Modern History Notes

Chapter 5:
The First Arab-Israeli War and the 1956 Suez Crisis

The war of 1947-49

Following Israel’s declaration of statehood the Arab armies attacked along all the borders of the Jewish state. Egyptian forces attacked from the south; Syria, Lebanon and Iraq attacked from the north and north-east. By 28 May 1948, the Jordanian Arab Legion had occupied East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
After initial setbacks, however, the Israelis successful drove the Arab armies out of the north, regained the Negev from the Egyptians and secured a corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. They were, however, unable to gain control of East Jerusalem.
The UN secured a truce in January 1949, and by July, Israel and the neighbouring Arab states had signed separate armistices agreements. Yet, these left many issues unresolved:
Israel refused to return to the borders laid out in the UN partition resolution, occupying 20% more of Palestine than the UN had agreed on.
Israel would not permit Palestinian refugees (of which there were 725, 000) to return to their homes
The Arab states and Palestinians refused diplomatic recognition to Israel and would not acknowledge the Jewish state’s right to exist.

How did Israel win the war?

1. One Zionist answer is the spirit and youthful determination of the Jews. According to Zionist historian A. L. Sachar, the Arabs “were almost listless by comparison, for they seemed to have little personal stake in the outcome of the war”. However, this is a very biased and simplistic analysis, and a closer look suggests a somewhat more complicated explanation.
2. Men and supply lines. The Israelis significantly outnumbered the Arabs (in December 1948, there were 95,000 Israeli troops, as opposed to 55,000 Arab troops). In addition, although the Israelis had few heavy weapons and no artillery or planes, they received a large shipment of weapons from Czechoslovakia at a crucial stage in the war. While the Arab states possessed armoured vehicles, they did not use them effectively, largely due to long lines of supply, eg. the Egyptians had a 400km supply line across the desert. As revisionist historian Avi Shlaim writes, “The Arab forces… mobilized to do battle against the emergent Jewish state were nowhere as powerful or united as they appeared to be in Arab and Jewish propaganda”.
3. Unified command. The Israelis had a strong unified command that the Arabs lacked. Traditional rivalries among Arab forces prevented the Arabs from having a coordinated campaign. The members of the British-trained Jordanian Arab Legion were the most effective fighters on the Arab side.

The effect of the creation of Israel on Jewish communities in Arab countries

The establishment of Israel had ramifications for Jews beyond Palestine and its borders:
In Africa and the Middle East, Jews were expelled or left Muslim countries. By 1957, over half a million Jews had settled in Israel.
Before 1948, almost 90% of Jews had arrived from Europe. The coming together in Israel of the Ashkenazim, or European, Jews (who had played such a central role in building up the national home) and the non-European Jews (who were so different in language and culture) created great problems for Israel.
In 1948, European Jews represented 75% of Israel’s Jews; by 1961, they made up only 55%. There was a danger that two Israels would be created: one consisting of Ashkenazi leaders who held power, and the other consisting of unemployed, uneducated and underprivileged Sephardic and Oriental Jews.

There has been some historical debate over whether the Jews in Arab countries were expelled as a result of the creation of Israel or whether they left voluntarily.
The traditional Zionist view sees the exodus as a response to a long history of Arab persecution. Zionists portray the lot of Oriental Jews in Arab countries as one of misery, fear and anti-Semitism.
The anti-Zionist view highlights the positives of Arab-Jewish history, and their exodus is attributed not to anti-Semitism, but rather to a malicious Zionist conspiracy including instances of bomb-throwing aimed at achieving mass Jewish immigration to Israel. Anti-Zionists believe that the wave of bombings which took place between April 1950 and June 1951 were perpetrated by Zionist agents in order to cause fear among the Jews and promote their exodus to Israel. Many Iraqi Jewish immigrants shared this belief, but there is no solid evidence, and the motivations of the bombings remain a contentious issue.
Both perspectives are overly simplistic, arguably intended to bolster contemporary political claims and agendas. The exodus reflected a combination of push and pull factors:
For many Jews, the reason to move was economic.
For others, the chance to live in a Jewish state, a place of refuge, was greatly attractive.
Anti-Jewish feeling had certainly been heightened by the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, encouraging many Jews to leave Arab states.
The Jewish exodus was also influenced by the Zionist underground movement, which convinced many Jews that emigration offered the best solution to their problems.

The effect of the creation of Israel on the Arab population of Palestine

For Palestinian Arabs, May 1948 meant that Palestine no longer existed. For this reason, Palestinians call these events al-Nakba: the catastrophe. According to the Palestinian perspective, three quarters of their land was taken by the Zionists, and the rest was annexed by the Kingdom of Transjordan (renamed Jordan in 1951).

No Palestinian state

No Palestinian Arab state had emerged after 1949.
Palestinian historians assert this was because Israel, supported by Western powers, prevented it. They claim that the British destroyed local Arab leadership through hostility and duplicity to the Arabs and complicity with the Zionists, therefore enabling the Zionists to expel the Palestinians from their own country.
Israeli historians argue that an Arab state did emerge in the area allocated by the UN General Assembly. It was, they say, an expanded Jordan: ‘Jordan is Palestine’. This argument harks back to the borders of the British mandate before 1922 when Transjordan was separated from the original Palestine mandate as an area in which Jewish land sales and settlement were prohibited.

A key historiographical issue is whether or not there was a secret deal between Israel and Jordan.
In the years following WW2, Britain recognized the independence of Jordan (with King Abdullah as hereditary monarch). Abdullah saw himself as the protector of the Muslim holy places in Jerusalem, and thus was very interested in what happened in Palestine, particularly Jerusalem. Since he was not highly regarded by Arab leaders, he also maintained close relations with Great Britain.
Abdullah saw the developing conflict as an opportunity to extend his rule into western Palestine and gain control of East Jerusalem. Although he did not approve of a Jewish state, he realized that its emergence could not be prevented by Arab forces. For this reason, Israeli historian Avi Shlaim argues that Abdullah and Ben-Gurion reached a secret informal agreement in which Jordan would not invade Jewish sate territory and, in return, Israel would not attempt to prevent Jordan from capturing and annexing the Arab part of Palestine.
Zionist historiography maintains that a conspiracy existed against Britain and her Arab allies, particularly Jordan, to engage the Jewish state in battle as soon as Britain departed from Palestine. However, Shlaim argues that the British ‘brokered’ a deal between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency to “partition Palestine between themselves and leave the Palestinians out in the cold”.

Palestinian refugees

While not formally expelled from Israel, more than half the Palestinians became refugees (around 726,000 according to UN estimates) and their communities were destroyed. Israel took over entire towns and villages.
While those Palestinians with skills migrated to cities, the vast majority were fellaheen (unskilled workers and dispossessed peasants), and they were forced into UNRWA refugee camps. Conditions in these camps were appalling, with little sanitation, no sewerage and only basic medical facilities. Electricity and communal running water were only supplied in the 1950s. The camps were places of desperation, degradation and insecurity, and remain so until this very day.
Opportunities for the refugees differed depending on where they were. While Palestinians in Jordan were allowed to become citizens, Jordan was the only Arab country to extend them this right. Many joined the army and civil service; others entered business and the professions. Lebanon was the country where Palestinians fared best, enjoying freedom of speech and many becoming successful in business and banking in Beirut. Some Palestinians also moved to the Persian Gulf countries and the United Arab Emirates.

Why were there so many Palestinian refugees?
The Zionist view is that Palestinians fled their homes at the order of Arab leaders, who did not want the Palestinians to be a hindrance to the invading Arab armies and promised that they would return once the Arabs had liberated Palestine. Although few historians today accept this view, some, such as Israeli historian Ephraim Karsh, claim that Palestinians left Haifa against the express wishes of Jewish leaders that they remain.
Arab historians maintain that the Israelis had a pre-planned systematic campaign to ‘cleanse the land’ of Arabs.
Zionist historian Martin Gilbert acknowledges that the Haganah had prepared a plan – Plan Dalet, or Plan D – to gain control of Palestinian areas outside those allocated to the Jewish state and to expel the Arab population from those areas. In order to facilitate this process, some Zionist military groups expressly used terror, eg. in April 1948, the Irgun (led by Begin) attacked Deir Yassin, killing more than 230 Palestinian non-combatants were killed and mutilated.
Zionists have attempted to minimize the importance of this incident, claiming that it was a minor and necessary skirmish. In 1998, the Zionist Organisation of America stated that the official death toll “was a wild and reckless exaggeration”.
Palestinians, however, see the battle of Deir Yassin as a massacre. James Zoghby compares the ZOA to historical revisionists who deny the Holocaust, and claims that it “seeks to rewrite history by eliminating from its record one of Zionism’s more odious events”.
The reality of the matter is that terrorism was an integral part of the 1947-49 War, and was employed by both sides.
Post-Zionist historian Benny Morris has suggested that the expulsion of the Palestinians and their ‘transfer’ to the surrounding Arab states was a haphazard affair and not part of a ‘master plan’.
Most historians accept that the majority of Palestinians fled in fear of their lives or property.

