Kursk: Turning Point On The Eastern Front

The Battle of Kursk is the only German offensive in 1943, as well as the last one of its kind on the Eastern front. German generals’ hope of gathering all of their possible fighting forces and make a difference by capturing Kursk was proved to have played a crucial role in the turning tide on the eastern front, if not the most decisive one. Many historian claim the several failed campaigns in previous years, for example Moscow, Caucasus, Kharkov, etc have already led to this eventual downfall, whereas others believe it was mainly due to the failed attempt to capture Kursk, otherwise the Germans would be able to advance even further.

When analysing the importance of the battle and whether it was the turning point of the Eastern front,
By this time the Russians dug about 3000 miles of trenches and placed more than 400,000 mines. (p134 Citino) With such forbidding defence, General Guderian confronted Hitler on May 10th of that year, as he attempted to persuade him to cancel the plans because he believes that Operation Citadel is doomed. (Clark p183) He said,” The world is completely indifferent as to whether we have Kursk or not… Why do you want to attack in the east, particularly this year?” And Hitler could only respond by saying that “the thought of this attack makes my stomach queasy.” (p184 Clark) In a situation like this where not even the decision makers themselves were certain about the outcome of the battle, no wonder the Germans were defeated and started to fall step by step back to
It was 250 kilometres long from north to south and 160 kilometres from east to west (Glantz p157 ) By eliminating the bulge, the Germans would be able to shorten their lines, ease off the numerical superiority of the soviet army, and regroup for the next offensive. (Healy p90) However, there is no other economic or political value like the Caucasus oilfield, the capital Moscow or Stalingrad which could have changed the course of war had any of these places been lost to the Germans. Even if the Germans managed to drive the Soviet army out of the bulge, it would still be an illusion for the Wehrmacht to push further east considering the large amount of reserves waiting for them not far from the battlefield. This is supported as the Soviet army had been preparing for a counteroffensive with their reserves. In the two valuable months of breathing time as the attack was delayed, the Soviets shipped in large amounts of reserves .Zhukov plans that by destroying the German armored forces at Kursk, there would be a chance to launch a major counterattack, for example, “to bolster the defence if necessary and provide the ‘sword’ of the counterattack behind the defensive ‘shield,’... General Ivan Konev, his army consisted of 573,195 troops.” (Clark