Kant's Argument Of Empiricism According To David Hume

Empiricism, according to David Hume is a flawed and incomplete mode of thinking, this is largely due to the fact that one may never truly experience a cause. He poses the argument that causes are assumed using synthetic, not analytic judgment. This is the essence of Hume's main argument that the view of actions and their consequences as logically dependent upon one another is necessarily flawed and detrimental to human understanding. He argues this in the following way. First, that empiricism is a flawed as a mode of making reasoned inferences, a contention that Hume posits as the result of poor conditioning of thought and poor training of blind trust in causality. Kant adds to this debate, stating that it is the propositions that have woken
What we may know, according to Hume, is a causal connection, or an understanding of the connection between an event, a, and apparent cause, b. That is not the same as the logical syllogism "if a then b" however, for we cannot, as humans perceive of our senses the moment of causality between the two events a and b. This forms the basis of Hume's argument and may be expanded and clarified by understanding that what we view as causes may be more adequately understood as an impression of necessary relation that does not itself constitute an actually necessary relation between events. This serves as the natural limit of human understanding in Hume's
They are mental functions which 'make sense' out of our disparate perceptions by organizing them into the form in which we experience the world. The categories in unison form 'the understanding' - the faculty for making empirical judgments. Finally, the categories are 'pure' concepts, in the sense that they are not as Hume had claimed, derived from experience, but have their origin in the very constitution of the mind itself.
The judgment that A is not merely joined to B (by always preceding it) but actually causes B is grounded in an a priori source of knowledge - ie in the faculty of the understanding with its a priori conditions of objective knowledge. It is because the judgment is so grounded a priori, that we are entitled to assert the principle of causality: that all events of type A are universally and necessarily followed by events of type