Khe Sanh Battle Analysis

On January 21 1968, the People's Army of North Vietnam (PAVN) initiated a large-scale attack against U.S. forces stationed at Khe Sanh Airbase. The battle lasted a total of 77 days ending on April 8 1968. This critical battle in the Vietnam War helped limit the advance of North Vietnamese forces from seizing the eastern Vietnamese coastline, spreading communist influence throughout northern South Vietnam, and maintaining the security along the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The purpose of this paper is to analyze the battle of Khe Sanh and to discuss how the use of unmanned ground sensor support could have drastically changed the course of the battle, and shaped the outcome of Vietnam.

By 1968, U.S troop strength in Vietnam was at 549,500 in
an attempt to limit the advance of communist aggression from the North Vietnamese. Nestled along a plateau, near the Dong Tri Mountain, overlooking the Quang Tri River, in northwest South Vietnam was the U.S Airbase Khe Sanh. The base was approximately 15 miles from the demilitarized zone near the Laotian border. Although established to limit the advance of North Vietnamese forces into the populated costal cities to the southeast, the airbase also halted the enemy’s lines of communications from bordering Laos, commonly referred to as the Santa Fe Trail. U.S commanders were concerned with the rate in which North Vietnamese forces were advancing on the south and established Khe Sanh Airbase to restrict the enemy’s freedom of movement.

General William Westmoreland, commander of U.S. Forces Vietnam, became concerned with Khe Sanh in late 1967 due to imagery and human intelligence reports that stated enemy forces were massing along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and were poised to strike the airbase. In October of 1967, troop strength at the base was only one battalion. This worried U.S. commanders in the north South Vietnam and forced the U.S. to begin increasing combat power at the airbase. Despite senior commanders placing less emphasis on the base and requesting additional support to the south, General Westmoreland approved the deployment of additional forces every month over the period of 90 days. By January 1968, troop strength bolstered to approximately 6,000 forces, comprised of the 26th Marine Regiment, Army Special Forces, and forces from Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. These numbers however were still minor to the estimated 30,000 PAVN that were massing near the base for an attack.

North Vietnamese forces, under the command of Vo Nguyen Giap, had been preparing for large-scale attacks throughout Vietnam in an attempt to seize power in South Vietnam. General Giap hoped that multi-coordinated offensives would cause a general uprising and lead to massive defections of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. Planned attacks against Khe Sanh sought to redirect U.S. forces away from vulnerable sites in the south and mirror Giap’s previous success at Dien Bien Phu, where he defeated the French. Giap hoped that the seizure of the base and large U.S. casualties would shock and break U.S. morale, and lead to the withdrawal of U.S. forces, similar to that which had happened with the French.

North Vietnamese forces set the conditions for battle by slowly moving men, weapons, and equipment across the border during the later part of 1967. Using rat trails and lines of communications from Laos, Soldiers from the 304th, 320th, 324th and 325th CVNA divisions trekked rough terrain with artillery, munitions, and supplies that would sustain a large-scale attack against the base. The CVNA understood that the base would need to be isolated and spent a good portion of 1967 probing the surrounding areas near the base, collecting intelligence, and severing U.S. ground supply routes. By January 1968, the CVNA seized major supply route highway 9, forcing the base to rely mainly off aerial re-supplies. To counter the use of aerial re-supplies, North Vietnamese forces began moving anti-aircraft weapon systems into the mountains and valleys. The enemy had put all the pieces in place and only required the opportunistic moment to start the attack.

Weather during the early portions of the year was favorable to the enemy. Low cloud ceilings and heavy moisture limited aerial support and operations around the airbase. CVNA forces planned to take advantage of this and start the battle by maneuvering forces during inclement weather to breach the U.S. defense and overwhelm the airbase. To counter CVNA offensive operations, U.S. forces reinforced tactical over watch positions overlooking the airbase and surrounding valleys and went about setting up land mine fields, complex bunker systems, and heavy weapon emplacements. Although the U.S. knew it would be greatly outnumbered when hit, the use of more superior firepower and technology would prevail.

The CVNA slowly began moving closer and closer to U.S. positions throughout the area when on 19 January they were discovered and a battalion sized enemy element was discovered by a U.S. reconnaissance patrol. U.S. forces were quickly overwhelmed forcing the unit to retrograde to a secondary outpost closer to the base. The patrol relayed the information to the airbase confirming intelligence that a large number of CVNA were in the area. U.S. artillery and airpower began pressuring the North Vietnamese however, the enemy dug into the sides of mountains and waited out the barrage until the 21st.

On January 21, the battle began. CVNA forces initiated a large-scale artillery barrage against the airbase while conducting simultaneous attacks against outposts north of the base and against the South Vietnamese battalion embedded with a small contingent of Special Forces in Khe Sahn village. The South Vietnamese could not hold their positions and becoming overwhelmed by the CVNA Division that hit them. Surviving forces withdrew back to the airbase where they took up defensive positions in anticipation for follow on attacks. Although enemy forces were persistent in their attacks, they were unable to overwhelm U.S. over watch positions enabling U.S. forces to defend the airbase. CVNA forces became limited in their advances due to round the clock fixed and rotary wing support combined with counter-fires from organic artillery pieces.

The enemy seemed temporarily incapable of overwhelming key terrain where U.S. forces were at but their use of laid on fires proved effective when they struck Khe Sanh’s ammo supply point. The attack resulted in the destruction of 90% of the bases munitions. The base quickly had to rely upon aerial drops from C-130’s, which faced immense anti-aircraft and indirect fires upon their approach. Helicopter support to over watch positions faced even greater fire resulting in the loss of multiple aircraft. The U.S. quickly challenged the enemy by including fixed wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and smoke screen escorts upon every supply run forcing the enemy to reduce surface to air attacks in order to limit their signatures.