The return of refugees to their homes: a key historiographical point.
Both parties in the conflict failed to find a satisfactory resolution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Israel would not permit the return of the refugees who had fled their homes.
1. Israel argued that, as Arabs, the displaced Palestinians could easily find homes in neighbouring states.
2. Israel pointed out that a large number of Jews had been expelled from Arab countries in the Middle East and northern Africa and migrated to Israel, so the Arab states had an obligation to take the refugees back.
3. Israel emphasized the small size and population of Israel compared to the Arab states.
4. Israel claimed that the returnees, due to their hostility towards the Jewish state, would constitute a subversive fifth column, dedicated to the destruction of the state.
5. Finally, Israel argued that it would only consider the return of refugees in the context of peace treaties with the Arab states. They claimed that Arab countries would not recognise or accept Israel, and thus, they would not consider the return of refugees.
Recently, however, historians have suggested that it was in fact Israel that refused to sign peace treaties with its neighbours (such as Avi Shlaim).

The fate of the 1947-49 Palestinian refugees, the reasons for their flight and the refusal of Israel to allow their return has remained one of the most contentious issues of the Arab-Israel conflict.

The Arabs of Israel

At the time of the 1949 armistice agreements, there were around 150,000-160,000 Arabs living in Israel, most in the north in Galilee. Once again, Palestinian and Israeli opinion differs of the condition of the Arab population of Israel.
Israeli supporters claim that Arabs were treated well. They note that by the Nationality Law of 1951, Arabs were allowed to vote, run for office and, on paper at least, enjoy equal rights with Jews. Arab women in Israel were the first Arab women anywhere to have the vote.
Palestinian advocates describe the measures often employed by Israel as oppressive. Palestinian Arabs in Israel were placed under military rule and forbidden to move out of their areas without permits. Under the Defense Regulations imposed (not lifted until 1966), military governors had extensive power over Palestinians, eg. Arabs could be arrested/detained without reason, and land/villages could be expropriated by declaring an area a ‘security zone’. The Arabs of Israel believe that they were discriminated against in terms of educational and employment opportunities. They cite the example of Nazareth to illustrate the situation of the Palestinians. During the 1950s, Arab land in Nazareth was expropriated to build an exclusively Jewish town on the hill overlooking Nazareth. Although Upper Nazareth was only 1/3 the population of Nazareth, it received more assistance from the state than the Arab town, and Arabs are discouraged from buying or renting property there.
The situation of the Israeli Arabs was made even more difficult by being a minority in a state that was at war with the neighbouring Arab countries. Israeli Arabs were regarded with suspicion and fear. The reason most frequently given for the harsh treatment of Arabs in Israel was PM Ben-Gurion’s hostile, reactionary attitude to Arabs. Israelis were obsessed by the idea of national vulnerability, and their prejudice towards the Arabs stemmed from their largely unjustified fear that Israeli Arabs would act as a fifth column against them.

The effect of the creation of Israel on neighbouring Arab states

Although the armistices of 1949 had ended the fighting, they did not finalise many issues surrounding the existence of the new state.
Arab neighbours, still opposed to its existence, refused to recognise Israel and would not sign a peace treaty.
The Arab population of Palestine was left in a kind of limbo.
The future of the Palestinian refugees looked bleak and uncertain.
The borders of Israel, the future of Jerusalem and the control of water resources still had to be resolved.
These questions failed to be resolved.
Demilitarized zones were set up at certain critical points along the armistice lines to separate the parties. The US and the UN encouraged both sides to share water and to discuss the return of refugees, but their proposals were rejected. The US, Britain and France, concerned about their future influence and strategic interests in the region, sought to limit further conflict through a Tripartite Agreement that limited the sales of arms to each side.

Israel’s attitudes towards its Arab neighbours can be explained by examining its borders.
Israel had over 900km of borders, and 75% of the population lived in the coastal plain from Haifa to Tel Aviv and the corridor to Jerusalem. This had a profound effect on Israeli thinking, as they saw themselves surrounded by Arab states committed to the destruction of Israel as an independent state. Israel was outnumbered by 40:1 and Arab standing armies outnumbered Israel’s 8:1.
In reality, however, the Arab states were in upheaval. In several countries, old rulers were overthrown by young nationalist leaders. Despite their military aspirations, the Arab states could do very little:
They imposed an economic boycott on Israel in January 1950 and closed the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping. In 1951, Egypt blocked the Strait of Tiran at Sharm al Shaikh, preventing Israeli ships going south.
Jordan, Syria and Egypt encouraged Palestinians in Jordan, the Gaza Strip and the demilitarized zones to cross the borders into Israel to reclaim their possessions. Israel responded with strong retaliatory strikes, and violence escalated in 1952. Altogether, around 2700-5000 infiltrators were killed between 1949-56. Israel hoped that the policy of reprisal attacks would force the neighbouring Arab govts to prevent Palestinian raids to protect their innocent citizens, but although the Jordanian govt attempted to keep peace, Palestinians and Israelis would not cooperate. One outcome of Abdullah’s efforts (and later, those of his son Hussein) to keep the peace was the emergence of dangerous divisions within Jordan itself. The Palestinians regarded the Jordanians as Bedouins and resented being ruled by them, while the Jordanians were suspicious of the Palestinians and did not trust their loyalty to the Hashemite royal family.
In July 1932, the corrupt and inefficient Egyptian King Farouk was overthrown in a bloody military coup, and in 1934, Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser became president. Nasser, determined to restore Egypt’s honour and establish himself as leader of the Arab world, encouraged Palestinian refugees in the Gaza strip to attack Israeli civilians and destroy their property. He also armed these guerrilla fighters (fedayeen – those who sacrifice themselves), who killed over 360 Israelis between 1950-56. In August 1955, in response to an Israeli attack in the Gaza Strip, Nasser bought large quantities of Russian arms – including 200 tanks and 190 planes – from Czechoslovakia.

The Suez War of 1956

The breaking point between Egypt and Israel came when Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal in July 1956. The British and French govts, the major stakeholders in the Suez Canal Company, were outraged. In 1955, 1/3 of all ships using the canal were British. In addition, the Middle East supplied nearly 80% of Europe’s oil and 45% of this reached Europe via the Suez Canal. The British, determined to regain control of the canal, supported by the French govt, who feared the growing Arab nationalism movement and its influence in their colony of Algeria, came to an arrangement with Israel to wage war against Nasser.
Thus, the aims of the war were:
1. To reclaim the canal for Britain
2. To rid France of Nasser’s influence in Algeria
3. To open the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping

The three countries met in France from 22-24 October 1956 and signed a secret agreement called the Sevres Protocol.
More than 100,000 Israeli soldiers were mobilized, and on 29 October, Israeli troops (supported by French aircraft) attacked Egypt across the Sinai desert and advanced towards the Suez Canal.
England and France vetoed a US sponsored Security Council Resolution on 30 October calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal, and the two allies launched air operations, bombing Egyptian airfields near Suez.
Israeli armoured corps swept across the desert, routing the Egyptians and capturing virtually the entire Sinai by 5 November.
British troops captured Port Said and advanced to within 40km of Suez City.
However, faced with USSR threats to use ‘every kind of modern destructive weapon’ to stop the violence, and US threats to withdraw support for a $1 bn loan to the British from the IMF, the British govt hastily agreed to a cease-fire.
Although their allies had failed to recapture the canal or overthrow Nasser, the Israelis were satisfied, as they now held the Gaza Strip and had advanced as far as Sharm al-Sheikh along the Red Sea.
The US was furious that Israel, France and Britain had secretly planned the campaign to evict Egypt from the Suez Canal. President Dwight Eisenhower threatened to discontinue American assistance, impose UN sanctions and expel Israel from the UN if Israel did not withdraw from the Sinai.
Israel did withdraw without obtaining concessions from the Egyptians, although the war temporarily ended the activities of the fedayeen. Before withdrawing, however, Israel received an assurance from the US that they would maintain freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba. In addition, Washington sponsored a UN resolution creating the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) to supervise the territories vacated by the Israeli forces.

* The Suez War has become known as ‘the British Lion’s last roar’, as it is seen as marking the end of an era in which the UK was the world’s superpower.

The first Arab-Israeli war 1948 and the new historiography

The 1948 war has long been considered a ‘sacred’ part of Israeli history, a key element of the nation’s ‘heroic past’. However, the writing of Zionist historians about the 1948 war, according to Shlaim at least, “is not history in the proper sense of the word” for three reasons:
- most literature from the war was not written by professional historians but by participants, politicians, soldiers, etc.
- the literature is very short on political analysis and long on chronicles of the military operations (particularly the heroic feats of Israeli fighters)
- this literature maintains that Israel’s conduct during the war was governed by higher moral standards than that of her enemies.

