Facts: On March 18, 2004, plaintiff’s, Carol Kilarjian and Dave de Castro, and defendants, John Vastola and Joan Vastola, entered into a contract for the sale of 136 East Cliff St., Somerville. The final date was scheduled for June 15, 2004. On June 14, 2004, defendant’s real estate attorney wrote plaintiff’s attorney stating that defendants had elected not to proceed to convey title. Plaintiff’s contended that the difference in the financing costs they experience because of the delay should be presented as damages because the breach by defendants will result in a higher financing cost. Also, plaintiffs strongly stress the breach of contract because they suffered costs and attorney’s fees as well as financing costs for the delay in acquiring a second mortgage obligation; Defendant’s delay should be calculated as damages for plaintiffs. On June 15, 2004, plaintiffs' real estate attorney forwarded a time-of-the-essence letter to defendants, setting a closing date of June 25, 2004. Defendants failed to close and are not willing to close on the property. Defendants do not dispute the weight of the contract. However, Mrs. Vastola's spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) began to accelerate. In defense of their position, defendants provided a letter from Mrs. Vastola's doctor, Mark J. Brown, which explained that SMA is a progressive neurological condition that, as a result, disables her from all daily activities because of her arms and legs are weak which results in putting Mrs. Vastola in no condition to sell her house and move. Correspondingly the defendants argue that since the time they signed the contract for the sale of the home, Mrs. Vastola’s conditions become increasingly worse, should excuse the performance in proceeding with the sale of their house. Besides the plaintiffs were well aware of Mrs. Vastola’s condition when
Facts: On March 18, 2004, plaintiff’s, Carol Kilarjian and Dave de Castro, and defendants, John Vastola and Joan Vastola, entered into a contract for the sale of 136 East Cliff St., Somerville. The final date was scheduled for June 15, 2004. On June 14, 2004, defendant’s real estate attorney wrote plaintiff’s attorney stating that defendants had elected not to proceed to convey title. Plaintiff’s contended that the difference in the financing costs they experience because of the delay should be presented as damages because the breach by defendants will result in a higher financing cost. Also, plaintiffs strongly stress the breach of contract because they suffered costs and attorney’s fees as well as financing costs for the delay in acquiring a second mortgage obligation; Defendant’s delay should be calculated as damages for plaintiffs. On June 15, 2004, plaintiffs' real estate attorney forwarded a time-of-the-essence letter to defendants, setting a closing date of June 25, 2004. Defendants failed to close and are not willing to close on the property. Defendants do not dispute the weight of the contract. However, Mrs. Vastola's spinal muscular atrophy (SMA) began to accelerate. In defense of their position, defendants provided a letter from Mrs. Vastola's doctor, Mark J. Brown, which explained that SMA is a progressive neurological condition that, as a result, disables her from all daily activities because of her arms and legs are weak which results in putting Mrs. Vastola in no condition to sell her house and move. Correspondingly the defendants argue that since the time they signed the contract for the sale of the home, Mrs. Vastola’s conditions become increasingly worse, should excuse the performance in proceeding with the sale of their house. Besides the plaintiffs were well aware of Mrs. Vastola’s condition when