To help identify these large signatures the U.S. began implementing the use of airdropped sensors that could detect enemy movements. The sensors would notify aircraft where CVNA personnel were enabling fighters to conduct bombing runs or artillery strikes. It proved effective considering the poor weather and limited ability for U.S. ground offensive operations. By the 29th of January intelligence reports that upwards of 30,000 CVNA were operating within the battle space and were intent on seizing the base. Persistent artillery strikes and probing attacks against the U.S. lines became so bad that General Westmoreland was briefing President Nixon on the status of the base. President Nixon refused to allow such a failure to occur despite open source news outlets promoting the pending fall of the airbase.

President Nixon pressured General Westmoreland to increase his veracity resulting in an increase in aerial support. Six hundred flights a day dropped a record numbers of ordinances forcing the enemy into a defensive posture outside of the U.S. positions. By February 22, intelligence once again reported an imminent attack against the base. Bombing runs however proved effective, limiting the enemy’s ability to mount anything larger than skirmishes and artillery barrages throughout the rest of the month and into late March.

On March 26, the enemy began to close in on the base and prepare for an attack. The enemy had entrenched themselves in defensive fighting positions and were digging tunnels in an attempt to breach the American lines. The enemy planned to use poor weather to avoid aerial detection and conduct an attack but airpower, coupled with ground sensors and intelligence, prevailed. The enemy were ineffective and beaten down by constant barrages of shear firepower. On 27 March, CVNA began to withdrawal forces, and by April had retrograded all four CVNA divisions from Khe Sanh.

The attack ended up resulting in approximately 10,000-15,000 enemy casualties.
Friendly forces comprised, of both South Vietnamese and Americans, sustained 703 killed in actions, 2,642 wounded in action, and 7 missing in action. The operation was hailed as an American victory because the base was sustained however, the amount of support that was required to do so left locations in South Vietnam vulnerable during the Tet Offensive. The high cost of the battle, both human and material loss, appeared negatively in the press, straining public support for the war. To the North Vietnamese the battle was a temporary setback. The CVNA withdrew back into Laos and across the DMZ where they refit and staged for future attempts against locations near the
border.

The battle forced U.S. commander to revaluate strategy and the cost of key terrain. It reinforced the fact that the CVNA were willing to sustain heavy loss and pressure U.S. forces into a slow withdrawal from Vietnam. The battle did however highlight the effectiveness of intelligence support and created innovative methods of aerial support that would be implemented in future battles. Overall, the battle was a temporary victory in a losing war. The U.S. would be unwilling to sustain the rate at which it was going but if not for the brave men who held their ground. American public sentiment for the war would have been too much forcing the U.S. into peace talks with the North Vietnamese much earlier than had occurred.

The outcome of the battle and the Vietnam War could have been drastically different if it not had been for the effective use of seismic sensors in support of the battle for Khe Sanh. If the U.S. had not implemented the new technology into the battle, it is probable that the enemy would have been much more effective and could have potentially seized the airbase and surrounding over watch positions. Such a loss would have had catastrophic tactical, strategic, and political impacts.

On the tactical level, the lack sensors would have allowed the enemy much more improved freedom of movement around the battlefield.
CVNA forces would have been able to plan their attacks in conjunction with poor weather allowing them to gain closer proximity of U.S. defensive positions without fear of aerial attacks. U.S. static positions would have been reliant solely on human intelligence that can be both late and inaccurate. This would enable the CVNA to move large amounts of forces undetected in the poor weather that could have overwhelmed the much smaller numbered U.S. positions. A breach of any of the positions would have been a domino effect any likely lead to the inevitable retrograde of over watch positions back to the
airbase.

CVNA would have been able to surround the airbase leaving it more susceptible for a large-scale offensive attack. The lack of sensors would not have given forewarning of pending attacks allowing CVNA the ability to mount large-scale attacks from any of the surrounding positions in attempt to breach the defenses. Once the defenses fell, it is unlikely that U.S. forces would have been able to hold off such a large number of enemy forces.

On the strategic level, the lack of sensors would have led to the loss of the base allowing CNVA forces to push further in northeastern South Vietnam. The DMZ is unlikely to have remained secured and logistical lines from the Laotian border expanded. These factors would have enabled the CVNA to set conditions for large-scale attacks against populated coastal cities and south into Saigon. A large unimpeded force could have quickly swept the mountainsides and jungles, garnering support from locals, expanding the communist’s sphere of influence. These movements could have also led to an expedited move on the South Vietnamese Capital of Saigon.

On the political level, the lack of sensors leading to the fall of the airbase would have been too much for the American public to take. It is probable that public outcry of such a loss would have eventually led to the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, similar to which the French had experienced. It is also possible that such a loss could have prompted President Nixon to make a rash decision and employ the use of nuclear or chemical weapons to limit the communists advance on the south. The international community would never support such an action and it could have led to a declaration of war from communist supporting allies such as Russia and China.

Overall, the battle of Khe Sanh was an important battle in the Vietnam War because it temporarily stalled the advance of CVNA forces on South Vietnam. The battle limited the enemy’s chance for a military and political embarrassment that could have forced the U.S. into an early withdrawal from the war. The use of intelligence ground sensors that relayed troop movements proved effective, and without them could have quickly resulted in a series of events that the U.S. could not have stomached at that time. Its alternate ending could have been one of the biggest U.S. losses of the 21st century and potentially could have led the U.S. into future conflicts that would have been much greater.