In 1978, the opening of archives in Israel/Britain/America resulted in a ‘revision’ of Jewish writing on the 1948 war. They presented a critical non-Zionist evaluation of past and present realities in the land of Israel and Palestine.
The works of historians, eg. Benny Morris, Avi Shlaim and Ilan Pappe, challenged the common Israeli interpretation of the 1948 war and triggered a public debate in Israel (particularly because this new version of history is now being taught in Israeli schools).
These ‘new historians’ (who were left-wing) challenged a number of long-held myths about the 1948 war.
However, some historians, such as Shabtai Teveth, have accused the post-Zionists of having a political agenda that aims at discrediting the legitimacy of Zionism and the State of Israel and supporting a pro-Palestinian position.

Chapter 6:
Israel, its Neighbours and the Palestinians, 1956-1973

What transformed this relatively regional conflict into a world event?
Part of the answer is that the Middle East became a battleground for Cold War rivalry between the US and the USSR, and between their allies (‘client states’) in the Middle East. The activities of the Palestinians and their militant opposition to Israel following the 1956 war also drew world attention to the Middle East.

The rise of pan-Arab nationalism

Despite Egypt’s defeat in 1956, Nasser’s popularity and influence in the Arab world increased. He was widely acclaimed as the symbol of Arab resistance to ‘colonialism, imperialism and Zionism’.
Nasser’s popularity coincided with the rise of the Arab Renaissance (Ba’ath) Party in the mid-1950s. The Ba’ath Party promoted Arab unity, socialism and freedom from colonialism. In 1957 the party gained power in Syria through a military coup and in 1963 took power in Iraq.
In early 1958, a United Arab Republic comprised of Syria and Egypt was formed and Nasser was elected president. Arabs everywhere felt a new sense of pride, and the Palestinians were thrilled with the union.
However, the union did not last long: the two countries were contiguous, their economies and populations were different, and the Syrian elite resented being made subservient to Egyptian dictates. The final break came in July 1961, when Nasser issued his ‘socialist decrees’, calling for widespread nationalisations and the unification of the Syrian and Egyptian currencies, which would effectively destroy Syrian economic independence. On 28 September, a group of Syrian army officers (the High Arab Revolutionary Command) staged a successful coup and proclaimed the separation of Syria from Egypt.

The creation of the PLO

In the decade following 1948, the Palestinians engaged in much political activity. They also formed themselves into guerilla groups, irregular forces who made attacks on Israeli border settlements; mining roads, blowing up bridges and murdering Israeli civilians. These recruits from refugee camps were called fedayeen.
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established at a conference convened by Nasser from 13-16 January 1964. It was an umbrella organization that took control of the fedayeen groups that had formed after the 1948 war, as Nasser feared they would drag Egypt into another war with Israel.
The headquarters were to be in Jerusalem, with worldwide branches to disseminate propaganda.
The Arab states ensured that the power and control of the PLO, especially with regard to the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) was in their hands.
Ahmad Shuqairy, the lawyer who drew up the Palestine National Charter, served as PLO chairman until his resignation in December 1967 after the Six Day War.
King Hussein of Jordan objected strongly to the creation of the PLO. He felt that it would place him under pressure in his own country, where half the population was Palestinian.

The Palestine National Council, or parliament of the PLO, was created in mid-1964. On 1 June, the PLO ‘National Charter’ drawn up by Shuqairy was adopted. The Charter set out the key aims of the PLO:
1. To liberate Palestine from its Zionist colonial oppressors, using the method of ‘armed struggle’.
2. To create an independent state.

The PLO was very ineffective at first, as it was dominated by Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seemed disinterested in conditions in the refugee camps.
Most guerilla operations against Israel were conducted by Fatah (Movement for the Liberation of Palestine), founded by Yasser Arafat and a young group of Palestinian students in Cairo in the late 1950s. Fatah members believed that the force was the only way to liberate Palestine. At first, Fatah launched fedayeen raids out of Egypt and the Gaza Strip, but after the 1956 Suez War, members relocated to Syria.
Although Fatah was the largest and most influential guerilla organization, others emerged during the 1960s, the most important of which was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

In late 1966, the PLO agreed to coordinate its activities with Fatah, and soon began to assume some authority over the Palestinians, eg. collecting taxes and setting up training camps.
King Hussein of Jordan, fearing that the PLO could threaten his rule over the Palestinians, arrested many members and closed down operations. He also feared Israeli counterattacks in retaliation for Fatah raids from Jordan into Israel, despite his efforts to curb the raids.
On 13 November 1966, Israel did launch a major retaliatory attack. The attack on the Jordanian village of Samu killed 18 Jordanians and destroyed hundreds of houses, a school and a medical clinic.
The UN and the US condemned the attack, both for its severity and because it destabilised King Hussein’s rule.

The 1967 Six Day War

Although Nasser wished to destroy Israel, he pursued a cautious and restrained policy as tension between Syria/Jordan and Israel increased to an alarming level.
Yemen, ruled by a hereditary monarch, had joined the UAR as a federated member but in 1962 a military coup overthrew Yemen’s royalist govt. Nasser intervened to support the new republican govt against the royalists who, with the assistance of Saudi Arabia, were attempting to regain control. Nasser’s intervention increased inter-Arab tensions, but proved to be a great strain on Egypt’s financial and military resources. At the height of its involvement, Egypt had 75,000 troops in Yemen, nearly half its army. Egypt’s economy was simply unable to cope.
So, in 1967, Nasser resorted to a high risk gamble, in part to regain prestige in the Arab world and in part to gain economic assistance from the US. He gambled that he could negotiate a withdrawal of his forces in return for the American financial and food aid he needed. However, the gamble failed, and on 5 June, war broke out.
In the events leading up to the war, the US and USSR played an increasingly significant role. Beginning in the early 1960s, Israel and the Arab states had entered into an arms race, purchasing their missiles, planes and tanks from the US and USSR respectively. The US wanted to prevent the USSR increasing its influence in the region, while the USSR was determined to play a more active role in an area it regarded as strategically important in protecting its southern borders. However, neither superpower was prepared to intervene directly or risk engaging the other militarily.
Public opinion in the US, encouraged by Zionist groups, became increasingly sympathetic to Israel, which received greater amounts of American economic and military aid.
Aware of their vulnerability against an Israeli attack, Syria and Egypt signed a defence pact in November 1966. In April 1967, Israeli jets shot down six Syrian jets over Syrian airspace, and Syria asked Nasser for assistance. Nasser was reluctant to act, as he feared an Israeli attack, but sent some troops and armour into the Sinai Peninsula as a warning to Israel not to attack Syria. He did not, however, send enough to seriously threaten Israel.
Events soon gathered momentum. On 18 May, Nasser asked UN Secretary General U Thant to withdraw UN troops in the Sinai and at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, and, much to Nasser’s surprise and consternation, U Thant did so. On 22 May, Nasser then moved his troops to Sharm al-Sheikhm, effectively blocking the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping.
On 30 May, King Hussein flew to Egypt and signed a defence pact, allowing Iraqi troops to enter Jordanian territory and placing Jordanian troops under Egyptian military authority.
With Arab armies poised on all sides, Israel struck on 5 June 1967. Within six days the war was over, and the outcome extraordinary: Israel destroyed the forces of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and volunteers from other Arab states. 766 Israelis were killed, compared with 10,000 Egyptians, 5,000 Syrians and 2,000 Jordanians. Israel now occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), the Gaza Strip, the Sinai and the Golan Heights. It was now three times larger than it had been in 1949.

Who was responsible for the Six Day War? A historiographical issue

1. The Zionist perspective: pre-emptive strike. Zionist historians claim that in June 1967 Israel was faced with the threat of attack and destruction by massed Arab armies on its borders. Zionists argue that Israeli leaders would have been placed the state’s existence in jeopardy had they not attacked first.
- This traditional view was widely accepted in the West and is still held by many today.
- Shlaim, for example, claims: “The Six-Day War was a defensive war. It was launched by Israel to safeguard its security, not to expand its territory”. Shlaim argues that political and territorial objectives were not defined by the govt when it gave the IDF the order to strike, and that war aims emerged only in the course of the fighting in a “confused and disorderly fashion”.
- It is certainly true that Nasser’s actions, with his inflammatory rhetoric and support for the increased Palestinian attacks, placed Israel under intolerable pressure.
- Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban gave a speech to the UN in which he stated: “An army greater than any force ever assembled in history in Sinai, had massed against Israel’s southern frontier… Terrorist groups came regularly into our territory to kill, plunder and set off explosives.” Eban suggests that the Arab states were an enormous threat to Israel’s existence, and that Israel was forced to launch an attack in response.

