. This section will also describe the foundation of Kant’s epistemological claims. As mentioned in the introduction, the mind, the somatic-sensory perceptions, and objects