Kant's Groundwork: A Theoretical Analysis

addressed. Specifically, I intend on analyzing the problematic aspects of other attempts and where we may be able to construct a less problematic approach to addressing the source of the emptiness critique. I hold that Kant has served as a compelling interlocutor in moral matters. Still further, my purpose here is to offer a better interpretation of Kantian thought than that offered by the both the formalist and non-formalists, I present a perspective that gives due credence to Kantian central texts and at the same time offers an alternative reading that is philosophically, morally, and psychologically plausible and powerful. I would consider my approach to be non-formal as well, My defense of emptiness charge, in a non-equivalence thesis sense,
In the following section, I will explain my objection to equivalence thesis in more detail, particularly regarding the explanation of maxims and how the feature within the CI and also with regard to the examples given by Kant and how CI is supposed to work here. I will first explain how Kant thought CI worked and led to concrete results. After this explanation of Kant’s formalistic ethics, in a next chapter I will go on to introduce and explain the emptiness charges brought forward by Hegel and Mill, and I will conclude that CI1, indeed, remains an empty formalism.

1.1 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals-The Equivalence Thesis
The opening sentence of Groundwork provides Kant’s significant distinction between the intelligible and sensible worlds: ‘‘Es ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja über haupt auch außer derselben.’’ This thesis which is proposed after the dissertation of 1770 provides a critical foundation which allows Kant to focus less on theoretical obscurity and more upon practical issues and leads to the notion of good will which Kant explains at the outset of Section I in the Groundwork:

It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Gr.
In response to the case of an agent with a mental disorder that gives rise to a perverse ideology that creates a universal will to torture others because they are unable to create the universal will by relying on CI1, while I will propose a compelling explanation of how the universal will is possible through CI2. Because Kant probably would claim that such an agent has no comprehension of the difference between means and ends and is therefore unable to grasp the notion of objective and intrinsic value. If everyone held to such a perverse ideology and assumed the same behavior, then the resulting universal assumption would be that torturing others is widely acceptable. However, this ideology is mistaken for, according to Kant, the agent’s assumption, would mean that the agent tends to believe that moral actions should treat prospective victims merely as means, rather than the ends. In other words, through mere assumptions, the agent essentially has no understanding of the distinction between means and ends. Kant would further point out if they have no idea about ends, they will not grasp the objective and intrinsic value of