Mill's Conception Of Representation In The United States

The seemingly simple concept of representation has a number of conflicting interpretations, resulting in a multitude of opinions on exactly what representation should look like. These clashing conceptions hold representatives to fundamentally different expectations. Edmund Burke, for example, maintains that a good representative should listen to his constituents, but rely mainly on his own judgment in pursuit of the common good, which can sometimes be at odds with the opinions of constituents. In contrast, John Stuart Mill’s idea of representation ties the representative much closer to his constituents. He views representation as a vehicle of the people, through which each and every citizen is guaranteed to be heard, and the elected representative
has a duty to follow the will of his or her constituents. Though this problem of representation has yet to be entirely solved, The Federalist comes the closest to painting a reliable picture of what comprises proper representation.
In Speech to the Electors at Bristol, Edmund Burke argues that the only thing a representative owes his constituents is his own judgment, which he or she should always prioritize over the opinions and desires of their constituents. Rather than pursue the interests of their individual constituents, representatives should, he argues, pursue the much broader “general good” of the nation as a whole. In his speech, Burke stresses that Parliament is a deliberative body that should make the right decisions for the nation as a whole without being held accountable to their local constituents. “You choose a member, indeed; but when you have chosen him he is not a member of Bristol, he is a Member of Parliament” (Burke 1). The representative will value the opinions of his constituents, but understands that they are not always right. It is the job of the representative to deliberate and decide the best course of action. The people elect a wise and competent representative to make important decisions on their behalf, and the representatives, together, work towards one goal: the common good. John Stuart Mill focuses much more on the “pluribus” aspect, advocating for a completely popular government in which every person has a voice. Mill does not share Burke’s assumption that the people do not know their best interest; he instead believes that the best way to further one’s interests and protect one’s rights is for one to speak for them directly. He sees an experiential gap between legislatures and normal constituents, which will keep the former from truly making the best decisions for the latter. “The interest of the excluded is always in danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons whom it directly concerns” (Mill 2). The elite representatives wouldn’t have the slightest idea how to represent their working-class constituents, even if they so desired. To be a representative body, the people need to be represented by someone just like them, who understands, to the full extent, their interests. In The Federalist No.
10, Madison presents a purpose of representation that is significantly different from Mill – representatives should “refine and enlarge the public view, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens . . .” (Hamilton 58) – much less of a direct democracy. He believes in the importance of representatives being accountable to their constituents, but not to the uber-pluribus extent argued by Mill. A representative should be tied closely enough to his constituents to understand all of their views, but should not follow their every wish. The representatives, through deliberation, can come to an understanding of the public view that is not based on “temporary or partial considerations” (Hamilton 59). Unlike Mill, Madison states that representatives should be primarily focused on local knowledge as it pertains to commerce, taxation, and the militia (Hamilton 360); it is neither probable nor necessary to know everything about their constituents. The function of the House, Madison argues, is not to advocate for local concerns. Instead, the purpose of representatives is to bring relevant local information into legislative discussion to better enable the House to make decisions that will benefit the nation as a
whole. The Federalist comes to the opposite conclusion as the Antifederalists regarding the appropriate size of a nation to have the most effective representation. Antifederalists Centinel and Brutus believe that the only way to solve the problem of representation is to have a small republic, where interests would be less diverse and thus easier for legislatures to represent their constituents. A representative government in a nation as big as the United States “ . . . cannot attend to the various concerns and wants of its different parts. It cannot be sufficiently numerous to be acquainted with the local condition and wants of the different districts, and if it could, it is impossible it would have sufficient time to attend to and provide for all the variety of cases of this nature, that would be continually arising” (Centinel 3). Centinel argues that the number of representatives set forth in the Constitution is too few; and there is no way one representative can adequately represent 30,000 constituents. Increasing the number of representatives, however, would not solve this problem of representation, as the number of representatives would subsequently be too great. Such a large number of representatives with so many different views would render the body incapable of legislating, and they would not be able to get anything done. The only solution, they argue, is a much smaller republic where the interests of the citizens will be extremely similar. Madison, on the other hand, sees a large republic as the only type capable of protecting the liberty of the people as a whole. Madison argues that factions are and will always be an inevitable occurrence in society, and danger lies in them if they become a majority. The best way to control the dangerous effects of factions is to have more factions – thus rendering a majority faction harder to emerge. It is a large republic that will ensure copious amounts of views and more diverse constituents. The only way one faction in a large republic could get a majority would be to compromise some of their goals to appeal to a larger number of citizens, which would, in turn, move them closer to the common good. Factions are a natural propensity of man, and will prove to exist even in the small republics advocated for by Centinel and Brutus; and even in the most homogeneous society imaginable “the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts” (Hamilton 55). Not only are smaller republics equally prone to factions, they are more vulnerable to them as well. A dangerous majority faction is much more easily formed in a small republic with only a few interests, and a small republic is more likely to yield to a dangerous majority. Madison maintains that one branch needs to be “immediately dependent” on the people to protect liberty in case the government should become tyrannical. The Antifederalists assumed that limiting a representative to one term would make them more responsive and accountable to their constituents, since he or she would not be concerned with reelection. Madison comes to a different conclusion – frequent elections by the people will guarantee accountability, and representatives will be especially motivated by the prospect of reelection. Madison hoped that the people would elect a wise and virtuous representative, but he did not assume, as did Burke, that they will always be virtuous; he recognized the need for frequent elections to ensure that the representative will continue to act in pursuit of the common good for the nation as well as their constituents.
Burke fails to solve the problem of representation, as he assumes that representatives will always be virtuous and motivated to act in pursuit of the common good, though this is certainly not the case in politics today.
Mill comes no closer, as his conception requires so strong a tie between representatives and their constituents that they would be far too focused on local concerns. Though there exists no clear model of what representation ought to look like, the Federalist moves closer towards reconciling the contradictory principles of representation. Short terms and elections by the people will ensure that representatives will be held accountable to their constituents, and their selfish desires of reelection will motivate them to pursue the common good. Although they will be tasked with being closely tied to their constituents, their primary focus is to “refine and enlarge the public view” in order to bring relevant local information to the House for deliberation, which they will do at a distance from their constituents to ensure that they will not follow them blindly or be caught up in temporary concerns. With the enlarged public view of each local area, the House can more successfully make decisions that will move further towards the good of the whole nation, as they will know how each local area will be
affected.