2. The Palestinian/Arab perspective: pre-meditated attack. Palestinian historians argue that Israel wanted a war, that Israeli military leaders knew the state’s existence was not in danger from Egyptian or Syrian troops. According to them, Israeli leaders were determined to expand Israel’s borders to include the promised land of Eretz Israel (including Samaria, Judea and East Jerusalem). To support this argument, Palestinian historians point to Israel’s policy of massive retaliation in response to minor Palestinian raids. They add that the economic effect of Egypt’s blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba was more symbolic than real. Other Israelis, they claim, saw a victorious war as a way of attracting Jewish immigrants to Israel and reinvigorating a sluggish economy by increasing Jewish funds from overseas.
- As Michael Brecher explains, Israeli foreign policy was dictated by a ‘Holocaust syndrome’; the common view in Israel (manipulated by its leaders) that “Israel’s very survival was at stake in every situation”.
- Israeli military leader General Yitzhak Rabin, a few months after the 1967, was quoted as saying: “I do not believe that Nasser wanted war. The two divisions he sent into the Sinai on May 14 would not have been enough to unleash an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.” This suggests that the Arabs were not presenting a significant threat to Israel, eroding the Zionist view of a ‘helpless’ Israel surrounded by a sea of Arab enemies.
- This argument is supported by the fact that the American administration and the Israeli govt were aware that, at the end of May at least, Nasser did not intend to attack Israel.

3. Revisionist historians such as Edward Said, Noam Chomsky and Cheryl Rubenberg argue that the Israeli govt was involved in secret negotiations with the USA; Israel had learnt from the 1956 Suez War that without US approval they would be forced to return hard-won territory.
- Rubenberg argues that US involvement was so extensive, in fact, that “Washington risked a conflagration with the Soviet Union, including the potential of escalation to nuclear confrontation, by its support for the Jewish state”. Stephen Green supports this view: “…the aerial reconnaissance aircraft that the United States provided to Israel during the Six Day War… help[ed] the Israelis to achieve certain territorial objectives within a very finite, limited time... the United States tactical reconnaissance assistance was not only important it was critical.”

4. There is still a great deal of evidence we do not have surrounding the Six Day War, and many of the arguments above rely on public statements and self-serving memoirs.

Impacts of the Six Day War (for more detail, see assessment).

(A) Annexation of Jerusalem

At first, the Israeli govt could not decide what policy to persuade in relation to the occupied territories. The govt did not want Israel to rule over a large Arab population in the territories. On the other hand, the govt was not prepared to hand back the seized territory without a peace treaty. However, despite secret negotiations between King Hussein and Israel, no peace treaty was forthcoming.
There were no such hesitations about Jerusalem. At the end of June 1967, Israel annexed the Old City and East Jerusalem, declaring that the city would never again be divided.

(B) The growth of Palestinian nationalism and change in the leadership of the PLO

Continued occupation of the territories and the establishment of Jewish settlements on the West Bank/Gaza Strip did not bring Israel any closer to the peace it desired. The 1.3 million Palestinians who came under Israeli control now became Israel’s problem.
If Palestinian nationalism had been held in check before 1967, when the Palestinians lived under Arab govts, it now grew into an authentic manifestation of the desire of Palestinian Arabs for self-determination.
Many Palestinian groups representing Palestinian interests came into being, differing on strategy and tactics and the order in which their various enemies (reactionary Arab states and Israel) should be overcome.
Nonetheless, Palestinian national aspirations, now fostered by a reorganized PLO, gained world recognition. Yasser Araft took over PLO leadership in 1969.

(C) US guarantees Israel’s survival

The USSR and several Eastern-bloc countries severed diplomatic relations with Israel in the aftermath of the war.
Nasser melodramatically ‘resigned’ but mass demonstrations all over the Arab world ‘forced’ him to stay on.
Many Arab states severed diplomatic ties with the US, and American relations with the Arabs in general deteriorated as a result of the war. Arabs largely blamed the US for their humiliating defeat, believing the Israelis incapable of defeating the Arabs on their own terms. Nonetheless, the US still retained important ties with Saudi Arabia and Jordan.
The US and Israel forged a symbiotic strategic relationship. The US became the guarantor of Israel’s survival. A strong Israel was increasingly seen in the US as a strategic ally. Thus, the identification of interests became closer on both sides.

(D) Reaction of Arab nations to the 1967 defeat

The Arab nations felt the only way they could respond to the humiliating 1967 loss was with defiance.
In August-September, therefore, an Arab summit in Khartoum, Sudan, proclaimed that there would be ‘no peace, no recognition and no negotiations’ with Israel (the ‘three noes of Khartoum’).
In reality, however, as revisionist historian Avi Shlaim notes, both Egypt and Jordan were willing to made peace, but could not do so in such a public forum. This was underpinned on 22 November by their acceptance of Resolution 242.

(E) UN Security Council Resolution 242

The diplomatic solution to the 1967 hostilities was Resolution 242.
Resolution 242 was accepted by Israel, Egypt and Jordan (not Syria) and was a notable milestone in the implicit acknowledgment by these Arab states of Israel’s existence and its expectation of a negotiated settlement.
The document has become the key instrument in all attempts to arrive at a peaceful solution to the conflict.
However, there a number of problems with the document, as it was highly ambiguous and interpreted differently by the two parties:
- The document proposed the idea of ‘peace for territory’ without specifying which comes first: Israel believed that direct negotiations should come before withdrawal, while the Arabs demanded withdrawal before negotiations.
- Israel was called upon to return occupied territories (not ‘the’ or ‘all’ territories): Israel held the view that they were not required to withdrawal from all occupied territories, while Arabs insisted that they did.
For this reason, as Shlaim writes, “Victory in the Six-Day War marked the beginning of a new era in Israel’s history – an era of uncertainty”.

* THE MOST SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM with Resolution 242 was that it lacked reference to the Palestinians, except for the provision that there should be a just solution to the ‘refugee problem’.

The Palestinians and the PLO after the Six Day War

The Six Day War triggered a rise in Palestinian nationalism and reawakened the Palestinian issue. Until 1967, Palestinians lived under Arab governments, reliant on Arab leadership to achieve their goal of a Palestinian state. Following the war, however, over 40% of Palestinians lived under Israeli control.
So emerged a sense of national identity: Palestinians turned away from dependence on Arab and foreign governments, convinced that the liberation of Palestine lay in their own hands.
These sentiments were strengthened by the fact that Resolution 242 neglected the Palestinians almost entirely. As Palestinian historian Rashid I Khalidi writes, Resolution 242 “dealt with the Palestinians as refugees, rather than as a people with national rights”. This made it even clearer to Palestinians that they would need to rely on their own efforts and not on the Arabs if they wished to achieve their goal of a Palestinian state.
As Palestinian historian Naseer Aruri comments, “the Arab-Israeli conflict was to be de-Arabized and Palestinianized”.

Arafat takes control of the PLO

The existing leadership of the PLO and their methods of conventional warfare was discredited as a result of the Six Day War. New leadership dedicated to active armed struggle was needed.
For this reason, in 1969, the head of al-Fatah (Yasser Araft) became head of the PLO. Organisations based on ‘armed struggle’ such as Fatah were able to influence and change the PLO Covenant in 1968. (Terrorism was born).
As its chairman, Arafat transformed the PLO from a ‘puppet’ of the Arab states into a powerful independent organization representing the Palestinian people.

Black September

Under Arafat’s leadership, the Palestinian groups took on more militant activities against Israel. This alarmed Jordan’s King Hussein, because Jordan became the target of Israeli reprisals.
The Palestinians, who at this time made up 60% of the Jordanian population, were no happier with Hussein than they were with the Israelis, and in June/September 1970 they made two attempts to assassinate him.
The Palestinians had almost become a state within a state in Jordan.
Between 6 and 9 September 1970, the PFLP hijacked four international airliners, landed them in Jordan and demanded the release of Palestinian prisoners. On 16 September, after the release of the passengers, Hussein used his loyal Bedouin troops to attack the hijackers. This soon escalated into a civil war of
Forces loyal to Hussein vs Palestinian groups

Without outside intervention, Hussein was able to crush the Palestinians.
Palestinian camps were shelled, killing over 3,000 and wounding 11,000.
This massacre, perpetrated by brother Arabs, is known as Black September.
PLO fighters moved into Syria and then Lebanon, where they set up bases into which they attacked northern Israel.
In retaliation for the Jordanian attack, radicals calling themselves ‘Black September’ assassinated the Jordanian PM Wafsi Tal in Cairo in November 1971.

The Munich Massacre: 1972 Olympic Games

During the Munich Olympic Games, eight Black September commandos took eleven Israeli athletes hostage.
A dramatic shootout with the terrorists followed in which all hostages and five Palestinians were killed.
The Palestinians quickly captured world attention, although most of the publicity in the West, at least, was negative.
The PLFP, Black September and other splinter groups conducted further terrorist actions but this did little to further the Palestinian cause. Arafat and the mainstream PLO had not supported the terrorist acts (at least not publicly), preferring to limit their targets to Israel itself. However, the more radical PLFP argued that the Palestinian problem was a world, as well as Israeli, responsibility.
There is considerable controversy over who was responsible for these acts:
- Israel has consistently maintained that the PLO is little more than a terrorist organization led by arch-terrorist Yasser Arafat.
- mainstream Palestinian groups did not favour extra-Israeli terrorist activities, preferring to limit themselves to targets in ‘occupied Palestine’. However, neither did they condemn or renounce these terrorist activities either. Most Palestinians, indeed most Arabs, looked on them as legitimate acts of war.
However, the evidence is difficult to assess. Many actions have taken place without the PLO or Fatah high command being involved. In any event, while Palestinians continued to use terror, Israel responded with military force.

