Joy-Of-Destruction Experiment

Prediger et al. (2013), used an experimental approach to examine how the scarcity of natural resources affects the willingness of people to cooperate or involve in antisocial behavior. The experiment was undertaken with pastoralists from southern Namibia and the study area is divided into two parts according to the exogenous differences in biomass production (a high yield and a low yield area). In this paper, biomass production is taken as a proxy of resource scarcity and moved the lab to the field to observe fundamental human behaviors, such as risk aversion, time preference, trust, spite, and cooperation. There were two experiments, such as, a one-shot public good experiment and joy-of-destruction experiment with pastoralists from both areas.
The design of this game is a simple way to analyze spiteful behavior. In this experiment, two players from anonymous villages, both received an initial endowment of Namibian dollar ten (N$10) and had to decide either burn the other player’s income by N$5 with a personal cost of N$1. In this game, destruction leads not to the material benefits for the destroying subject but a personal sacrifice. The important features of this experiment are played a one-shot game, decisions are made anonymously, strategic aspects should not be matter, and “not-burning” is the strictly dominant strategy implying rational self-concerned player. There are three possible outcomes of this experiment, such as, firstly, both players decide not to reduce the other player’s income. In that case, they both receive N$10.Secondly, each player decides to reduce the other player’s income leaving both with N$4.Thirdly, one player reduces the other player’s income but the other player does not do so. It refers an unequal payoff distribution with N$9 for the destroying party and N$5 for the victim of
160-168, experiment the experimental study of risk behavior in natural disasters. The evidence was taken from Cameron. The experiment was involved in choosing between two lottery games. The game A was a lottery having a 50% winning a chance of an amount of winning three times of local daily wage. Game B perceived a constant amount of money but smaller win. A total five repetition will be made and players have to decide at the beginning which game they choose either A or B. Each player had been given one sheet of paper with recording tables for the five repeated games. In the experiment, it is assumed that a constant payment for game B increases, so the risk averse move to game A to B as game A becomes less attractive. On the other hand, some players may switch to game A for trying their luck. Risk takers may have hidden, cognitive risk aversion traits and they switch to a constant winning game B after losing in the first risky game A. The experimental results demonstrate stronger cognitive risk aversion behavior. Although experimental results reveal a more realistic distribution of risk preference compared to hypothetical survey questions, the financial gain is not a major factor influencing behavior for the survivors of disaster victims. In addition, the paper of Cameron, L., & Shah, M. (2015), includes a standard risk games by selecting random players. The hypothesis of this study is to player living in the village that exposed natural