In John Maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace, …show more content…
He was heavily pressured by the French public to demand revenge for the damage done to their country. In his and the citizens’ eyes of France, it was Clemenceau’s job to crush the economic life of the enemy, thus done by insuring much needed reparations for the rebuilding of France and simultaneously weakening a previously ominous and formidable enemy. Clemenceau also doubted a similar alliance in the future if Germany regained its strength, and it was apparent to the French Premier that its enemy would have twice as many men of military age to put into the field as France by 1940. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Wilson was focused with his Fourteen Points, on which the truce had been based. His famous document was, “steeped in the language of freedom and open diplomacy; it called for arms reduction, an “open-minded” settlement of colonial affairs, and the self-determination of peoples.” His goal was not punishment of the aggressors but an end to war with fair peace and the opportunity of self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe. He also made it clear that he wouldn’t support punitive fines. Interestingly, British Prime Minister Lloyd George fell somewhere in the middle between Clemenceau and Wilson. He wanted justice, but not revenge. “While England …show more content…
Obviously the dilapidated French countryside fueled the nation’s anger, but even the British public, whose land had remained practically unscathed throughout the war, conveyed a similar message to Prime Minister Lloyd George: “The cry went up that Germany should pay the whole cost of the war, that the Kaiser should be hanged, and that all Germans who had violated the laws of war should be brought to trial and punished.” Nevertheless, both Clemenceau and Lloyd George quickly, “discovered the truth that Germany’s capacity to pay might be more nearly assessed at 2,000 millions than at the fantastic figure of 24,000 millions.” Along with reparations, the French also expected negotiations to give back territories such as the Rhineland and the coalmines of the Saar, heavily disarm Germany’s army and navy, and prevent the creation of an air force. This, they thought, would permanently guarantee France’s security from German invasion. It’s safe to say that both the British and the French did not expect war again from Germany for a long