Creating the political infrastructure for a state

During this period, Palestinians were creating the political infrastructure for a state.
The Palestine National Council, the supreme decision-making body for Palestinians, expanded its membership from 105 in 1969, to 293 in 1977 and to 450 in 1989.
The majority of these members did not belong to guerrilla or terrorist organizations, but represented mass organizations, trade unions and dispersed communities.
The PLO built up an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure which, by the 1980s, employed some 8,000 Palestinians in non-combatant roles such as health care and education.

The War of Attrition (1969-73)

The 1967 war had solved few of the problems between Israel and the Arabs. Clashes continued along the borders between Israel, Jordan and Egypt, particularly in the GS.
Israel’s occupation of the Sinai led Nasser to close the Suez Canal, although this deprived him of much needed revenue. Determined the regain the Sinai and open the canal, in March 1969 Nasser declared a ‘War of Attrition’ to force Israel to withdraw. This involved prolonged artillery attacks directed at Israeli forces, and Israelis responded in kind. An American-inspired cease-fire was agreed to in August 1970. Nasser died of a heart attack in September 1970, a broken man.
His successor, Anwar Sadat, was relatively unknown, but equally determined to regain the Sinai. Around this time, Soviet president Leonard Brezhnev and US president Nixon had begun a process of détente to lessen Cold War rivalry. This meant that the Soviets supplied fewer arms to the Arab states than previously, although in contrast, American military support for Israel increased. Although he signed a defence pact with the Soviets in May 1971, Sadat believed Egyptian reliance on them was becoming a liability, and in March 1972 he expelled around 15,000 Soviet advisors from Egypt. Nonetheless, he continued to purchase Soviet weapons.

Creeping Annexation or Creating Facts on the Ground

Israelis believed this meant Egypt was less likely to go to war with Israel. Israel, after 1967, felt confident and secure, especially now it was receiving American military assistance, and Israel’s leaders (PM Golda Meir and Defence Minister General Moshe Dayan) boasted of a new Jewish state stretching from the Jordan to the Suez Canal.
Dayan encouraged the establishment of Jewish settlements in military strategic places in occupied territories – a kind of ‘creeping annexation’. Dayan called the process ‘creating facts on the ground’. Meir even went so far as to deny that there had ever been a Palestinian people, and refused to negotiate with Sadat.
In early 1971, Sadat proposed opening the Suez Canal if Israel withdrew to the Mitla and Gidi passes, but Meir rejected the offer.

The 1973 ‘Yom Kippur’ or ‘Ramadan’ War

Sadat was desperate: Egypt’s economy was in ruins; he could not affort arms from the Soviets; his diplomatic efforts had failed. With the support of the new Syrian leader, Hafez al-Assad, Sadat began secretly planning to attack Israel.
Neither Sadat nor Assat believed they could comprehensively defeat Israel, but hoped to gain some territory in the Sinai and Golan Heights and then negotiate the return of more territory in return for peace.
Sadat launched the war in part to restore Egyptian honour.

The course of the war was short:
Egyptian infantry crossed the canal on 6 October 1973 and, supported by Soviet missiles, advanced across the Sinai before stopped by an Israeli counterattack.
Israel, believing it was invulnerable, was caught by surprise by the Arab attack.
Syria almost succeeded in regaining the Golan Heights before being stopped in a major tank battle.
The US and USSR played a pivotal role in rearming their respective ‘clients’. On 11 October the Soviets began a massive airlift to rearm Egypt and Syria. On 14 October the US did the same for Israel.
Israel advanced within 40 km of Damascus and on 15 October, an Israeli army unit led by Ariel Sharon re-crossed the Suez Canal and destroyed Soviet surface-to-air-missiles.
A Soviet-American brokered ceasefire was finally agreed to by both parties on 24 October, with Israel the obvious victor.
The PLO played little role in the planning/execution of the war.

Results of the 1973 war for Israel

Israel lost 2,800 dead and 8,500 were wounded.
The war had been a close call for Israel and Israelis were shocked back into reality.
Dayan and Meir lost their reputations.
Mossad (Israeli intelligence service) was discredited.
The Labour govt was weakened, and in 1977 a Likud coalition govt was elected.
Israel realized that their ‘defensible borders’ were not as defensible as previously believed.
Israel became more dependent on the US.
The US now saw Israel as sufficiently strong to be a strategic asset rather than a liability in the region, and as a result of American military assistance, over the next three years, Israel’s military power doubled.

Results of the 1973 war for the Arab states

Around 11,000 Egyptians and Syrians were killed, and 19,500 were wounded.
The Arab states lost the war militarily but won it diplomatically. World attention was now focused more seriously on the conflict.
The Arabs had a new weapon: oil. During the 1973 war, the Organisation of Arab Oil Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) adopted a plan proposed by the Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister Sheikh Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani. In this plan, the Yamani Plan, Arab oil producers would not send oil to pro-Israeli countries, but only to ‘friends’ of the Arabs and maybe ‘neutrals’. Oil prices were increased by 400%. This had an enormous economic impact on Europe and the US. 2/3 of Europe’s oil came from the Middle East, and the West’s demand for oil was increasing. At the same time, American oil production was falling. The embargo cost the US over 500,000 jobs and between $10-$20 billion. It was a highly effective diplomatic strategy, at least in the short term.
- Almost immediately, the European Economic Community (EEC) urged Israel to end its occupation of the territories seized in 1967 and stated that the ‘legitimate rights’ of the Palestinians should be taken into account in any settlement.
The use of the ‘oil weapon’ by the Arab states brought the US in as a ‘broker’ of peace in the Middle East.

Recognition of the PLO

In some ways, the Palestinians and the PLO were the victors of the 1973 war. Meeting in Rabat in 1974, the Arab League recognized the PLO as the ‘sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people’. This was a blow to Hussein, who until that time regarded himself as the main spokesman for the Palestinians. This had a number of effects:
It was an acknowledgement that the Palestinians had a right to what Hussein had physically lost in 1967.
It forced the Israelis to grapple with the idea that they would now have to negotiate with the PLO and not Hussein, who they much preferred. This meant that they could no longer claim, as they had when Hussein spoke for the Palestinians, that ‘Jordan is Palestine’.

Israeli-Egypt Negotiations

On 22 October, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 338 calling on the parties to negotiate directly on the basis of Resolution 242. The meeting of the two parties was facilitated by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as America feared the possibility that repercussions of the conflict would damage the world economy.
The outcome was a peace conference co-chaired by the US and USSR in Geneva on 21 December 1973. Israel, Egypt and Jordan attended. Israel insisted that no member of the PLO be present and Syria boycotted the conference. This was the first time Israeli and Arab negotiators had met ‘face to face’.
In May 1974, Kissinger achieved a disengagement accord between Israel and Syria regarding the Golan Heights. Israel agreed to withdraw from occupied territory in the heights in return for the establishment of a UN buffer zone and defensive Arab missile placements west of Suez. The Syrian president also agreed to prevent any Palestinian terrorist groups launching attacks from Syria. In return, the US resumed diplomatic relations with Syria.
Kissinger assured Israeli leaders that the US would not pressure them into a treaty with Jordan, or demand that they make major territorial concessions in future negotiations with Syria. Finally, the US assured Israel that it would not talk to the PLO unless it specifically recognised Israel’s right to exist and accepted UN Resolution 242. Later that year, the US added that the PLO must renounce terrorism.
Over the next two years, Kissinger continued to facilitate negotiations between Israel and Egypt. Some gains were achieved:
The Suez Canal was re-opened in June 1975 and Israeli ships were allowed to carry non-military cargoes through the canal.
Israeli troops partially withdrew
UN buffer zones were set up.

The stage was set for progress in Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Chapter 7: The Peace Process 1973-79

In 1973, the Arabs’ approach to Israel had followed the three principles, or ‘three noes’, set out in the September 1967 Khartoum Declaration.
The concerns of the Israelis were those that had existed since 1948:
a) the security of the state
b) the refusal of the Arab states to acknowledge Israel’s right to exist

Between 1973 and 1979 there were some significant developments. The 1973 war meant that the balance of power in the Middle East had shifted towards and the Arabs, and Israel recognised the need to attain peace with its neighbours. While the Arabs continued their technical state of war against Israel, a number of factors prevented them from making collective decisions against the Jewish state, including: national and traditional rivalries political instabilities and corruption societies not ready for the demands of modern warfare.

Resolution of the Arab-Israel conflict also became important for the superpowers. The Persian Gulf was to dramatically increase in importance, significantly impacting on the geopolitical balance in the Middle East. To this very day, the oil of this region is critically important to the world economy: Europe imports 85% of its oil needs from the Persian Gulf states and Japan 90%. During the 1960s and 70s, the USSR attempted to extend and augment its influence in the Gulf region.

