Military Ethics: The Profession Of Arms

MILITARY ETHICS

1

Team Writing Notes:
Journal of Military Ethics Writing Guidelines (This journal uses a pseudo­APA style for citations that will need to be entered manually; see the following link for details and citation guidance): http://www.tandfonline.com/action/authorSubmission?journalCode=smil20&page=instructions#. VNDbV2jVofx TEAM COLOR CODE
PETER
FOUAD
MO

ABSTRACT

KEY WORDS
Ethical Leadership; Joint Force; Military Ethics training and development; Multinational;
Profession of Arms

MILITARY ETHICS

2

MILITARY ETHICS: THE JOINT FORCE’S MOST ESSENTIAL UNIFORM

FOR SUBMISSION TO
JOURNAL OF MILITARY ETHICS

Major Peter J. Reiley, USAF
Major Morina Foster, USMC
Lieutenant Colonel Fouad El Hayek, LAF
Hundreds of innocent civilians and surrendering soldiers, women, children, and town elders were slaughter, executed, and raped, by U.S. armed forces . Weintgartner argues that senior leadership during both massacres are ultimately

MILITARY ETHICS

10

responsible for the atrocities based on the ‘commander intent’ and potential ‘strategic messaging’. Prior to the massacre of Biscari, General Patton’s specifically stated to the forces, “When we meet the enemy we will kill him, we will show him no mercy, he has killed thousands of your comrades and he must die”. No mention of unconditional surrender, treatment of innocent civilian, or ethical direction was given. Although, policy’s, ROE, and the LOAC was in place, it was not reinforced at any level. Was the commander’s message perceived as literal, which translated onto the battlefield? or was this strategic messaging in an effort to get the enemy capitulate his forces out fear? Were the atrocities committed at Biscari predicated upon this statement alone, as depicted during the accused trial? or was unethical human behavior and the lack of morals, virtues, and respect for LOAC the case? During the Vietnam conflict there were similar
TRICKLE DOWN ETHICAL LEADERSHIP)
In spite of its ostensive advantages for developing military ethics, on its own, the top­down approach may prove to be tenuous, since any perceived malfeasance among these senior leaders can compromise critical ethical foundations. The top­down approach may also have practical limitations for military ethics training. Robinson (2007) argued that a pure, top­down approach may be construed by junior military members as yet another training

MILITARY ETHICS

16

requirement imposed on them by senior leaders. These perceptions limit junior military members’ personal investment and ownership of the developmental process; this often leads to cynicism and resentment rather than long­term organizational change and buy­in. Given these limitations, a more integrative and bottom­up approach may be well­suited to the Joint Force’s ethical challenges.
A bottom­up approach attempts to overcome limitations and potential negative perceptions inherent in the top­down approach. A bottom­up approach promotes a wider ownership of the ethical development process by delegating the leading role to military members at lower levels of the chain of command (Robinson 2007). This bottom­up approach