Miracle or Malthus?

Miracle or Malthus?
The Economist December 17th, 2011 Lucca Zachmann Development economics, Fall 2012

Sciences Po, Paris, France

Summary Africa’s demographic structure is globally unique: Fertility rates are generally considerably above replacement level, mortality rates are among the highest in the world and the continent tops the list of new HIV infections. Unlike any other continent Africa’s population structure does not develop as it would according to the classic demographic transition of more advanced developing countries. This calls for a big question mark regarding Africa’s future; will the continent face a Malthusian disaster or can it still achieve a demographic dividend? The face of a Malthusian disaster According to the British economist Thomas Robert Malthus, who published the hypothesis in his famous book An Essay on the Principal of Population (1798), the population is growing at an exponential rate where as the food production is only raising at a linear rate, food supply and demand are developing apart. African countries which present the world’s highest fertility rates are therefore likely to enter in this trap as predicted by Thomas Malthus and risk to fall deeper into poverty and pauperisation due to the finiteness of natural resources. On the other hand it can be argued, like Ester Boserup did in her notable book The Conditions of Agricultural Growth (1965), that population growth leads to innovation in agricultural techniques due to an increasing talent pool and therefore to economic growth. Apart from Boserup’s different view on the topic there are other arguments why Thomas Malthus’ hypothesis does not reflect reality. Firstly, the theory does not take into account that people choose to have fewer children when the demographic situation is getting worse, and ignores therefore the so-called feedback effect. Secondly, food production technologies develop with time which may lead to a different form of the food production rate than linear. Furthermore, Thomas Malthus argues in

his hypothesis that the population growth rate is given exogenously. China’s one-child policy is probably the best prove to refute this assumption. The policy shows that governments are capable to actively change a countries’ population growth rate by either creating incentives for individuals to lower their fertility rates or simply by forcing them to have fewer children. India with its forced sterilization program is another example. Government policies which manipulate population growth may be effective in China and other Asian countries. However, this does not mean that they are applicable to the rest of the world. In Africa, the situation is not as in any other part of the world. In Asia and Latin America fertility rates started to decline soon after contraceptives had been introduced. However, this demographic transition, a stage model when fertility rates start to decline after mortality rates declined, is not happening in Africa. The fertility fall has not yet begun in the majority of the African countries and where it begun it is happening at a very slow pace. What is behind Africa’s high fertility rates? Generally said, African families decide to have a lot of children because they earn a pecuniary benefit of each newborn child. Daughters and Sons can work on the farm, support the housekeeping as well as care for their parents once there are not able to work anymore. Children are also simply enjoyable and a gift from heaven regarding to some religions and cultures. On the other hand, are the pecuniary costs of children fairly humble in Africa’s developing countries. Especially the opportunity costs, the costs parents face in order to care for the children instead of working, are very low compared to those in developing countries. But the high fertility rates in Africa cannot only be explained by an economic calculus. Cultural resistance, low women’s education, weak political will and the lack of contraceptive use are further deter-

minants of a high fertility. And this high fertility of women in Africa affects them negatively: They can suffer from health issues due to many pregnancies, they could drop out from school as well as their bargaining power can decrease due to homework instead of outside work. This indicates that high fertility rates are not only bad for the country as a whole but also for its citizens. A drop of Africa’s, and other developing countries, fertility rates can therefore be a gamechanging objective on their way to becoming a developed nation. But how can this be achieved? Means to reduce fertility The most famous and probably also the most effective way to reduce fertility is the use of contraceptives. But unlike other areas of the world like Asia, where the use of contraceptives spread rapidly, in rural Africa many married women do not have access to such means. And even if they have there is still a big cultural barrier to conquer. This asks for other or complementary means to reduce fertility. Emancipation and women’s education play therefore an important role to lower fertility rates. If girls attend schools they can be made aware of possible causes of high fertility rates and unprotected sexual intercourse, such as HIV. Also their work and wage opportunities improve and they do not need to have a lot of children to help to feed the family and to serve as a pension system. Empirical evidence from Duflo, Dupas, Kremer and Sinei (2006) shows that in Western Kenya, where children received free school uniforms in order to be able to attend school, the fertility rate fell from 14% to 11%. Another instrument to encourage individuals to have fewer children is to manipulate the economic incentives. The introduction of minimum age child labour laws or the provision of a monetary incentive for sterilisation are further possibilities. However, it might be hard to en-

force such child laws because in developing countries children are usually working on family farms in rural areas and therefore they are difficult to be controlled. If such means to reduce fertility are implemented correctly and most importantly adopted by the population this may lead to an actual decrease in the population growth and can hence bring a well-balanced population structure. A demographic dividend and the hidden momentum of population growth Some people still argue that its not too late and Africa and its mostly underdeveloped countries can still reach a demographic dividend, a situation where the working age population (people aged between 15 and 64) increases in share relative to the people below 15 and above 64. But this is certainly only true if fertility drops continuously and drastically, otherwise the share of the population of people aged below 15 would increase. This issue is multiplied by the hidden momentum of population growth. Population scientists define such a situation as the tendency of population growth to persist, even after fertility rates have decreased considerably. Reasons therefore are that changes in birth rates may take decades and that if the young population is large, this will lead to more births of this cohort at their childbearing age relative to the present population at childbearing age. Therefore a population is still rapidly growing even after the present fertility rates have fallen. Given that changes in fertility rates have an impact on the long run of a countries population structure, governments of developing countries must take actions now. Evidence shows that fertility rates can be manipulated with different methods, some of them may be suitable for some countries but would not work for others. It is up to the leading elite of a developing country to find the adequate means. A demographic dividend is thus still in reachable range.

References Ester Boserup (1965), The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure, London Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael Kremer, Samuel Sinei (2006), Education and HIV/AIDS Prevention: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Western Kenya The Economist, „Miracle or Malthus?“ (2011, December 17), retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/21541834 Thomas Robert Malthus (1798), An Essay on the Principle of Population, London Sandra Poncet (2012), Population Growth [PowerPoint Slides], retrieved from: http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/Poncet/SciencesPo/Lecture%205.pdf

References: Ester Boserup (1965), The Conditions of Agricultural Growth. The Economics of Agrarian Change under Population Pressure, London Esther Duflo, Pascaline Dupas, Michael Kremer, Samuel Sinei (2006), Education and HIV/AIDS Prevention: Evidence from a randomized evaluation in Western Kenya The Economist, „Miracle or Malthus?“ (2011, December 17), retrieved from: http://www.economist.com/node/21541834 Thomas Robert Malthus (1798), An Essay on the Principle of Population, London Sandra Poncet (2012), Population Growth [PowerPoint Slides], retrieved from: http://ces.univ-paris1.fr/membre/Poncet/SciencesPo/Lecture%205.pdf