Control of the Occupied Territories

In December 1973, Israel held national elections. The ruling Labour Party, led by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, won the election but with a significantly reduced plurality in the Knesset (down from 46% to 39%). The main challenge came from the newly formed Likud, led by Menachem Begin (1913-1992).
The Likud was a coalition of the Herut Party, the Liberal Party and other parties of the political right engineered by the hero of the 1973 campaign in Egypt, former general Ariel Sharon. The Likud won 30% of the vote and 39 seats in the Knesset.

After Meir resigned in April 1974, the Labour Party elected Yitzhak Rabin, chief of Staff during the Six Day War and former ambassador to the US, as prime minister. With the promise of large amounts of American aid to both parties, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was able to get Israel and Egypt to agree to a settlement regarding the Sinai.

The situation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip was becoming increasingly problematic for Israel. Following the capturing of territory in the Six Day War, the Israelis could either:
a) annex the occupied territories and expel the Arab population, or
b) return the areas to their former status, an option unacceptable to many groups in Israel.

At the time, the idea of a Palestinian entity alongside Israel was not seriously considered by either side. Meanwhile, the continuing occupation was oppressive for the Palestinians and raised further moral and practical dilemmas for Israel.

Historiographical Issues surrounding the West Bank and Gaza, 1967-1977

Palestinians and Israelis disagree over the conditions of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation following the 1967 war.

Israeli perspective:
Israelis argue that the material prosperity of the Palestinian Arabs occupying the West Bank increased dramatically under Israeli rule.
Under Jordanian control, between 1948 and 1967, the Palestinians had been kept politically and socially divided in an effort to limit the growth of Palestinian (rather than Jordanian) nationalism.
Israelis argue that, after 1967, the West Bank economy and labour force were incorporated into the Israeli economy. Traditional large land owners were forbidden to grow crops that competed with those grown in Israel and suffered as a result, but their workers, who then became unskilled workers in the Israeli economy (primarily in the construction industry), gained in terms of real wages and living conditions.

Palestinian perspective:
Palestinians argue that Israel continued a policy aimed at preventing the growth of a collective Palestinian identity.
They assert that Israel set out on the path of deliberately establishing Jewish military settlements in the Gaza Strip, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights.
Although they accept that, initially, Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza benefited economically with high levels of unemployment, they claim that these benefits did not last long.

Establishment of Jewish military settlements

Israel soon began to establish Jewish military settlements outside Arab population centres in the Gaza Strip, the Jordan Valley and the Golan Heights. This policy of ‘creeping annexation’ was pursued by the ruling Labour Party and the National Religious Party, its coalition partner, and a new religious organisation that emerged in 1974, Gush Emunim (The Bloc of the Faithful).
These groups evoked religious and historical sentiments and called for the absorption of the West Bank as it had been part of Eretz Yisrael, the biblical Promised Land.
Within a few years, these groups had established additional settlements among existing Arab towns, accepted by the government. By 1977, approximately 85 settlements had been established in the OT’s.

This process was accelerated by the emergence of the Likud Party.
National elections were held in Israel in May 1977. Israel voted out the Labour Party, which had ruled the country ever since its creation. The right-wing Likud coalition won, ironically representing a victory for Revisionist Zionism.

After Israel was established, the Revisionist Zionist Organisation had helped form the Herut Party. Herut (Freedom Movement) was founded by Begin in 1948 and became a major component of the Likud. Begin had been a leader of the Irgun, and he and his supporters were intransigent on core issues in respect to the Palestinians, such as the return of territory. They had no intention of relinquishing land acquired in 1967, especially Judea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. Ultra-nationalists and the ultra-religious agreed with Begin’s policy of retaining the territories.

Rise of the Settler Movement

Many Begin supporters opposed trading land for peace, because they did not trust the Palestinians. These attitudes gave new ideological impetus to the settlement movement.
Begin approved 21 more settlements between 1980-81, bringing the number of Jewish settlers in the OT’s to about 110,000.
Jews controlled more than one-third of the land and 90% of the water in the region.
Settlements were also established in the Gaza Strip, where about 3000 settlers were located in heavily guarded enclaves among the 500,000 Palestinians.
Jewish settlers held, on average, one hectare of land each while the Palestinians had 0.1 hectare.

PLO policy towards peace initiatives

The PLO’s National Covenant asserted that ‘armed struggle’ was the only way to liberate Palestine, and later Palestinian National Council resolutions called for the establishment of a secular democratic state to replace Israel. King Hussein was as troubled as Israel by this: leftist Palestinian groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), led by Nayef Hawatmeh, called for the overthrow of Hussein as part of the liberation of Palestine. In fact, until 1975 these groups argued that before Palestine could be freed all reactionary Arab govts would have to be reformed or overthrown.

In April and May 1974, groups within the PLO mounted a series of spectacular terrorist missions. In April, three PFPL terrorists killed 18 Israelis, eight of them children, in a northern Israeli town. In may, DFLP terrorists held 90 children hostage in Galilee, in the village of Ma’alot, and 20 were killed.

PLO considers the establishment of a Palestinian Arab State
By mid-1974, some in the PLO had modified their position on the liberation of Palestine, and at the twelfth Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in June-July 1974, the PLO used the term ‘national authority’ to indicate its willingness to consider the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza. Many Israelis, however, asserted that this would be a launching pad for the destruction of Israel.
Elements within the Palestinian cause, eg. the PFLP and DFLP, opposed claiming a national authority within the West Bank and Gaza. Arafat himself and most West Bank Palestinians preferred the limited goal of regaining the West Bank and Gaza, but Arafat felt his leadership of the PLO was not secure enough for him to speak out against the factions calling for the liberation of all Palestine.
This situation was compounded by the fact that the PLO would not accept UN Resolution 242. The US demanded that the PLO accept Resolution 242 and recognise Israel as a precondition to negotiations, but the PLO rejected 242 because it referred only to Arab refugees and did not recognise Palestinian rights of self-determination.

Arafat’s speech to the United Nations
On 13 November 1974, Arafat spoke before the General Assembly of the UN.
After setting out the PLO position calling for a democratic, secular state in Palestine, which did not include a recognition or acceptance of Israel, Arafat concluded his speech with this appeal:
“I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun.
Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.”
The Israeli government believed a Palestinian state would merely act as a platform for renewing warfare against an Israel reduced to its earlier, more vulnerable size. Israel repeated the position it had held throughout the 1970s that ‘Jordan was Palestine’, since a majority of the Jordanian population were Palestinians and Hussein maintained that he had the right to speak for Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan river.
In 1974, most of the PLO were vehemently against negotiating with Israel. Some Palestinians, however, did see Arafat’s olive branch, and they began to believe that if a Palestinian state were to be established, diplomacy could achieve more than force.

The rise of Islamic Fundamentalism

One of the most important developments in the 1970s-80s was the emergence of Islamic extremists. Although revivalist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood had existed in the Middle East since the 1920s, the rise of Islamic religious fanaticism is usually associated with the Iranian revolution in 1979, when religious preacher Ayatollah Khomeini emerged into the spotlight.
Arafat’s unwillingness or inability to control the extremists in his organisation not only weakened the credibility of the moderates within the PLO but also added weight to the argument that the PLO was a terrorist organisation that should not be negotiated with.

The Camp David Accords – a ‘Cold Peace’

Negotiations between Egypt and Israel had stalled by late 1977.
Egyptian President Sadat had concluded that he needed US support if he was to regain the Sinai. Jimmy Carter (elected president in November 1976) had indicated that he favoured a ‘homeland’ for the Palestinians. Sadat also realised that to succeed he would have to make peace with Israel. In November 1977, he announced that he was willing to visit Jerusalem to discuss peace.
Sadat stated in his speech to the Knesset on 19 November that he wanted a permanent peace with Israel, but also demanded that Israel withdraw from all the territories occupied in 1967 and recognise the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. Begin refused but did agree to continue discussions.
After several months, Carter met the two leaders at Camp David, Maryland. On 17 September 1978, two accords were signed.
The importance of the Camp David Accords to later negotiations cannot be overestimated.
The accords consisted of two agreements:
1. ‘A Framework for Peace in the Middle East’ contained provisions that have formed the basis of all subsequent peace discussions. It called for negotiations among Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians to settle the question of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A self-governing Arab authority would be set up to replace the Israeli military forces for five years while negotiations were taking place on the final status of the OT’s (this did not occur until 1993).
2. ‘A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel’ was a draft proposal of a peace agreement to be negotiated and signed within three months. This provided for a phased Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai over three years and full restoration of the area to Egypt. Israeli ships were to be allowed free passage through the Suez Canal.
The Camp Davids Accords were, however, problematic, as they simply ignored the more difficult questions of Jerusalem and the future of the Golan Heights.

Why did Egypt sign the Accords?
Sadat agreed to a separate peace with Israel, without regard for other Arab states or the Palestinians. This was because he wanted to free up resources that had been devoted to waging war in order to reconstruct and widen the Suez Canal and to free Egypt from Soviet influence. The treaty also meant a recovery of treaty and honour.
Sadat, in signing the accords, demonstrated that a single Arab state could act independently of the rest of the Arab world: pan-Arabism was no longer – if indeed it had ever been – a straightjacket determining Egyptian policy.

