Legislative History Paper
Charles Nunez
PSC 31719
April 4, 2012
Legislative History
Interpreting statutes is never simple and sometimes even problematic; there are several reasons for this. First is because the United States does not have a generally accepted and consistent applied theory for interpreting statues[1]. Second, statutes are written and the texts used to write the statutes are sometimes vague, or the text might be outdated and have a new meaning. Finally, interpreting statutes are sometimes problematic because the entire statute might have been constructed vaguely and left open to interpretation. The problems with statutory interpretations caused many legal scholars to debate on what method is best suited for interpreting statues. Two prestigious Supreme Court Justices provided their opinion on what method is best suited for interpreting statues as well. Justice Scalia praises textualism, in which “one need not be too dull to perceive the border social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to serve; or too hidebound to realize that new times require new laws. One need only hold the belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws”[2] Justice Breyer praises legislative history, in which one reviews and analyzes “the statements made in the floor debates, committees reports, and even committee testimony, leading up to the enactment of the legislation.”[3] Given the fact that statutes are sometimes ambiguous, the use of legislative history is occasionally needed in order to resolve statutory conflicts, and this is why the use of legislative history should never be completely abandoned.
. The use of legislative history to resolve statutory conflicts is often criticized because of three main reasons, but not one reason provides a strong enough argument to completely abandon the use of legislative history. First, critics are afraid that Judges will use legislative history to support their personal opinions
PSC 31719
April 4, 2012
Legislative History
Interpreting statutes is never simple and sometimes even problematic; there are several reasons for this. First is because the United States does not have a generally accepted and consistent applied theory for interpreting statues[1]. Second, statutes are written and the texts used to write the statutes are sometimes vague, or the text might be outdated and have a new meaning. Finally, interpreting statutes are sometimes problematic because the entire statute might have been constructed vaguely and left open to interpretation. The problems with statutory interpretations caused many legal scholars to debate on what method is best suited for interpreting statues. Two prestigious Supreme Court Justices provided their opinion on what method is best suited for interpreting statues as well. Justice Scalia praises textualism, in which “one need not be too dull to perceive the border social purposes that a statute is designed, or could be designed, to serve; or too hidebound to realize that new times require new laws. One need only hold the belief that judges have no authority to pursue those broader purposes or write those new laws”[2] Justice Breyer praises legislative history, in which one reviews and analyzes “the statements made in the floor debates, committees reports, and even committee testimony, leading up to the enactment of the legislation.”[3] Given the fact that statutes are sometimes ambiguous, the use of legislative history is occasionally needed in order to resolve statutory conflicts, and this is why the use of legislative history should never be completely abandoned.
. The use of legislative history to resolve statutory conflicts is often criticized because of three main reasons, but not one reason provides a strong enough argument to completely abandon the use of legislative history. First, critics are afraid that Judges will use legislative history to support their personal opinions