La Gloire: Invasion Of France

La Gloire can be translated as a reputation in the world and the posterity for nobility, honour and glorious feats of arms. With this in mind the question can be interpreted as whether Louis XIV was to use his foreign policy to establish a universal monarchy for himself or alternatively to use it to secure natural frontiers for France thus improving its defences. During his reign Louis was involved in four major wars some of which Louis may be accountable as the provocateur, however, I believe that mainly his motives were purely defensive.

It was apparent to Louis that there were a number of gateways from the Empire through which enemies of France might threaten the state 's security. The three imperial bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun
were strategically situated on the north-eastern frontier. They had been occupied by French troops since 1552 but it was only at the treaty of Westphalia that they were finally acknowledged as sovereign possessions of the French King. Franche-Comté was one entry into France previously exploited by its enemies that Louis succeeded in closing in 1678 by arguably legal claims that he had sovereignty. He had already closed another, the port of Dunkirk, by purchasing it from Charles II of England in 1662 and a third gateway, from the southern Netherlands, was effectively barred by the military fortifications erected by his great military engineer, Vauban, in the 1680s. Following the successful Peace of Nijmegen, Louis began to employ his own judicial courts to determine what additional territories were dependant on those properly acquired by Louis at Westphalia and Nijmwegem. Not surprisingly the additions proved to be extensive and strategically important. From this it seems that Louis does have a genuine concern for his country and despite his dubious methods he does manage to secure the territories that he wishes to secure. It is therefore possible to rule out the fact his attacks on these lands was in order to pursue his gloire and that his intentions were merely defensive.

There was no legal justification however for Louis 's greatest victory in the area -the seizure in 1681 of the independent city of Strasbourg. It became obvious that to Louis this key city was the door through which imperial armies could pass into Alsace, representing a serious threat, for Strasbourg was within easy reach of the Danube valley and Vienna. This seems to be the turning point in his reign where it became apparent that his intentions were not merely defensive and in fact Strasbourg could be used as a window to the west.

By now Louis 's gloire was beginning to play a large role in his foreign policy as shown in his bullying attitude towards the Dutch.
His invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in 1667 and the ensuing War of Devolution frightened the Dutch into a Triple Alliance with England and Sweden, which led to the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1668. Then, in the Dutch War that followed shortly afterward, Louis intended to warn the Dutch that France was a serious European player and to force the Dutch to give him a free hand in the Spanish Netherlands when the issue of the Spanish succession came up. He learned from that war that he could never hope to incorporate a large part of the Netherlands into France against Dutch opposition; but he also continued to fear the manner in which the Dutch might try to influence the government of the Spanish Netherlands for their own economic benefit. Here again was an example of mutual hostility and suspicion in which interpretations of motives in Versailles and in The Hague were opposed. At the Treaty of Rijswijk in 1697 the Dutch gained the right to keep a series of Dutch barrier fortresses within the southern Netherlands as a check against French aggression; it was Louis 's seizure of these fortresses in 1701 that precipitated the War of the Spanish
Succession.

The nine years war also seemed to be sparked off as a result of defensive measures. Despite the truce of Ratisbon in 1684, Louis was still concerned with the security of his eastern frontier and his defensive strategy was now extended to two Rhineland objectives beyond his boundaries, the electorate of Cologne and the fortress of Phillipsburg on the right bank of the river beyond the Palatinate. Control of Cologne would provide a barrier in northern Germany and a base from which to threaten the Dutch republic thus in 1688 French troops marched into Cologne and across the Palatinate to Phillipsburg.

It is certainly true that the approaching end of the direct ruling line in Spain had interested European rulers for many years, and the Bourbon claim to a share in that rich inheritance - deriving from Louis 's marriage to Maria-Theresa was accepted as a key factor in the situation. In 1668 Louis and Emperor Leopold I had gone so far as to sign a partition treaty, more than 30 years before the death of the last Spanish Habsburg, Charles II. No European statesman was surprised, therefore, at Louis 's later concern when, after the signature of the Treaty of Rijswijk in 1697, he undertook negotiations with the English king William III out of which two further partition treaties emerged. The crucial moment came when Charles II 's last will was published, offering the Spanish crown, in opposition to the second Partition Treaty, to Louis 's grandson Philip, Duke d 'Anjou. Louis 's decision to accept did not in itself provoke war. Besides, if Louis had refused the Spanish offer, it would have been made to Austria, and the spectre of the restoration of Charles V 's empire, probably coupled with French losses on the north-eastern frontiers was intolerable. In addition, Louis had recently made peace after the War of the Grand Alliance, the hardest conflict in which he had so far been engaged, and thus had no illusions about the difficulty of overcoming another coalition under William III 's leadership. One may conclude that he did not seek war and thus was not merely concerned with la gloire, however, he did make decisions that made war likely. He recognised the Old Pretender as James III of England, as well as his unexplained decision to protect his grandson 's right to the French throne, his occupation of the barrier fortresses, and his seizure of the monopoly of the Spanish-American trade.

When peace was signed at Utrecht in 1713, Louis, despite the disasters of the intervening years, succeeded in holding onto the gains in Europe that he had considered vital throughout his reign, including Alsace and Strasbourg.
In addition, his grandson remained king of Spain, despite all of the efforts of the Grand Alliance to replace him by their candidate, the Austrian archduke
Charles.

The defensive needs of the kingdom therefore were a major preoccupation behind Louis XIV 's foreign policy. Yet the aggressive and opportunistic implementation of Louis 's policy understandably persuaded those threatened by it that the king 's intention was expansionist and his intentions unlimited. There had been acts of gratuitous violence as well which underlined the arrogance and ruthlessness of French conduct: the scorched earth policy during the Dutch War and the destruction by naval barrage of the free city of Genoa as a result of assisting Spain. In conclusion it seems that by the end of his reign his war had placed him in a strong and secure position in Europe yet his intention was not entirely for glory. Despite the fact that la gloire did play a role in Luois 's foreign policy, the defence of his nation was the dominant feature.

Bibliography

Louis XIV by Campbell

Louis XIV by J.H Shennan