Why did Israel sign the Accords?
Begin made peace with Egypt because the Sinai had always been negotiable. The ideological and national reasons for retaining the WB and GS did not apply to the Sinai. Begin was also conscious of the growing sentiment in Israel that the OT’s, rather than creating secure, defensible borders, were doing the reverse. The accords also meant that the most powerful Arab country would no longer pose a threat to its security.

Importance of US economic assistance
Both sides were fully aware of the importance of future relations with the US. Concern for this relationship led Begin reluctantly to agree to the concessions that produced the peace settlement. Both sides received massive American economic and military aid as part of separate agreements accompanying the Accords (Israel was to receive $3 billion and Egypt was to receive $2 billion).

Reactions of the PLO and Arab states to the Accords
While the West hailed Sadat as a hero for signing the accords, the Arab world regarded him as a traitor.
The PLO rejected the accords because they did not specifically call for a fully independent Palestinian state.
The more radical states such as Syria and Iraq, which immediately emerged as leaders of the rejectionist front, denounced not only the agreements but also Sadat for what they saw as his treason to the Arab cause. Syria could not agree to any negotiations that did not indicate Israel was willing to withdraw from the Golan Heights. Saddam Hussein of Iraq, who claimed to be the champion of Arab nationalism, could not endorse accords that omitted any reference to the recovery of all Palestine.
Even Jordan and Saudi Arabia, considered Arab moderates and friends of the US, rejected the agreements. King Hussein of Jordan, with his Palestinian subjects, could not accept an accord that was unacceptable to the majority of his people and his three powerful neighbours. In Saudi Arabia, Islam pervades social customs, dominates the political structure and legitimises the regime, meaning the king could not endorse an agreement that did not mention Jerusalem (the third holiest city of Islam).
The leaders of the Arab states did not agree to the Camp David Accords because to have done so would have endangered their own political survival. They felt threatened by internal instability and external threats.
The Arab states thus continued in a state of war with Israel.

Arab reaction to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty
The formal signing of the treaty took place at the White House on 26 March 1979.
The reaction of the Arab states was harsh and swift:
19 members of the Arab League immediately met in Baghdad, Iraq and on 31 March issued a communiqué outlining political and economic sanctions against Egypt.
By early May, all the Arab states except Oman and Sudan had severed diplomatic relations with Egypt.
Egypt was suspended from the 22 member Arab League, expelled from the Islamic Conference and ousted from a number of Arab financial and economic institutions such as the Federation of Arab Banks and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC).

The Camp David Accords increased Arab suspicion of Israel and the US, and the other Arab states refused to be drawn into the peace process. This hostility, in turn, hardened Israeli attitudes towards the Arabs.

On 6 October 1981, Sadat was assassinated by members of Islamic Jihad, an extremist group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. He was succeeded by Hosni Mubarak, a former commander of the Egyptian air force and a vice president since 1975, who has upheld the peace treaty to this day.

Historiographical Issues surrounding the Camp David Accords
The accords were hailed as a ‘watershed’ by the West but denounced by most Arab states and the Palestinians.

Disagreements broke out almost immediately among Carter, Begin and Sadat as to exactly what had been agreed on at Camp David.
1. Begin claimed that the accords permitted him to go ahead with new settlements on the WB and GS after a three-month suspension.
2. Carter said Begin had agreed that no new settlements would be established during the five-year transition period.
3. Sadat claimed that the treaty was linked to the issue of the OT’s, and stated that a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel could be signed only after a timetable for Palestinian self-rule had been finalised.
Throughout the period, both Sadat and Begin were under intense domestic political pressure not to make concessions.

The fact that the Camp David Accords had NOT provided a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict soon became evident. In July 1980, the Israeli Knesset passed a ‘fundamental’ law proclaiming Jerusalem the permanent and indivisible capital of Israel. At the end of 1981, Israel annexed the Golan Heights, conquered from Syria in 1967.

Many Arabs hold that the strategic consequences of Camp David have had a devastating impact on the Arab world. By neutralising Egypt, many Arabs claim, the rest of the Arab countries were left at the mercy of Israel, who would have thought twice about invading Lebanon in 1982. Walid Kazziha, a professor in Cairo, claims that “without Egypt, there can be no balance of power. Camp David not only affected the military balance, which is overwhelmingly in favour of Israel, but led to a defeatist, pessimistic mood where the Arabs feel disarmed vis-à-vis Israel.”

THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS WAS A COLD PEACE WHICH HAS SINCE DETERIORATED INTO A COLD WAR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT. IT WAS A BREAKTHROUGH THAT LED TO A DEADLOCK.

The future of the Palestinians and the Occupies Territories

Major issues unresolved by the accords were the future of: the West Bank the Gaza Strip the Golan Heights
East Jerusalem

In 1978, some 800,000 Arabs inhabited the West Bank and 500,000 more were in the Gaza Strip. They did not regard themselves as part of Israel in any way.
Israeli doves argued that although Israel would be smaller in size if the WB and GS were returned to Arab sovereignty, a major reason for the Arab world’s military, economic and psychological hostility to Israel would be destroyed, thereby creating a much more secure Israel. Israel would then by free of the oppressive burden of its military priorities and diplomatic problems and would be able to trade and invest in Arab markets to great economic advantage.
However, the Palestinians were largely overlooked and ignored as the 1980s began. By the end of that decade, with the PLO leadership no longer in Beirut but in Tunis, the Palestinians in the territories took their fate into their own hands.

Lebanon and Israeli Politics – Chapter 8

Sectarian rivalry had plagued the Christians, Sunni and Shiite Muslims and Druze in Lebanon for many decades.
Until the 1960s, the Lebanese govt was controlled by the Christian majority.
Since the 1960s, the Muslim population has increased but the Christians refused to share power equally, leading to two civil wars.

Lebanon and the Arab-Israeli conflict

Lebanon was almost an inadvertent participant in the Arab-Israeli conflict, not having been involved in Arab wars with Israel since sending troops in 1947.
Following the war of 1947-1949, however, over 100,000 Palestinian refugees fled to Lebanon. The arrival of these poor Sunni Muslims, who located in the south of the country, upset the balance of power and population between Christians and Muslims. By the 1970s, as a result of the 1967 war and Black September in 1970, the number of Palestinians had increased to more than 300,000. Many were housed in UNRWA refugee camps.
Fatah used the camps in the south to launch guerrilla attacks against Israel. By 1971, the day-to-day running of the camps was in the hands of the PLO, headquartered in West Beirut. Naturally, Israel retaliated. In 1968, Israeli commandos destroyed 13 civilian aircraft at Beirut airport. If Lebanon would not control the Palestinians, then the Israelis would.

The PLO in Lebanon
Soon the PLO became involved in Lebanon’s domestic political rivalries, which were rapidly turning violent as rival Christian and Muslim militias took to the streets. The Christian Maronite militia, Phalange, determined to destroy Fatah groups that were causing them trouble with Israel.
President Assad of Syria decided to help the Maronites and sent troops into Lebanon against the Palestinians in June 1976. However, he did not want a strong Christian government in Lebanon. Fearing Syria’s support for the Muslims, the Maronites turned to Israel for assistance in controlling the PLO.
Things came to a head on 11 March 1978 when a PLO raid into Israel killed 34 Israelis.
In response, Likud invaded southern Lebanon (Operation Litani) to destroy PLO military infrastructure and set up a 15 km wide ‘security zone’. In the process they killed over 1,000 people and made 200,000 homeless.
Faced with a UN Security Council Resolution that demanded Israel withdraw and created a UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Israel set up a predominantly Christian army in the south. The Southern Lebanon army, under Major Saad Haddad, was to prevent PLO attacks on Israel.
The Israeli Invasion of Lebanon

Haddad had little success and PLO rocket attacks on northern Israeli towns continued.
As a result, on 6 June 1982, 40,000 Israeli troops invaded Lebanon once again (Operation Peace for Galilee).
The initial aim was to drive the PLO north so Israel was out of range of the rockets.
However, Israeli Defence Minister Ariel Sharon extended the operation to include the destruction of the Soviet-armed Syrian missile bases in the Bekaa Valley and to attack Beirut to install a friendly Christian government. Sharon aimed to drive the PLO and Syria out of Lebanon.

Within four days, Israel’s troops reached Beirut and began bombarding the city.
Israel’s aerial and artillery bombardment continued for 79 days, despite American and UN efforts to end the attack.

On 18 August, Israel finally agreed to a US brokered cease-fire. Arafat and between 9,000-14,000 PLO fighters were allowed safe passage out of Lebanon and evacuated West Beirut. Most headed for Tunisia.

The Reagan and Fez peace plans
As soon as the PLO had evacuated Beirut, a number of peace plans were put forward:
1. On 1 September 1982, US President Ronald Reagan proposed the Reagan Plan.
2. Later in the month, the Arab League suggested modifications to a proposal first made by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Fahd. This became known as the Fez Plan.
However:
The Israelis rejected the Fez Plan because it did not include Arab peace with Israel while demanding total Israeli withdrawal from ‘all Arab territories’.
The Palestinians rejected the Reagan Plan because it did not support a Palestinian state, instead proposing a joint Jordanian-Palestinian state under King Hussein’s rule.

