Maersk Doha
1 Communication
The working language onboard Maersk Doha was English and the crew had achieved the necessary standard to obtain UK CECs. All the officers apart from the chief engineer came from Eastern European countries and shared a common language which was observed to be in regular use. This had the effect of isolating the chief engineer even in normal circumstances, but would have been exacerbated during the emergency, making it substantially harder for him to understand and control what was happening. Despite exceeding the required Marlins test score, the chief engineer had only achieved scores of 3 for the language section in the majority of his evaluation reports, less than the score of 2 required by ZMA’s crewing manual. The definition for a score of 3 includes the statement that, ‘comprehension is likely to fail under pressure’. It is apparent from the chief engineer’s actions throughout the accident that he had difficulty understanding what was being reported to him and that language barriers hindered his command of the situation.
Investigators interviewing the chief engineer found it extremely difficult to frame questions that he understood, and to interpret his answers. This amply illustrated the communication problems that would have been present during the emergency.
2.6.2 Leadership
The chief engineer had worked at sea for many years and had experience of a wide variety of vessels. He was well liked by other crew and was regarded as a very hard working man with a gentle demeanour. As the machinery breakdown developed, he reported to the bridge but did little else to direct his subordinates. By the time the first and third engineers told the chief engineer about the auxiliary boiler failure, the EGE was already at risk, yet the chief engineer accepted their initial actions and allowed them to continue. This decision demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the overall machinery state and an
The working language onboard Maersk Doha was English and the crew had achieved the necessary standard to obtain UK CECs. All the officers apart from the chief engineer came from Eastern European countries and shared a common language which was observed to be in regular use. This had the effect of isolating the chief engineer even in normal circumstances, but would have been exacerbated during the emergency, making it substantially harder for him to understand and control what was happening. Despite exceeding the required Marlins test score, the chief engineer had only achieved scores of 3 for the language section in the majority of his evaluation reports, less than the score of 2 required by ZMA’s crewing manual. The definition for a score of 3 includes the statement that, ‘comprehension is likely to fail under pressure’. It is apparent from the chief engineer’s actions throughout the accident that he had difficulty understanding what was being reported to him and that language barriers hindered his command of the situation.
Investigators interviewing the chief engineer found it extremely difficult to frame questions that he understood, and to interpret his answers. This amply illustrated the communication problems that would have been present during the emergency.
2.6.2 Leadership
The chief engineer had worked at sea for many years and had experience of a wide variety of vessels. He was well liked by other crew and was regarded as a very hard working man with a gentle demeanour. As the machinery breakdown developed, he reported to the bridge but did little else to direct his subordinates. By the time the first and third engineers told the chief engineer about the auxiliary boiler failure, the EGE was already at risk, yet the chief engineer accepted their initial actions and allowed them to continue. This decision demonstrated a lack of appreciation of the overall machinery state and an