Joint Operation Plan

At both the strategic and operational levels, all planning must demonstrate this balance by passing litmus tests for feasibility, acceptability, and suitability. Feasibility, the focus of this essay, is defined as, “the joint operation plan review criterion for assessing whether the assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan.” Feasibility, as a test of means, is primarily the province of the military. The onus is on the military to apply resources correctly and in time to achieve campaign objectives. Testing ways, referred to as acceptability, and linking ways to means requires a broader and more inclusive civil-military dialogue. Focusing on feasibility therefore creates realistic
military options and promotes a robust discussion of ways in order to create a coherent strategy. The good news is that existing staff processes already promote good feasibility testing.
Since inception of the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) under the leadership of Secretary McNamara, operational planning feasibility is primarily tested through analysis of the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD -- pronounced “TIP-FID”).
The documentation for the integrated planning system has been recently updated and renamed the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX) system. However, JOPES and the associated TPFDDs will remain integral parts of the system for the foreseeable future. Even after the JOPES information system is replaced, the data analyzed will remain the same.
The combination of written plans and JOPES data allows the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to assess joint feasibility for contingency plans. The JPEC is defined as:
“Those headquarters commands, and agencies involved in the training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations or objective area. It usually consists of the Joint Staff, Services, Service major commands (including the Service wholesale logistic commands), unified commands (and their certain Service component commands), Joint Task Forces (as applicable), Defense Logistics Agency, and other Defense Agencies (e.g., Defense Intelligence Agency) as may be appropriate to a given
scenario.”

Viewed through this lens, the feasibility of nested plans, or lack thereof, becomes evident to senior leaders. Before the initiation of JOPES, information regarding feasibility wasn’t necessarily different, but it was certainly harder to analyze. Today, planners tend to suffer from a lack of understanding of JOPES, and fail to realize that plans are not complete until the TPFDD is assessed as feasible during the planning process’s formal review period. Correspondingly, senior leaders are prone to paying too little attention to this synchronization process, and the time and effort required to establish feasibility correctly.
Responding to a crisis or contingency triggers another important process that supports feasibility. This is the Global Force Management Process (GFMP) run by the Joint Staff, J3 (the Director of Operations). This process supports feasibility assessment, coordinates deployment actions, and assesses risk between the Secretary of Defense, operational commanders, and service component commanders. It entails the use of contingency plan TPFDDs and/or Requests for Forces (RFFs) that seek approval to deploy and/or employ forces inter- or intra-theater. Approved actions result in adjustments to the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) and detailed follow-on coordination. These decisions result in JOPES actions, with information being added or modified on an existing TPFDD (for an ongoing operation), or the creation of a new TPFDD (for a new operation). Part of altering or creating a TPFDD is understanding the movement priority for the new capability so that it either arrives in time to meet the commander’s requirement, or allows time for the commander to adjust his scheme of maneuver to meet various political or military constraints. With few exceptions, all movement is eventually encapsulated in JOPES.
Creating nested plans capable of supporting warfighting commanders is a difficult process requiring a significant amount of coordination. As discussed, mechanisms exist which promote coordination to test feasibility, but there also exists an unfortunate lack of understanding of these mechanisms and their critical role in planning and decision cycles. Accurate feasibility assessments shared between military and civilian leaders result in better options and better decisions, but only if leaders know what to consider when testing means.

Important Factors in Feasibility Assessments
Janine Davidson, a former Deputy Assist Secretary of Defense for Plans, recently wrote compellingly that civilian and military leadership need to push past the personality and cultural differences, which seem to plague the civil-military relationship.
Politicians and military leaders have different perspectives on conflict, particularly in a limited war scenario. Both parties are pragmatic, but for different reasons. Senior military leaders often look at conflict from a longer-term perspective of potential outcomes related to military action, and key in on the risks service members will face to achieve a political objective. When military action is approved, they prefer to use maximum force as rapidly as possible by attacking the estimated enemy center of gravity. Political leaders are generally concerned with maintaining options, minimizing resource allocation, limiting the duration of conflict, and preserving the domestic political agenda; and they are keenly aware of the next election cycle. Neither perspective is exclusively right or wrong. Points of view simply differ and must be taken into account as decisions related to planning and execution are
made.
By assessing feasibility properly, senior military and civilian leaders not only understand what the military intends to do, they better understand the potential options and risks associated with strategic and operational decisions. Military officers who are able to discuss feasibility in a concise, accurate, and logical manner promote a better interagency dialogue by providing the clarity needed by civilian leaders. If civilian leaders understand feasibility, then the discussion of ways, which is at the heart of the civil-military relationship, will also improve. This section provides that understanding.
Synchronizing multiple plans is time consuming and complex, and senior leaders should keep a few feasibility factors in mind when conducting an assessment. Internalizing and examining what drives feasibility in the military realm will drive good assessments through the planning and force management processes. Feasibility is not a simple math problem; information contained in the plans and in JOPES requires interpretive evaluation, with a two-fold goal. The first is to work through executability. The second is to stimulate a better ends-ways-means dialogue between political and military decision makers through the lens the military knows best. The following list of factors is neither comprehensive, nor are the factors distinctly separate from each other. The doctrinal definition of feasibility prompts us to consider time and available resources as critical factors. However, these two factors alone do not adequately determine if a plan is feasible. Resources are applied against a thinking enemy and within a decision space created when politics dictate the importance of the end. Together, these four factors – time, enemy actions, resource availability, and preservation of civ-mil decision space – create a complete feasibility evaluation using the existing processes.