Sabra and Shatila massacres: September 1982
For about a month, an American, French and Italian multinational force remained in Beirut to preserve order. However, on 14 September, 3 days after their departure, the recently elected Phalangist president and ally of Israel Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by a bomb blast attributed to Palestinians or Syria. Israel immediately re-entered West Beirut.
Between 15-18 September, Israeli troops allowed Phalangists bent on revenge to enter two Palestinian refugee camps, Sabra and Shatla. Sharon argued there were still Palestinian terrorists in the camp. A horrific massacre eventuated in which between 1000 and 2000 refugees were killed.
Israel was internationally condemned for its complicity in the massacres.
Most Israelis were shocked and horrified at news of the massacre, and on 24 September almost 400,000 Israelis demonstrated in Tel Aviv. Begin was forced to hold an inquiry and the report of the Kahan Commission (February 1983) was highly critical of Sharon and Begin.
Sharon was forced to resign as defence minister, and Begin resigned soon later, in August 1983, a shattered man. Yitzhak Shamir, an even more extreme revisionist, succeeded him as leader of the Likud and as a prime minister.
Gemayel’s brother Amin took over as president of Lebanon, and Reagan agreed to the return of a larger peacekeeping force. Between 1983-85 Israel withdrew from Lebanon, although remaining within its 15km security zone. Immediately after Israel withdrew, fighting broke out between Lebanon’s Christian and Druze militias, and radical Shiite Muslim terrorists attacked the multinational force. After 300 American and French troops were killed on 23 October 1983, the Western forces pulled out in February 1984.
Factional rivalry, unrest and militancy continued, much of it caused by the Israeli invasion. A new group, Hizbollah (Party of God), emerged to replace the PLO in southern Lebanon.

Hizbollah or Party of God
Hizbollah is an umbrella organisation of several Shiite para-military extremist groups. Inspired, funded and supplied by Iran, Hizbollah supports Iran’s Islamic ideology. It preaches the eradication of Western influence from Lebanon and the Middle East, holy war against Israel and the creation of an Islamic state in Lebanon.
The Shiites became increasingly aware of their numerical strength (they are now the largest Muslim group in Lebanon). They also became more radicalised, particularly those in the south, due to their enmity towards the PLO and because of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the south after the 1982 invasion.

Palestinians in Lebanon
In 1998 there were more than 370,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, of whom 55% were living in camps. Until the departure of the PLO from Beirut in 1982, the Palestinian population had a well-organised communal structure providing security. The PLO’s departure left the Palestinians helpless and unprotected. Unable to become naturalised citizens and without access to public health or education, they have no civil rights and around 40% are unemployed.

Historiographical issues surrounding the Israeli invasion of Lebanon

1. Israel’s motives for invasion. Begin stated that for Israel the war was:
- a war of choice
- not imposed by Arab enemies
- not a response to Arab provocation
- a deliberate decision to invade for controversial political goals.
Zionists argue that Israel’s invasion was aimed at freeing its civilian population of northern Galilee from the threat of Lebanese-based PLO artillery attacks and guerrilla raids. They claim that Israel’s policy in Lebanon has been a factor for stability.
The Palestinian and post-Zionist perspective asserts that Israel’s aim in Lebanon was to undermine Lebanon’s stability and prevent attempts at reconciliation, and that it was for this reason that Israel supported the Phalangists and armed and supplied Major Haddad, a mutineer from the Lebanese army. British journalist David Gilmour wrote in June 1982: “As a violator of Lebanon’s sovereignty and an exploiter of the country’s divisions, Israel stands in a league of its own.” Post-Zionist historian Noam Chomsky writes that the invasion of Lebanon was a further stage in Israel’s efforts to “remove the displaced Palestinian refugees from the border refugees from the border areas and to destroy their emerging political and military structures”.

2. Responsibility for the Sabra and Shatila massacres:
- The Zionist perspective blames the massacres on Arafat and the PLO. They assert that the PLO deliberately sought to maximise civilian casualties by planting its troops and weapons in and around schools, hospitals and apartment houses. American-Zionist journalist Norman Podhoretz wrote in September 1982: “I put Israel last on [the] list because Israel complicity in this atrocity surely cannot be ranked with that of the Christian militias and the PLO”.
- Internationally, Israel was largely held accountable for the massacres. The US government revealed intelligence information confirming that Israeli military officers in Beirut were well aware of the brutal killings many hours before the IDF actually went into the camps, but did nothing to prevent the carnage.
- The Palestinian and post-Zionist perspective also holds Israel responsible for the massacres. Noam Chomsky points to the comment of Israeli military analyst Ze’ev Schiff: “In South Lebanon we struck the civilian population consciously, because they served it”.

Implications of Israel’s invasion of Lebanon

FOR ISRAEL:
None of Israel’s strategic goals were achieved. Israel could not translate its military superiority into lasting political gains.
Sharon’s ‘big plan’ collapsed.
Soviet missile bases had been destroyed but relations between Syria and the USSR continued to be close.
Syrian influence over the Lebanese govt increased, as did the number of Syrian troops (around 35,000-40,000) in the country. By 1990, the Lebanese govt was a puppet of Syria.
The Maronites had proved less than reliable allies or supporters of Israel.
Israel did gain some benefits from piped diversions of the Litani River, but in 1999 retreated from its security zone in humiliating circumstances.
Israel suffered high casualties: 368 killed, 2400 wounded and a further 250 killed during the occupation from 1982-85.

FOR THE ARABS:
To the Arabs, the invasion was further evidence of Israel’s expansionist ambitions.
The more radical Hizbollah took the place of the PLO in southern Lebanon. Supported by Syria, Hizbollah continued rocket attacks on northern Israel towns. Israel retaliated and tension continued.

FOR THE PALESTINIANS:
Although the dispersal of PLO leaders weakened Arafat’s control, by the late 1980s he had reasserted his control over the PLO.
The Palestinians suffered considerable military/civilian casualties during the invasion. This (along with high levels of Lebanese civilian casualties) brought world condemnation of Israel and an upsurge of sympathy and support for the Palestinian cause.
The Palestinians demonstrated a greater capacity for fighting than the Israelis had anticipated, raising morale and pride among Palestinians everywhere, leading not to greater cooperation with Israel in the WB and Gaza (as Sharon had expected) but fuelling nationalism and contributing to an increased determination to resist Israeli rule.

Formation of a National Unity Government in Israel

Elections in July 1984 in Israel indicated a loss of confidence in the Likud. The Likud and Labour Party formed a National Unity govt in which both parties shared power and took turns governing. Labour’s Shimon Peres was PM until October 1986 with Likud’s Yitzhak Shamir as foreign minister, and then the roles were reversed.
Peres remained committed to his earlier policy of reaching an agreement with Jordan’s King Hussein concerning the WB, thereby excluding the PLO. The Peres solution involved giving up some territory to Jordan in return for peace and recognition of Israel. Likud’s Ariel Sharon (now minister of commerce and industry) wanted Israeli annexation of the occupied land. The ongoing rivalry blocked any consensus among Israeli politicians on the future of the WB.

Proposal for a Palestinian State on the West Bank

In February 1985, Hussein and Arafat appeared to have come to some kind of understanding and proposed the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank within the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.
They called for a UN sponsored international conference to solve the details. Israel and the US both rejected the idea.

Chapter 9 – The Intifada,
The Impact of the Gulf War and Madrid

Effects of Jewish Settlement on the Occupied Territories

Violence between Israel and the Palestinians escalated during the 1980s.
In response to demands of the ultra-nationalist and religious parties, Israel increased the number and size of settlements in the WB and GS. By 1988, more than half the WB and a third of the WB were under Jewish control.
By the late 1980s a whole generation of Palestinians had grown up under Israeli occupation. They had limited civil rights, lived in poverty and their political future was uncertain. Many lived in refugee camps (10% in the WB and 25% in the GS). Between 100,000-200,000 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians daily crossed into Israel to work in low paid, unskilled jobs.
PLO attacks against Israeli settlers and military rule in the WB increased, but the settlements continued.

The Palestinians realised that the Arab states could not/would not help them, the PLO was ineffectual and they would have to rely on their own efforts if they were to ‘shake off’ Israeli rule.

The Intifada or ‘Shaking Off’ (1987-1991)

The situation deteriorated until finally, in December 1987, large-scale spontaneous demonstrations and rioting broke out in the GS following an incident in which an Israeli truck accidentally four Palestinians and injured seven others.
Within a short time, rock-throwing masked young Palestinians were confronting Israeli troops throughout the territories in a series of riots that became known as the intifada and lasted for five years. The uprising quickly attracted world attention.

Israeli response:
Within the first year of the intifada, more than 150 Palestinians were killed and around 11,500 were wounded (two thirds of whom were